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THE CHRISTIAN
EXPERIENCE OF
THE HOLY SPIRIT
LAWRENCE ROBINSON

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THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE
OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

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THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

BY
H. WHEELER ROBINSON
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THE Editors of this series are convinced that the Christian Church as a whole is confronted with a great though largely silent crisis, and also with an unparalleled opportunity. They have a common mind concerning the way in which this crisis and opportunity should be met. The time has gone by when "apologetics" could be of any great value. Something more is needed than a defence of propositions already accepted on authority, for the present spiritual crisis is essentially a questioning of authority if not a revolt against it. It may be predicted that the number of people who are content simply to rest their religion on the authority of the Bible or the Church is steadily diminishing, and with the growing effectiveness of popular education will continue to diminish. We shall not therefore meet the need, if we have rightly diagnosed it, by dissertations, however learned, on the interpretation of the Bible or the history of Christian doctrine. Nothing less is required than a candid, courageous and well-informed effort to think out anew, in the light of modern knowledge, the foundation affirmations of our common Christianity. This is the aim of every writer in this series.

A further agreement is, we hope, characteristic of the books which will be published in the series. The authors

have a common mind not only with regard to the problem but also with regard to the starting-point of reconstruction. They desire to lay stress upon the value and validity of religious experience and to develop their theology on the basis of the religious consciousness. In so doing they claim to be in harmony with modern thought. The massive achievements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been built up on the method of observation and experiment, on experience, not on abstract *a priori* reasoning. Our contention is that the moral and spiritual experience of mankind has the right to be considered, and demands to be understood.

Many distinguished thinkers might be quoted in support of the assertion that philosophers are now prepared in a greater measure than formerly to consider religious experience as among the most significant of their data. One of the greatest has said, "There is nothing more real than what comes in religion. To compare facts such as these with what is given to us in outward existence would be to trifle with the subject. The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness, seeks he does not know what."¹ Nor does this estimate of religious experience come only from idealist thinkers. A philosopher who writes from the standpoint of mathematics and natural science has expressed the same thought in even more forcible language. "The fact of religious vision, and its history of persistent expansion, is our one ground for optimism. Apart from it, human life is a flash of occasional enjoyments lighting up a

¹ F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 449.

mass of pain and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience.”¹

The conviction that religious experience is to be taken as the starting-point of theological reconstruction does not, of course, imply that we are absolved from the labour of thought. On the contrary, it should serve as the stimulus to thought. No experience can be taken at its face value ; it must be criticised and interpreted. Just as natural science could not exist without experience and the thought concerning experience, so theology cannot exist without the religious consciousness and reflection upon it. Nor do we mean by “experience” anything less than the whole experience of the human race, so far as it has shared in the Christian consciousness. As Mazzini finely said, “Tradition and conscience are the two wings given to the human soul to reach the truth.”

It has been the aim of the writers and the Editors of the series to produce studies of the main aspects of Christianity which will be intelligible and interesting to the general reader and at the same time may be worthy of the attention of the specialist. After all, in religion we are dealing with a subject-matter which is open to all and the plan of the works does not require that they shall delve very deeply into questions of minute scholarship. We have had the ambition to produce volumes which might find a useful place on the shelves of the clergyman and minister, and no less on those of the intelligent layman. Perhaps we may have done something to bridge the gulf which too often separates the pulpit from the pew.

¹ A. N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, p. 275.

Naturally, the plan of our series has led us to give the utmost freedom to the authors of the books to work out their own lines of thought, and our part has been strictly confined to the invitation to contribute, and to suggestions concerning the mode of presentation. We hope that the series will contribute something useful to the great debate on religion which is proceeding in secret in the mind of our age, and we humbly pray that their endeavours and ours may be blessed by the Spirit of Truth for the building up of Christ's Universal Church.

PREFACE

FIFTEEN years ago, in the preface to the second edition of my book on "The Christian Doctrine of Man", I expressed the hope of writing a similar book on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Since then, the subject has been constantly in my mind. In 1916 I conducted a fruitful "Seminar" in it, for a group of old pupils and friends. In the winter of 1916-17 I gave courses of lectures to the Free Church ministers of Leeds and Birmingham, Sheffield and Liverpool, on "Christian Experience and the Holy Spirit". These lectures formed the first draft of the present volume, though it has been entirely rewritten within the last three years. Much of it has been debated in conferences with Anglican or Free Church ministers. Chapter I was discussed in 1923 by the London Society for the Study of Religion, Chapter XI in 1927 by the Oxford Society of Historical Theology. These facts are named to shew that, whatever the shortcomings of the book, its substance has been frequently tested amongst those who are intimately concerned with the subject, and I need not say that I have learnt much from my many fellow-students.

The aim of the book (outlined in the Introduction, pp. 2, 3) is theological *construction*, which accounts for the prominence given to the philosophical issues. In accordance with the general plan of this series, historical matter is kept to the minimum necessary for illustrative or explanatory purposes. I hope to publish a later book on the Biblical and historical developments of the doctrine.

I am grateful to Mr. David Stewart, my loyal friend and unofficial teacher through many years, for his unwearied interest in the book throughout its slow growth, and his keen criticisms of its philosophical implications, and its literary expression. Professor C. H. Dodd, of Mansfield College, has read Part II and made a number of useful suggestions, nearly all of which I have adopted. Professor A. J. D. Farrer, of Regent's Park College, has given me his always ready help in the correction of the proofs.

I have to thank the Editors of the *Expository Times* and the *Baptist Times* for allowing me to use, in the second part of the Introduction, material already published by them.

H. WHEELER ROBINSON.

55, ST. GILES', OXFORD,
Easter, 1928.

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THE CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

INTRODUCTION

(1) THE CHARACTER OF THE SUBJECT

WHY is it that there are so many books about the Holy Spirit, and so few that help us towards a real understanding of the doctrine? Four reasons may be given. In the first place, no theological subject is more comprehensive than this. It comprehends or involves all the others, for it is in experience that all the great doctrines are focussed to their burning-point, and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is the doctrine of this experience. To write adequately on *this* doctrine would require a strong grasp on every other doctrine and an expert knowledge of all the great theological problems, such as usually belongs only to the specialist in one of them. But, further, the subject requires a familiarity with science and art, life and literature, history and philosophy which no single mind can possibly attain; the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is indissolubly related to the whole conception of Spirit in all these manifestations. In the second place, no primary Christian doctrine has been left so undeveloped dogmatically, i.e. by the formal elaboration of ecclesiastical decisions. A history of the doctrine is apt to become a survey of the views of individual thinkers, and even these must often be elicited indirectly. We lack the

guidance of great oecumenical statements (except in the barest outline), and the perspective of generations of detailed discussion. We seem to be without the historic landmarks by which the student of Christology or of the doctrine of Justification can orientate himself. In the third place, no doctrine depends more intimately on a living and life-long experience of the Christian verities, an inner knowledge of God such as seems to belong to a few elect souls, often without the training and ability to make their knowledge articulate. No theological doctrine is more definitely *religious* in its texture; the content of a particular human experience is always prominent in it, when it is alive, and no doctrine is more repellent when dead, through the loss of this personal warmth and energy. In the fourth place, none of the great doctrines suffers more by our remoteness from the life of the New Testament. We no longer live in such a "spirit-world" as formed the matrix of the idea of the Holy Spirit, and it is by no means easy to translate the essence of the doctrine into forms more congenial to our thinking, without losing or seeming to lose that essence itself. That is why so many writers confine themselves to an account of the Biblical doctrine, and make little contact with our modern problems, or leave them unsolved.

These are the considerations which have determined the plan of the present book, in accordance with the series to which it belongs. It begins with a survey of Christian experience in general, in order to shew the context of our experience of the Holy Spirit, and further discusses the reality of that experience (meeting the criticism that it is illusory) and the nature of Spirit, so far as our own spirits throw light on this. The first part concludes by a cursory review of the chief manifestations

of Spirit in the widest sense of the term—in nature, history and personality. The second part begins with the Incarnation in relation to the Spirit of God, and shews how the Holy Spirit (working through the personality of Jesus Christ) creates the Church and its sacraments, uses the Scriptures, and sanctifies the individual life. The third part is necessarily more difficult (though technicalities have been avoided as far as possible), since it deals with the metaphysical implicates of the personality of the Holy Spirit and His relation to the Godhead. It may seem to some readers that this should have been left to the companion volume in this series on “The Doctrine of God”. Much trouble would have been saved by doing this, but at the cost of evading or seeming to evade theological difficulties in favour of a purely psychological treatment, whereas it is precisely in the realm of theological reconstruction that we need more courage at the present time. Moreover, the approach to a doctrine of the Godhead from the standpoint of a doctrine of the Holy Spirit may prove to be the first step towards a more adequate and convincing doctrine of the Holy Trinity (a summary of the general lines of this may be found on p. 285). In this, as in some other parts of the book, a certain amount of repetition has been unavoidable.

If, in view of the difficulties of the subject and its elusiveness, we are likely to feel at the end of our study that we are still standing only on the threshold, as the writer certainly does, we may well find our comfort in the conviction that it is better to stand at the threshold of the house of our God than to penetrate anywhere else. That the subject is of vital importance to both theology and religion no one can doubt. “When the Holy Ghost departs from any set of opinions, or form of character,

they wither like a sapless tree.”¹ The worst kind of failure here is a book which says much about the power of the Spirit, yet shews little consciousness of the inner content of the doctrine, the living experience of the presence of God. *Absit omen!*

The writer of this book may perhaps be allowed to record a personal experience, which explains why it has come to be written. In 1913, in the course of a serious illness, he was led to ask himself why the truths of “evangelical” Christianity which he had often preached to others now failed to bring him personal strength. They remained true to him, but they seemed to lack vitality. They seemed to demand an active effort of faith, for which the physical energy was lacking. The figure that presented itself at the time was that of a great balloon, with ample lifting power,—if only one had the strength to grasp the rope that trailed down from it! He contrasted with this presentation of Christian truth that of a more “sacramental” religion, as he rightly or wrongly conceived it, in which the priest would bring the sacred elements to the bedside, and with them the needed grace. The result of this experience was not to change a “Protestant” into a “Catholic”, but to lead him to seek for the lacuna in his own conception of evangelical truth. He found it in his relative neglect of those conceptions of the Holy Spirit in which the New Testament is so rich. If the readers of this book sometimes feel that its argument becomes too theoretical, he would ask them to believe that it has been conceived and written with a practical aim—to help others with the thoughts concerning God’s real presence by which he has himself been helped in the Christian life.

¹ Edward Irving, in *Mrs. Oliphant’s Life*, p. 178.

(2) THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THE BIBLE

Amongst the toys of childhood is—or was—the kaleidoscope, that transparent box of fragments of coloured glass yielding the symmetry of an ever-changing pattern when viewed through the triangular tube of mirrors which multiplied and co-ordinated their “broken lights”. No doctrine of the Bible is more kaleidoscopic than that of the Holy Spirit, whether we choose to think of the fragmentary elements which exhibit the “iridescent wisdom”¹ of God, or of the elusive transformations which the doctrine undergoes within the thousand years of its revolving history, or of its fascination as we see it reflected backwards and forwards between God and man and human society.

The Bible is the Book of the Spirit. On its first page there is painted the impressive picture of chaos, when darkness was upon the face of the deep; but the Spirit of God was brooding, like a mother-bird, upon the face of the waters. From the last page there rings out the evangelical challenge of the Church to the world, “The Spirit and the bride say, Come.” Between them there is the story of a divine evolution, which is from God’s side, revelation, and from man’s side, discovery. Out of that vast storehouse of spiritual wealth, what shall we take as most typical or significant for the message of the Spirit which the Bible gives?

To a prophet of the exile there came a grim vision—a valley that was a charnel-house, full of the bones of the dead, from which the very flesh had long since rotted away. Then, at the prophetic word, a strange scene enacted itself before his horrified eyes—those ancient bones jarred and rattled from disorder into order, bone

¹ πολυποικίλος σοφία, Eph. III, 10

to his bone, and they became articulated, though unstrung, skeletons. The sinews were stretched upon them, the flesh was packed around these, and the skin drawn over each inanimate figure, but it remained a figure of death. Once more, at the word, a blast of wind swept through the valley and filled the bodies of the dead men, and they lived and sprang to their feet, an exceeding great army, on that ancient battlefield which had once been the scene of their overthrow. The difference between death and life, the secret of vitality, was that "wind" of God which in its Old Testament name cannot be distinguished from the "Spirit" of God. To those men whose fathers had been desert-dwellers, the wind that swept the sand resistlessly before it was the very breath of God, and the power that so strangely moved men beyond their own power was the "wind" of God. Whatever else the Spirit of God may mean in the Old Testament, it means the difference between death and life, it means *vitality*.

Amid the crowd that flocked down to the river from Jerusalem to hear the new prophet of the desert, and to be thrilled for an hour with a new experience, there came One who had no need to be baptized of him, One who came already with the consciousness of sonship to the Father. But, as He came up out of the water, He saw the heavens rent asunder, and the Spirit as a dove descending upon Him; and confirmation was given to that consciousness of sonship, and to the inner realization of its nature, by the voice that linked two sayings of the Old Testament and made them one. "Thou art my beloved Son" was the utterance of a psalm that told of the Messianic king; "in thee I am well pleased" was the divine approval of the suffering Servant of Jehovah. None had brought them together before, for the Jews had

no doctrine of a suffering Messiah. But the Spirit welded them in the consciousness of Jesus, and He became that smooth shaft from the quiver of God,¹ barbed with the Messianic consciousness, winged with the gentleness of the Servant. The Spirit of God became the Holy Spirit of the Lord Jesus Christ, henceforth inseparable from Him. By that new entrance into our life, *personality* is declared to be the supreme organ of the Spirit.

To the men whom Jesus had trained in the ways of the Spirit there came at Pentecost a new discovery, the discovery of a *fellowship* with one another and with Him that made Him still present with power in their midst. They spoke of that Presence in their fellowship as an unquestioned reality: "It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us."² Their discovery (which was God's revelation) created an epoch. The new fellowship had the distinctive marks of its new creation, for it was marked by reverence, mutual helpfulness, joy, and a graciousness that won men by its life more than by its speech. Thus to the love of God that had issued in the grace of Christ there was added the fellowship created by the Holy Spirit.

We pass from Jerusalem to the court of a Corinthian house, where "a few poor slaves and outcast Hebrews have heard the divinest whisper borne to them from Palestine; have discovered by it that inner region of love and hope and trust, in which all fraternity of heart begins."³ They are gathered that the Spirit of Jesus may speak in and through them: some of them think more of the display of religious excitement and enthusiasm than of the weightier things of the law of the Spirit. But to-night they are listening to the reading

¹ Isaiah XLIX. 2.

² Acts xv. 28.

³ Martineau, *Endeavours after the Christian Life*, p. 137.

of a papyrus roll that has newly come from the Apostle, and it rebukes them for their narrow horizon and littleness of spirit, that thinks more of self than of the common good. It bids them think of those gifts of the Spirit which issue in *service*, and above all, it points out a more excellent way of the Spirit than the gift of tongues, the way of loving service, without which they are but sounding brass, or clanging cymbal. To Paul it was given to know and preach the nobler realities of spiritual experience, and to call men from the debauch of religious emotion to the inspiration of duty.

Are not these the key-words of the Biblical doctrine of the Spirit? Vitality, Personality, Fellowship, Service. Where the Spirit of God is, there is God, and where God is present, God is active, and these are the tokens of His activity. The primitive and fundamental idea of "spirit" (*ruach*) in the Old Testament is that of active power or energy (*ἐνέργεια* not *δύναμις*), power, superhuman, mysterious, elusive, of which the *ruach* or wind of the desert was not so much the symbol as the most familiar example.¹ When we read books of travel in Arabia, such as Doughty's *Arabia Deserta* or Lawrence's *Revolt in the Desert*, we are often made to feel the overwhelming power of the wind across the desert, scorching heat by day and piercing cold by night. This elemental force, incalculable and irresistible and invisible, was surely akin to that which could shape a man's behaviour as strangely as the desert sand was shaped before the blast. There was a demonic power which sometimes took possession of men, for good or for evil, enabling them to do for a season what was normally impossible. Such energy "rushed upon" Samson, when he tore a lion limb from

¹ Cf. Shelley's "Ode to the West Wind."

limb (Judges xiv. 6, cf. xiii. 25), slew thirty men (xiv. 19), burst the ropes that bound him (xv. 14), or upon Saul, when he cut in pieces a yoke of oxen in prophetic symbolism (1 Sam. xi. 6); it would explain the heroic valour with which Othniel (Judges iii. 10) or Jephthah (xi. 29) led Israel to war, and Gideon sounded the war-horn (vi. 34). The abnormality might lie in qualities rather than in deeds, and therefore be less dramatic and more permanent, as in those displayed by David, after his anointing by Samuel (1 Sam. xvi. 13), or by the Messianic prince (Isa. xi. 2ff.), or by the anonymous prophet charged with a divine message (Lxi. 1ff.), or by the wise Joseph (Gen. xli. 38), the efficient Joshua (Num. xxvii. 18), the artistic Bezalel (Exod. xxxi. 3), the faithful Caleb (Num. xiv. 24). But originally the *ruach* is a non-moral energy, which may issue in evil as well as in good, like the evil *ruach* that divided Abimelech and the Shechemites (Judges ix. 23), or makes a husband doubt his wife's fidelity (Num. v. 14, 30), or a people unfaithful to its God (Hos. iv. 12, v. 4). In one instance only is this *ruach* clearly personalized, viz. in the vision of Micaiah (1 Kings xxii. 21), and here it is a lying *ruach* employed by Yahweh to “inspire” the optimistic prophets. This passage shews us how objective the prophetic inspiration was conceived to be—as objective in its origin as in its phenomena—as when Saul stripped off his clothes and “prophesied” before Samuel (1 Sam. xix. 18–24). The energy is so materialistically conceived that it can be transferred from one to another (Num. xi. 17, 25; 2 Kings ii. 9ff.). Amongst the greater prophets, the physical phenomena were incidental rather than essential to their message, though probably none would have reckoned himself, or have been recognized by others as, a prophet without some such abnormal experience.

Indeed, Ezekiel is the only one of these to connect *ruach* directly and explicitly with his prophetic inspiration, though others (e.g. Hosea) seem to imply it.

So far we have been concerned simply with the psychical and physical results of a superhuman energy, similar to the phenomena encountered elsewhere by the student of primitive animism. The only difference (but it is a great one) is that in the Old Testament these phenomena are brought under the control of Yahweh, instead of irresponsible demons and "spirits". This centralization meant, of course, ultimately a complete moralization of the idea of Spirit, in proportion as the idea of Yahweh Himself was moralized, through the teaching of the great prophets. But it meant more than this. We must always beware of making the Hebrew mind more "metaphysical" than it ever was; but so far as Israel did advance to a philosophy of the divine nature, it was in terms of *ruach*. The Egyptian empire with its powerful cavalry was reckoned irresistible in Isaiah's day, but he bids his compatriots remember that the Egyptians are man and not God, and their horses flesh and not *ruach* (Isa. xxxi. 3). This is the true Hebrew dualism—not the contrast between the human body and the soul (or spirit) but that between terrestrial nature as being of one order and the celestial as being of another (cf. 1 Cor. xv. 40). The contrast, as Duhm acutely remarks, "forms the driving force of the subsequent religious development up to the fifteenth of First Corinthians." A similar contrast underlies the obscure legend of the mingling of the "sons of God" with the daughters of men (Gen. vi. 1ff.). The Hebrews thought of God as being in human form, yet of a different substance from man; His body was of fiery brilliance (Ezek. i. 26, 27), so dazzling that even the most favoured of mortals could not bear a frontal view of Him (Exod. xxxiii. 17ff.). It is

never said that this substance was *ruach*, yet it belongs to the realm of *ruach*, and it is significant that when that Hebrew of Hebrews, the Apostle Paul, was faced by a similar problem in the Christological realm, he says explicitly, “The Lord is the Spirit” (2 Cor. III. 17), whilst the Fourth Gospel takes the further step and says, “God is Spirit” (IV. 24). We must not read back the full content of these words into the Old Testament conception of Yahweh, with all its naive realism. But at least we may see some preparation for them in the way in which His activity is described as His presence (lit. “face”), and this paralleled with His *ruach*. We must note the full significance of Hebrew parallelism when we read :

Cast me not away from Thy face,
And take not Thy holy *ruach* from me (Ps. LI. 11).

Where God is present, He is always active, and no word gathers up His activity more completely than this word *ruach*. Yahweh’s presence among His people means that His *ruach* is in their midst (Hag. II. 4, 5, LXX); indeed, the divine *ruach* is virtually hypostasized in Isa. LXIII. 10, 11, where rebellion grieves the *ruach* of His holiness in the midst of Israel (LXX omits the reference to Moses). Yet here again we must remember that the hypostasization, such as it is, is Hebrew and not Greek. So with the assertion of the divine omnipresence in Psalm CXXXIX. 7,

Whither shall I go from Thy *ruach* ?
Or whither shall I flee from Thy face ?

As Volz rightly says, “the omnipresence of Yahweh does not depend on the *ruach* of Yahweh, but on Yahweh Himself ; Yahweh is in heaven and in Sheol (v. 8), at the

uttermost end of the world His hand holds man (v. 9f.). It goes without saying that His *ruach* and His Face (*panim*) are also omnipresent.”¹

Parallel with this highly important development of the idea of *ruach* within the theological realm, there was another, intimately connected with it, yet much less obvious, within the anthropological. The original idea of *ruach* as an invasive energy, used to explain the abnormal in man's conduct, was so far naturalized as to allow the use of the term for the more marked energies of life, even when there was no suggestion of an invasion from the supernatural realm. Thus when the weary and thirsty Samson finds water and drinks, “his *ruach* returned and he lived”, i.e. his life-energy was renewed (Judges xv. 19), and when the queen of Sheba saw Solomon's wisdom and splendour “there was no more *ruach* in her”, i.e. she was utterly overwhelmed (1 Kings x. 5). (In such passages, we must forget all we have been told about a Hebrew trichotomy or even dichotomy, and take the word simply as meaning energy, for this is all that it does mean, as applied to man, before the exile. But when the creation of the world and of man had been ascribed to Yahweh, the breath (*neshamah*) and the breath-soul (*nephesh*) which were the principle of human life came to be conceived as due to the inbreathing of Yahweh. He had moulded the physical organism—the “flesh”—but it was inanimate until He blew into its nostrils living breath. The wind itself, however, was Yahweh's breath, and so, in course of time (but not before the exile) the breath of man came to be called by the same term as the wind, viz. *ruach*. This was naturally extended to cover the psychical phenomena ascribed to the breath-soul, though never to the point of displacing the original term for

¹ *Der Geist Gottes*, p. 147, n. 1.

this (*nephesh*), or the terms for certain physical organs (such as the heart) to which psychical functions were ascribed. *The term ruach was thus naturalized in man's life as it had been supernaturalized in God's.* The importance of this anthropological development (hardly yet realized by theologians, because only a critical study of the terms will reveal it) will be obvious to anyone who knows the Pauline pneumatology. *Ruach* as an element, or rather, as an aspect, of human nature would always tend to suggest its origin in God's creative activity ; its very use linked man to God, bridging the gulf of the Isaianic contrast of flesh and spirit by the assertion of an implicit kinship. Here, in man's *ruach*, was a potential contact for the inflow of new accessions of the divine *ruach* ; to use the term was to keep the door open for God. It gave to the Biblical idea of man a certain *δύναμις* which is one of its most characteristic features—the potentiality for the yet greater things, and the suggestion that their possibility lay in the *ἐνέργεια* of God. If it seems an exaggeration to base this conception on the mere identity of terms, the answer must be to point to the enormous influence of terminology on theological and philosophical thought—think of the dominance of Christian thought by the term *Logos*, largely because it expressed at once the inner thought and the outer word. But we are here dealing with much more than a mere identity of terms. The careful study of the Old Testament in its true chronological order will reveal that as “ wind ” became “ Spirit ” in relation to God, so “ Spirit ” became “ spirit ” in man. If we reverse this order, as we do when we take *ruach* to be a constituent of the idea of man from the beginning, ignoring all the evidence of literary criticism, then we shall not only create a “ trichotomy ” which never existed in Hebrew thought, but we shall blur the

line of development and confuse the true Biblical conception of the relation of man to God.

It is in the pages of the New Testament that we first see the full significance of this long development. The Christian consciousness might be not unfairly described as the democratization of the prophetic consciousness through the gift of the Holy Spirit. This is true whether we think of the cruder side of prophecy in its psychophysical phenomena, or of its moral and spiritual side realized by the greater prophets. This consciousness includes a new experience of God (through Jesus Christ), a new emphasis on the supernatural, a new sense of power, notably in the conflict with those many "spiritual" powers which thronged the air of the ancient world. The conflict can be traced through the Synoptics, in the war waged by Jesus in the power of the Spirit against the demons of disease and insanity, or in the Spirit-world of the Apostle Paul, filled with principalities and powers, or again, in more etherealized form, in the Johannine conception of the world, the flesh and the devil. The new sense of power, always the characteristic creation of the Spirit, breaks into consciousness at Pentecost, where it is seen in the creation of a new fellowship. On the individual side, though never divorced from the communal, we have the Pauline experience of deliverance by the Holy Spirit, which is exhibited most fully in the seventh and eighth of Romans. On the communal side, again in closest relation to the individual, we have the development of the doctrine in the Fourth Gospel.

The increasing recognition that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is central in the Christian thought of the Apostle Paul (rather than the Rabbinical doctrine of "justification") marks a great advance in the interpretation of his Gospel. Every other conception of his

is baptized into this, and most of all the concrete fact of history—the Cross of Christ. The whole life of the Christian, normal and abnormal, is brought within the sphere of the Holy Spirit. This comprehensive view, with its new evaluation of the phenomena, forms Paul’s greatest contribution to the doctrine. He had learnt from the Old Testament to regard πνεῦμα (“ spirit ” with the content of *ruach*) as a normal constituent of human nature, its highest aspect (e.g., Rom. VIII. 16). From the same source came, in long tradition, the explanation of all supernatural influences by the same term. But, apart from his new conviction about Jesus, that after all He was the Christ, the contact between supernatural power and the potentialities of human nature would never have been made for him. When it had been made, on the road to Damascus, there came not only a new ability to fulfil the old moral ideals of Pharisaism, but a new conception of life. As he came to realize that the human personality of Jesus, dominated by the ethics of the Cross, really belonged to the “ heavenlies ”, and was therefore the most essential link in the chain of the Spirit, the doctrine of the Spirit was transformed for him—personalized, ethicized, as never before. It claimed the whole of human life, and claimed it for new ends and in new ways of working. He could not be content with the conventional views which specialized the activities of the Spirit in such *charismata* as “ Tongues ” and “ Prophecy ”. He saw those activities in the more valuable *charismata* of service to the community, the gifts of healing and helpfulness, of administration and government, and above all, that gift of the Christian ἀγάπη (“ love ”) upon which the proper exercise of every other gift and grace depended. He traced back to the Holy Spirit of God (or Christ) the whole of the inner life also—the mediation of Christian

experience, the union with Christ, the assurance of sonship, the consecration of life, the specific virtues, and the extension of this life into the life beyond death, of which we have already the beginning in the earnest of the Spirit, and of which the final feature will be a "spiritual" body, commensurate to the needs of the redeemed spirit. The ethical realism of this Pauline mysticism owes its form, doubtless, to his Jewish nature and nurture, but its content is drawn from the Person and Work of Jesus Christ, through whom the Spirit of God flows.

The communal aspect of the Holy Spirit has been already implied in the reference to the *charismata*; these gifts of the Spirit are bestowed on the community, in the community, and for the community, and the spirit of selfish display or ostentatious individualism comes from another quarter. It is as much out of date for historical exegesis to discuss whether the spirit-filled individual or the spirit-filled Church comes first, as it is to discuss whether individual or social life in general is primary. As in the natural order, so in the spiritual—the individual and the group grow together into a new consciousness of their inherent nature, and the individual life is inherently social, whilst the social life does not exist at all save through its individual representatives. The authority of the Church by which it declares that "it seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us" (Acts xv. 25, 28), is the authority of Spirit-led individuals in their group relation; it is the collective consciousness of the Church which speaks through the mouths of its prophets (XIII. 2). The unity of the Church through this indwelling Spirit is the particular theme of the Epistle to the Ephesians—"one Body and one Spirit . . . one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all" (iv. 3ff.). But the doctrine becomes most explicit in the Fourth Gospel.

The farewell address to the apostles in the Upper Room declares that another Paraclete, or “Helper”, will take the place of their present Helper. This “Spirit of truth” will be unseen and therefore unknown by the world, but will be known to, and remaining with, the disciples of Christ (xiv. 16, 17). He will come in Christ’s name to teach and to recall all the teaching of Christ (26), and to bear witness of Him (xv. 26). He will be given and sent by the Father (xiv. 16, 26), or sent by Christ from the Father, from whom He proceeds (xv. 26; xvi. 7). Christ’s withdrawal from the world is the condition of His coming, and the apparent loss is real gain (xvi. 7). His presence (with the disciples) will conclusively convince the world that their unbelief in Christ is sin, that Christ’s cause has been vindicated by His ascent to the Father, and that the sentence of divine judgment has already been pronounced on the arch-enemy of Christ, the Satanic ruler of the world (xvi. 8–11). It has been necessary for Christ to leave much unsaid, but His successor will guide the disciples into all the truth, being Himself the Spirit of truth. His teaching is not, however, independent of Christ’s, but its complement, deriving from Christ Himself, and opening the future; His work will glorify Christ (xvi. 12–14). The significant feature in all this teaching is that the activity of the Spirit is confined in its direct operation to the Church, enabling it to win its victory over the world; there is no thought of the Spirit working directly on the hearts of sinful men to bring them to Christ; if the unbeliever is convinced it will be after the fashion of the Corinthian meeting, where the testimony of a Christian “prophet” will bring him to faith by revealing the secrets of his heart.¹

The Spirit is conceived as the projected presence and

¹ Cf. E. F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 337.

activity of Christ Himself with His Church, and this explains the personalization of the conception. The communal activity of the Holy Spirit here begins to be ecclesiasticized, though such a word really does violence to the fluidity of Johannine mysticism.

How far, then, has the Bible brought us towards the Trinitarian doctrine of the fourth century? The answer to this will be given by our exegesis of the Pauline benediction in 2 Corinthians XIII. 14 (for by this we shall construe the more ambiguous, and probably later, baptismal formula of Matt. XXVIII. 19). "The fellowship of the Holy Spirit" is most naturally taken as an activity of the Spirit comparable with and resulting from the active grace of Christ and the active love of God which is expressed in and through that grace (cf. Rom. xv. 30, "the love of, i.e. produced by, the Spirit"). The fellowship is a fellowship with God through Christ mediated by or in the Holy Spirit, so agreeing exactly with the teaching of Ephesians II. 18, "through Him (Christ) we both have our access in one Spirit unto the Father". There is certainly no warrant for the interpretation "fellowship *with* the Holy Spirit", as distinguished from the Father and the Son; nor does it satisfy the parallel members of the Benediction (always important for Hebrew or Hebraised thought) to make *κοινωνία* mean simply the fellowship with men created by the Spirit, i.e. the Church. Thus the triple Benediction is simply a more explicit form of that which Paul uses elsewhere, "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with you all." When that is said, all is said, for the grace of Christ implies the love of God behind it, and the fellowship (of the whole group) with God created by the Spirit through that grace.

Inevitably, we are left asking further questions about

the Holy Spirit which the Bible will not answer for us, questions which have emerged in subsequent discussion, questions which do not belong to historical exegesis at all. We must always recognize that the thought-world of an ancient document cannot possibly be ours, and that the writers were content to leave many problems unsolved, because those problems had not risen upon their horizon. Just as the Apostle Paul seems to have had no difficulty in postulating the pre-existence and the post-existence of Christ, alongside the Father and sharing His nature, though subordinate to Him, so he comes to intellectual equilibrium in the thought of the real presence of that Christ in the believer's heart and life by the indwelling Spirit. To treat this presence as the “influence” of a vague and semi-physical *something* is altogether to miss the truth ; for Paul, life is so identified with Christ that to live is Christ, and the fellowship of the Spirit is intensely personal, with nothing between the believer and his Lord. Yet, on the other hand, to think that we can therefore leave out the Spirit, as some tacitly do, is to forget that cardinal utterance of Paul's—“the Lord is the Spirit”. No mere historical figure of the past could ever have entered into the Apostle's thought and experience as did the living Christ. If the Lord gave personality to the Spirit, the Spirit gave ubiquity to the Lord. If the divine Fatherhood and Sonship gave to the Spirit a new content of truth, the Spirit (by the very use and meaning of the term) opened up new avenues of inquiry, new fields of speculation about personality in man and in God which are very far from being yet exhausted. The glory of the Bible doctrine of the Holy Spirit is that it compels us to seek its meaning in the larger book of human history and human thought to which all the nations of the earth contribute.

(3) THE USE OF THE TERM "SPIRIT" IN THIS BOOK

This book does not systematically develop the Biblical doctrine of the Holy Spirit, or trace the history of ecclesiastical dogma in relation to the Holy Spirit. Its starting-point is in the psychology of Christian experience. Its concern is with the validity and meaning of the claim of Christian experience to have fellowship with God through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit. The actual content of the term "Spirit" is therefore drawn from the experience to be examined, and any attempt at a preliminary definition would be out of place. But the term "Spirit" has had a great history, and carries with it certain suggestions which must affect our use of it. The English word "spirit" reproduces directly the "spiritus" of the Vulgate, rendered "spirit" by all versions of the Bible, from Wyclif onwards. The Latin word etymologically denotes a breathing, and so "breath" or "air". In its meaning it thus goes back to the Greek *pneuma* and the Hebrew *ruach*, which share the same meaning, though with characteristic differences and extensions. The wide range of the English usage of this distinctly Biblical term is shewn by the fact that upwards of twenty different usages are classified in the Oxford Dictionary (s.v.) It is sufficient for us to notice the five outstanding suggestions of the term which emerge in the course of its long history through four languages and literatures. In the fundamental Hebrew usage, as we have seen, it denoted a wind-like energy, and then the special appropriation of this energy as the activity, the "Spirit" of God. Through the idea of His creative activity, it came to denote, from the exile onwards, the vital principle in man, his whole psychical life, though usually regarded on its higher side, as the religious origin

of the usage would suggest. The New Testament personalized the idea of the divine energy which might still flow into human life by closely associating the idea of the Spirit of God with the Person of Jesus Christ. On the other hand, the usage of the Greek term *pneuma* was philosophical, rather than religious, and covered the idea of divine immanence, thus linking itself with the use of the term in modern philosophy (e.g. in Hegel).¹ In this remarkable history of the term—ranging from *mana* to monotheism—lies the justification for both the wider and the narrower use of it in the following pages. The wider and more philosophical use of the term "Spirit" in Part I, in regard to the essential nature of personality, human and divine, is followed by the specifically Christian usage of Part II (usually designated as "Holy Spirit"). In Part III these are correlated and extended in their theological and philosophical applications. In such contractions and expansions there is no conscious or necessary ambiguity. They are the systole and diastole of life. They shew that we are dealing with an idea (cf. *logos*) which is greater than any single usage can compass. It is fortunate that history has created a term so eminently fitted to express the "iridescent wisdom" of God in creation, revelation, redemption and sanctification, a term which is so capable of correlating the emphasis of religion on transcendence with that of philosophy on immanence.

¹ For the blending of Hebrew and Greek ideas in Alexandrian Judaism, see Rees, *The Holy Spirit*, Ch. III ("The Spirit of Wisdom"). It is interesting to speculate on the consequences for Christian theology if the Logos idea had been linked to the Spirit instead of the Son.

PART I

THE APPROACH THROUGH EXPERIENCE

CHAPTER I

THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE

AN analysis of Christian experience which is not also, in some sense, an *apologia* for it, stumbles upon the threshold ; for religion, more than anything else, is intelligible only from within. A purely psychological study, extensively in history and intensively in selected types, is of real value, but the result may easily be remote from the reality of the religion itself. A comparison of the Christian with other religions is an important and necessary corrective of misplaced emphasis, but it marks out a field rather than gathers in its harvest. It is only as we consider the experience in its theological setting, which means also with its metaphysical background, that we can hope to understand that fellowship of God and man through Christ, of which Christian experience claims to be the result. Even so, one man's statement of it can never be the adequate substitute for another's. As Lord Acton said¹ of his historical studies : " My life is spent in endless striving to make out the inner point of view, the *raison d'être*, the secret of fascination for powerful minds, of systems of religion and philosophy, and of politics, the offspring of the others, and one finds that the deepest historians know how to display their origin and their defects, but do not know how to think or to feel as men

¹ *Letters to Mary Gladstone*, p. 60.

do who live in the grasp of the various systems." Yet, if Christianity is a living and organic unity, and not a mere amalgam, plastic to the handling of each generation or group, then Christian experience as a whole must shew characteristic features. If, further, the Christian religion is destined to be the universal religion, those features will be intimately related to the life experience of the whole human race. These principles must always be remembered, but they are remembered most usefully from within an experience, not from without, and are served most loyally when we follow our own path up the mount of catholicity. It is the living spirit of Christian experience which we seek to know, not a bunch of artificial flowers plucked from the creeds and confessions of Christendom, which never grew in any man's garden. Even if we were to try to watch the uplifted head of the living plant itself, nineteen centuries ago, and to penetrate to the factors of its hidden germination beneath the soil, our own predilections might easily lead to a false selection of essentials. Selection, indeed, which means relative emphasis, is the real difficulty in this subject, and is not escaped by the historical method, though often veiled by it. But any genuinely Christian experience, honestly analysed, will reveal something of its own catholicity, if the analysis go deep enough.

I. The first postulate of Christian experience seems to be the reality, the dignity, the eternal value of human personality. This gives a cosmic setting to the humblest life; what more can be said of man's importance than that there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth? Man becomes, as in the apostle Paul's striking figure (1 Cor. iv. 9), a gladiator of God, fighting in an arena ringed not by faces of flesh and blood alone, but by the eyes of unseen worlds. The racial

struggle between good and evil within man's heart acquires a significance beyond time, as beyond space. In sharpest contrast with the original Buddhist solution of the mystery of life, by the elimination of personality as an illusion, the Christian of all types finds an intensification and justification of his personality as a first result of his faith. In Vinet's impressive words, with reference to that aspect of human personality which we call individuality, "The glory of the Gospel lies in strengthening it in a few, in awakening it in the majority, in purifying it in all."¹

We might have expected this emphasis, if only from the vital connection between Judaism and Christianity. The religion of the Old Testament gives to man a meaning in the universal scheme of things which we shall hardly find elsewhere, except for its continuation in the New Testament. The very humility which is inculcated towards God as Spirit, whilst man is flesh, serves to throw into greater prominence the supreme place of man in the whole creation. Shakespeare owes to the eighth Psalm his description of man, standing beneath "this most excellent canopy, the air, look you, this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire . . . What a piece of work is a man ! how noble in reason ! how infinite in faculty ! in form and moving how express and admirable ! in action how like an angel ! in apprehension how like a god ! the beauty of the world ! the paragon of animals !" Even the bitter parody of the eighth Psalm in the seventh chapter of Job confirms the normal Old Testament assertion of man's dignity ; for the loss of faith in the significance of man is there bound up with the temporary loss of faith in the

¹ Quoted by Schaumann, *Das Prinzip der Individualität bei Alexander Vinet*, in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 1902, p. 67.

significance of God.¹ Nor is this Old Testament emphasis on human personality at all diminished by its limitation of real personal existence to this earth. What the Hebrew lost in extensivity, he gained in intensity. Over against the Greek idea of an immortal soul temporally inhabiting an earthly body, the Hebrew psychology gives us, not an incarnated soul, but an animated body, as its characteristic doctrine of resurrection clearly shews, and this doctrine has proved able to maintain itself in its Pauline transformation, as the basis of the hope of the future.

It is significant for the faith and experience of the New Testament that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews should have applied the eighth Psalm to Jesus, finding in Him its true and supreme fulfilment.² A religion which gives to its personal founder a central and permanent place is likely to bear the impress of a strongly marked personality, as does Islam. But Jesus became to Christian faith more than the prophet of Nazareth ; He became the manifestation of God in the flesh, conceived at first as the Messiah, and later as the Logos-Son of God. In this way there was an enrichment of the idea of personality in regard not only to man but also to God. The point to be emphasized is that this development is historically and logically linked with the central feature of the Old Testament religion—the prophetic consciousness. If we look at such a prophet as Amos, disregarding the peculiar

¹ The Psalmist (viii. 3-5) dwells on the honour of man's place above all other creatures, due to God's beneficence ; the (later) author of Job (vii. 17, 18) ironically repeats his words to imply a malignant purpose in this distinction, God being a tyrannical torturer of man. Thus the conception of human personality rises or falls with that of the divine.

² Heb. ii. 6-8 ; the ideal place of man is attained actually by the Son of God become man that He might suffer for man. The glory of the Man made perfect through sufferings answers to the glory of God, according to the Gospel.

psychology of the Hebrews and the ecstatic element of audition or vision, we find that his "Thus saith the Lord" essentially rests on a value-judgment. He ascribed to God the highest contents of his own consciousness. As compared with this, there is in the teaching of Jesus a new note of authority, as His contemporaries were quick to recognize, an authority which is suggested by the significant change from "Thus saith the Lord" into "I say unto you". Yet the difference is of degree rather than of kind. Whatever consciousness of unbroken fellowship with the Father belonged to Jesus, we have no adequate reason to suppose that it was not reached psychologically by faith in the divine values of the truths of experience. When His disciples in their turn, then or now, find the value of God in Christ Jesus they are making a projection of faith into the unseen world akin to that which Amos of Tekoa made—the faith that in human personality we may know the divine. The prophetic consciousness means, in fact, that human experience is real, and that the one sure key to the knowledge of God is our knowledge of man at his highest and best. It is no accident, but of the very essence of that faith, that the clearest and most intensely real idea of divine personality comes to us from a people with the surest conviction of the reality of human personality.

Illustrations of the emphasis on personality in Christian experience are perhaps hardly necessary, but it is worth while to notice the recurrence and degree of it in strongly contrasted types. The psychological analysis of the seventh chapter of Romans is continued in Augustine's *Confessions* and in Bunyan's *Grace Abounding*. If any book reveals the main current of Christian life and experience in classic form, that book is Augustine's *Confessions*, and that book is autobiography lifted to

the cosmic level in a great and sustained prayer, presupposing the infinite worth of man to God. The landscape of *The Pilgrim's Progress*—more familiar to the world than any other except that of Palestine—is dotted with many types of personality which are largely the projection of the personal experience recorded in *Grace Abounding*. In the Catholic and the Puritan alike, there is the same confidence that the stolen pears or Sunday tip-cat on the village green are God's concern. This is logical enough; the reality of the Gospel implies the reality of history, and the reality of history means the reality of personality in all its activity. The illustrations just given remind us that the Christian interest in personality is primarily ethical. Christian faith not only asserts the existence of a spiritual world, but also has its own characteristic hierarchy of values within it. Here, again, Christian experience is true to its roots in the Old Testament. The contribution of that book to the spiritual values of the world is admittedly to be found in its religious ethics and in its ethical religion; in æsthetic it has little to give except the religious lyric, and no impartial judge would compare its intellectual achievements with those of the Greek. The emphasis falls on the will, i.e. personality in action, though many readers of the Old Testament are apt to miss this emphasis in its full extent, because the Hebrews made the heart the seat of volition, and constantly refer to it by the term which we use for the emotional side of personality. Similarly, the New Testament appeal for faith is for an active and volitional response, however necessarily inclusive of both intellectual and emotional factors. This is the continued emphasis of the most representative and the strongest Christian experience. Its concern is with the good will, and in times of lethargy or worldliness it turns instinctively,

even harshly and sternly, from other spiritual values to the ethical, as though knowing that its essential life moves there. Jerome was perhaps a more likeable—or shall we say a less unlikeable?—person before he had given up Cicero for Hebrew, but he probably represents the historic emphasis of Christianity more faithfully in his later stage, just as Luther, not Erasmus, is the pioneer of Protestant experience. The greatest poet of the mediaeval Church is profoundly ethical; the Protestant Milton also, like the Catholic Dante, is dominated by moral issues when he deals with Christian themes. The great ascetic tradition in the Church, remote as it is from Jewish life, owes its strength and value to the same ethical demands. Puritanism, which is Protestant asceticism, is easily caricatured, yet its lineage belongs to this ethical order. We must not forget that there are other values for religion, and that other nations besides the Hebrews have contributed, and will contribute, to the spiritual, and therefore to the religious, wealth of the race.¹ But we may seriously doubt whether any syncretism of these values which disputed or even minimized the supremacy of the ethical side of human personality would not challenge the very essence of the Christian experience, and ultimately render it unrecognizable. In this limitation lies not a little of its strength.

All this assumes the unity of personality—the existence of a spiritual entity, which *is* in its experiences, such as its growth in time, though its ultimate nature may be timeless. This unity is larger than its self-consciousness at any phase, and possibly larger than all its experiences. Christian faith instinctively defends this

¹ This is not meant to ignore the *ethical* contribution of other nations (e.g. the Greeks); the point is rather that no other nation so welded ethics and religion as did Israel.

unity against all the modern attempts to analyse it into non-ethical components, from that of Hume to that of Bertrand Russell. The elements of personality are extraordinarily complex, and such abnormal phenomena as those of "multiple personality" may well remind us how subtle and delicately balanced our normal consciousness is. Yet personality, in the light of its ultimate characteristics, such as its real freedom, its moral responsibility, its unique individuality, must in some real sense be a unity, and not a mere ego-complex or a "behaviourist" illusion.

II. The second characteristic to be considered is that relation of person to person which is suggested by the phrase "the spirit of the Cross"—the central ethical principle. It might seem more logical to consider the Christian experience of *faith*, to the volitional quality of which reference has already been made. But faith, considered formally, belongs to all the higher religions,¹ and underlies all the rest of their experiences.² Our concern is rather with its specific ethical content in Christian experience, and the intrinsic quality of this, not as something believed so much as something achieved. To this something we may give the name, "the spirit of the Cross", because no other name better expresses the fundamental relation in which one person stands to another, man to man, man to God, and God to man, according to Christian faith. The New Testament term for this central ethical relation of man to man is *agapé*, a new name for what is essentially a new thing. "It describes what human life begins to look like when the Spirit gets to work upon

¹ In an elementary form it belongs to all religion; cf. Durkheim's epigram, "Le premier article de toute foi, c'est la croyance au salut par la foi" (*Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse*,² p. 595).

² For the nature and theological content of Christian faith see Cc. v. and ix.

it.”¹ “Love” in the sense of the Apostle’s famous exposition (1 Cor. XIII.) is not a pious sentiment or even a vague, though practical, humanitarianism ; it is the reproduction of the Spirit of the Cross. In the fine saying of Schleiermacher, “the fruits of the Spirit are the virtues of Christ”.² The early Christians were fully conscious of the newness of this relation, as we may see in the Epistle to Diognetus, the Apology of Aristides, or in that magnificent sentence of Cyprian’s, when he called on the persecuted Christians of Carthage to minister to the heathen sick and dying in time of plague—“It behoves us to be worthy of our birth.”³ Even the popular use of the term “Christian” to-day suggests the forgiving and merciful and charitable temper ; what is called “unchristian conduct” is usually taken to mean harshness, self-assertiveness and aggression—in fact, the opposites of those qualities which belong to the Gospel portraits of Jesus, and are seen supremely in His Passion.

The sacrificial spirit in itself is not specifically Christian, not even necessarily religious. It is true to say with Bourget that “nothing is lost when we make an offering of it” ;⁴ but the term “offering” here implies a worthy altar. Self-sacrifice is simply the measure of the intensity of a passion ; its quality and significance depend on the *object* which excites the passion. Jesus is represented as accepting the Cross, in life and in death, through His passion to do the will of God. One significance of that sacrifice of Himself,—to use the term without any theological implication—is that it affords the supreme example of love devoted to the highest possible object. But that example became inseparable from an interpretation

¹ F. R. Barry, in *The Spirit in Life and Thought*, p. 116.

² *Glaubenslehre*, § 124, 2.

³ “Respondere nos decet natalibus nostris” (*Vita*, 9).

⁴ *Le Sens de la Mort*, p. 310.

and manifestation of the nature of God. The terms applied to Jesus—Messiah, Lord, Logos—mark the growth of this religious conviction. The sanction of the divine nature now rested on the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount; it was of immense importance for the ethical ideals of the Christian that there was a new connotation to the divine command, “Ye shall be holy: for I the Lord your God am holy” (Lev. xix. 2, cf. Matt. v. 48). Love became the supreme Christian duty, because God is love, and the measure of God’s love to the world was found in the gift of His Son.¹ It was this theological apotheosis of the Spirit of the Cross which taught Christians to say, “We love, because He first loved us”, and to assert, as Phillips Brooks has put it, the right of the weaker over the stronger as part of the moral structure of the universe.²

Man’s ideal is God’s real. The grace of Christ, which is the activity of the love of God, has for its supreme characteristic “the Spirit of the Cross”. This is the true continuation of what the Hebrews knew as *chesed*, or “loving-kindness” (better rendered with Cheyne as “duteous love”). It is illustrated by the spirit of the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah, the sacrificial grace into which the prophet transformed the undeserved sufferings of Israel. That Scriptural parallel to the thirteenth of First Corinthians may remind us of the intense humanity of the divine grace, as known through the Spirit of the Cross. Not a doctrine about it, but the human exhibition of it in Christ, has moved Christian life to whatever graciousness it has won; missionaries constantly tell us

¹ “We in India knew already that God is good. But we did not know that He was so good that Christ was willing to die for us” (*The Gospel of Sadhu Sundar Singh*, by F. Heiler; E.T., p. 219).

² *The Influence of Jesus*, p. 131.

that this is the central missionary asset. The closer we bring together the grace of God, and the grace, however imperfect, of man, the closer we get to the secret of the maintenance of the Spirit of the Cross in Christian experience. The appeal made by both is fundamentally the same—through the intrinsic worth of the quality displayed—to the instinctive response of man. The precise form of the appeal is of quite secondary importance. An interesting example of this appeal and response is afforded by a book which has found wide circulation, called *A Gentleman in Prison*, giving the autobiography of a Japanese convict, executed for murder a few years ago. He was most genuinely converted whilst in prison by the direct appeal of the words read in his cell, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do”. He was, he says, stabbed to the heart, “as if pierced by a five-inch nail.” Therein was exhibited the power of the Spirit of the Cross at its simplest. But the interesting feature is that once before, in a previous imprisonment of this hardened and life-long criminal, he had been changed from a very troublesome to a quite exemplary prisoner, through a simple act of grace on the part of the governor of the jail, in relieving him from agonizing torture. The same quality, human in the one instance and divine in the other, made the same effective appeal, ethical or religious. We shall escape from the perplexity caused by so many rival theories of atonement, if we hold firmly to the Christian faith that grace, in God and in man, is of essentially the same quality. It does what it does in moving man to repentance or in initiating a new relation to God, by its actual achievement and positive worth.¹

It is from such an experience of divine grace, the

¹ This is not to be taken as endorsing a “moral” or “subjective” doctrine of atonement.

knowledge of what God *is*, that the specifically Christian consciousness of sin begins. The conviction of sin wrought by a John the Baptist is other than the Christian attitude to sin, however useful as a preparation for it. The genuinely Christian consciousness of sin, whether reached early or late in Christian experience, is always more than the sense of having rebelled against a divine command ; it involves the discovery of a churlish, wanton and utterly *ungracious* attitude towards grace—like that of the organ-grinder in Michael Fairless's *Roadmender*, who had repulsed a little child with a blow and a curse, and could never forget that the child turned back to him and lifted up his face to be kissed. The strength of the appeal made by the Spirit of the Cross, whether from man to man, or from God to man, is in this intrinsic quality, this power to inflict a wound more deadly than any blow. More than anything else, it seems to be the secret of the Christian experience—the norm and inspiration of its ethics, the ground and content of its fellowship with God. In our own time, we have seen it moving Albrecht Schweitzer to follow Christ to an African forest, abandoning brilliant achievements and prospects in both the intellectual and aesthetic realms, as though to bear witness to the centrality of the will in Christian experience—an example the more impressive because without the usual theological setting for such a faith and obedience.¹

III. It is by experience of the grace of God in Christ that the Christian finds deliverance from the three great and deep shadows that fall across the human pathway—adversity, moral evil and death. All religions must meet the challenge of their presence, and all religions worthy of the name must do something to dispel their darkness.

¹ See p. 158.

So definite and so central is the demand of man's heart for deliverance from these that there is no test of any religion more searching and more revealing than the kind of deliverance or "salvation" which it offers. In this particular experience of any religion, its leading ideas are brought to a focus. The Buddhist finds his deliverance from the psychological causes of suffering, deep as life itself, by his escape from the illusion of personality. The Hindu finds deliverance from the cycle of transmigration through union with the supreme Brahman. The Moslem finds deliverance from future punishment, and the entrance into future blessedness, through that submission to the will of Allah which is expressed in certain primary duties. Over against these, and all other religions, we may say that the religion of the Old Testament rested its assurance of deliverance from sorrow, sin, and the incidence of death on the nature of Yahweh and His covenanted grace towards His people. The religion of the New Testament continues this emphasis on the nature of God, in the light of all that might be further known about Him from the Person and Work of Jesus Christ. Here, in the divine nature, is that fulcrum beyond us which is always needed for the lever of faith, together with the full recognition of personality human and divine.

There is a difference in the kind and manner of deliverance from these three enemies of man's welfare, adversity, death and moral evil, because the first two are temporal, but in the third there is an element which is not temporal. We shall sooner or later leave behind us the adversities of life and of physical death, whilst it is possible to interpret these facts in such a way that the Christian is delivered even now from the real pressure of their burden. But in sin there is something much deeper,

something which Anselm was trying to express when he urged that a single look contrary to the will of God had an eternal significance ; worlds ought not to win it, and worlds could not atone for it. That is why there is the need for a deliverance which is more than a gracious and delivering *influence*, a deliverance which has some eternal significance to meet adequately man's consciousness of his own sinfulness. Where can that " eternal salvation " be found but in the nature of God as grace, the fact that divine personality in some way takes on itself the sins of the human ? Theories of atonement are many, and perhaps all of them are no more than the elaboration of a symbol, more or less adequate to express what is beyond full expression. But beneath all these not unimportant differences of symbolism there is a common appeal to the grace of the divine nature, the common experience of entrance into such relation with the divine nature that there is eternal deliverance from the *fact* as well as from the present *power* of sin. Nor is it simply the past that alienates us from God ; there is the consciousness of a present, and the anticipation of a future, unworthiness which separates from Him—or would separate from Him but for the ceaseless reality of His love. There are differences of interpretation of the historic acts by which this experience is mediated to the world, and of the ecclesiastical tradition by which it is still mediated to the believer. As examples of the latter, we may take the classical Protestant doctrine of justification by faith with its mediaeval Catholic equivalent, which has been said to be not justification by works, but " the absolution pronounced by a priest ".¹ The difference corresponds to a different conception of the function of the Church as being either the community of believers personally

¹ Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, I, p. 448.

assured of a divine redemption through the Word of God, or the sacramental institution divinely authorized to mediate this grace of forgiveness. But along either path there is a vital discovery of the divine nature as gracious. There is the birth of a conviction, however inarticulate, that God being what He is—a God who cannot stand aloof from a world so oppressed as ours, but must effectively enter it and share our burdens, most of all those of our sins—God being what He is, our personal life may rest securely in His. In that abandonment to the being of God as gracious love, in that surrender of the human personality to the divine, in that experience which, for want of a less ambiguous term, we must needs call “mystical” union, we seem to come nearest to the essence of the universal Christian experience of salvation, in its simplest and deepest form, underlying the greatly varied manner of its mediation.

It is instructive to notice, in this connection, the fundamental agreement in this experience between two such different natures, with such different trainings, as those of St. Teresa and John Bunyan. St. Teresa, in her *Interior Castle*, which is a sort of *Pilgrim's Progress* seen through an inverted telescope, tells us how, when kneeling before the Crucifix, she was overcome with a sense of her own unworthiness, and felt that she never had anything to offer to God or to sacrifice for His sake. The Crucified consoled her by saying that He gave her for her own all the pains and labours which He had borne in His Passion, that she might offer them to His Father.¹ Bunyan, in his *Grace Abounding*, writes of the great discovery, “One day, as I was passing into the field, and that, too, with some dashes on my conscience, fearing lest yet all was not right, suddenly this sentence fell upon

¹ English Translation of 1906, p. 185.

my soul, Thy righteousness is in heaven. And methought withal I saw with the eyes of my soul Jesus Christ at God's right hand. There, I say, was my righteousness : so that wherever I was, or whatever I was doing, God could not say of me, He wants my righteousness, for that was just before him."¹ So do Catholic nun and Puritan tinker meet, even on earth, at the foot of the Cross, to find a like deliverance from their common burden of sin.

IV. Those who have entered into this new relation to higher and larger personality have often described it as a new life, initiated by a new birth. But a new life implies the inflow of new energies for its creation and sustenance, the intensification or transvaluation of the old experience by the new relation to God in Christ. The inclusive name in the New Testament for this new factor is "the Holy Spirit", by which name we denote the whole activity of the divine in relation to the human personality, as mediated through Christ. There are wide and legitimate differences in the vocabulary and modes of thought which Christians employ in speaking of this experience, as there are in the New Testament itself. There are many names for the same thing. We may, for example, speak of the indwelling Christ, or of the fellowship of God, or of His Real Presence, and something of the meaning lingers even in that pathetic phrase, in which we hear the melancholy, long, withdrawing roar of the "Sea of Faith" on Dover Beach,—“the power not ourselves that makes for righteousness”. But it might conduce to theological accuracy and clearness of expression if the term "Holy Spirit" were confined to the definitely Christian experience, and used to denote the proximate source of this. When we speak simply of fellowship with

¹ Par. 229.

either God or Christ, there is always a theological lacuna, a lacuna which the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is designed to fill—"through Christ we have our access in one Spirit unto the Father".¹ The operation of this spiritual energy, however, is not to be limited by man's consciousness of it, though that makes new kinds of experience possible. The boundaries we draw can never limit the moving current of life. The distinction of "prevenient" grace from the grace of conscious life with God is like the distinction of successive portions of the same stream, down to which the different fences run, each with its own sign-board; the continuity of the stream is unbroken by them. But it is a matter of experience that the spiritual energies of God, the active relation of Himself as Spirit with us as spirits, are immeasurably enhanced when psychologically or sacramentally mediated through Jesus Christ. In some form or other, this dependence on the Holy Spirit is an essential mark of any experience that deserves to be called Christian. The Christian experience would not be what it is, in any of its characteristic features, if the Christian did not believe that a divine and "supernatural" factor was working in and through him. The term "supernatural" is an unhappy one, because of the naturalness with which this divine activity clothes itself, because its presence and vitality are immanent. The relation of Spirit to spirit means the heightening of all human powers, the clarifying of human vision and judgment, the strengthening of the human will, the discovery of latent and unsuspected possibilities of endurance. But it does seem essential to the full exercise and efficiency of the divine help that it should be traced to Spirit as not simply immanent, but as also transcendent. The Christian faith cannot be built on

¹ Eph. ii. 18; see the Introduction, p. 4.

naturalistic assumptions, however idealistically or spiritually applied.

The doctrine of the Holy Spirit, so conceived, is not an annexe of the Christian faith, a more or less useful adjunct or extension of it ; it is the article of a standing or falling Church, since it describes that relation which makes faith as a whole dynamic. Unless there be the warmth and life of a personal fellowship with God as known in Christ, or with Christ as God manifest in the flesh, there will always be lacking the essential *fiducia* or trust, without which belief is not yet faith. But this fellowship of Spirit with spirit implies just what is meant in the New Testament by the energies of the Holy Spirit. It is this living relation rather than the specific ethical theory which distinguished Christianity from Stoicism. "The primitive Christian and the Stoic morality had certain features in common from the outset : withdrawal from the outer world into one's inner life, the enfranchisement of the soul from the fetters of the material, the conquest of the passions, the low estimate of external good and evil, cosmopolitanism, the recognition of the common worth of humanity, and of mutual obligation, the encouragement of gentleness and good will, philanthropy and humanity. But that which was pure theory in the schools of the Stoics became power and life in the communities of the Christians."¹ That power and life were felt by the first disciples of Jesus, during their intercourse with Him on earth. They continued to be felt after His removal, and to be felt in wider and more remarkable ways ; in this power and life He, and therefore God through Him, were held to be really present in the believer's heart. Men would not go on praying unless they believed in the providence of God ; men would

¹ Pfleiderer, *Das Urchristentum*², II, p. 701,

not go on striving to achieve in the Christian life unless they believed in the real presence of God—which means the Holy Spirit—working in and through their human striving, yet always greater and other than it. Once more we see that close inter-relation of the human and the divine which goes back to the prophetic consciousness of the Old Testament.

V. Finally, there are the spiritual values which attach to the Church. Many would prefer to make these the point of departure rather than of culmination, and in the preference one of the main distinctions of type emerges. The Christian society can be regarded as the bearer of the tradition, the home of the children, the authority which declares the truth; or the phrase "Christian society" can get the emphasis on the adjective "Christian" rather than on the noun "society", and be regarded as the ingathering of those who have had personal and individual experience of Christ. This is not the place to argue the difference; there are great truths on both sides. It is more important for us here to recognize that the foundations of the Christian Church go back beyond the New Testament, or even the Old; they are in human nature itself, for the social aspects of personality belong to it as really as the individual aspects. For this very reason there is nothing characteristic in the existence of a Christian society; all religions have their Churches, or those social groups in religion which correspond to Churches. The characteristic feature lies in the kind of fellowship and the significance which is given to it. There is a wide difference between an interpretation of the Church as a mere sublimation of the gregarious instinct and as the Body of Christ—the fellowship created by the Holy Spirit. We must not, however, exaggerate that difference to the point of

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 forgetting that the greater may include the less, that the social group is a larger organ for spiritual values than the individual can ever be, and that this remains true when we reach the highest values of all. As the orchestra offers opportunities to the composer which the single instruments could never afford, so the Church becomes a larger organ for the Spirit of God. Whatever may be said, therefore, on behalf of or against specific claims of the Church, we may be sure that its historic function will never be discredited by an appeal to experience of the largest and most genuinely Christian type, for this will always bring out the social character of its faith and of its ethics.

May we not find the most characteristic feature of the Christian Church in its reconciliation of the individual and the social aspects of life, or at least in its ideal of their reconciliation? "Religion is what the individual does with his solitariness":¹ "the Bible knows nothing of solitary religion".² Both are true, or rather both are half-truths. The reality of religion is never possessed until it is a first-hand experience of God, unfettered by the conventions of the crowd, unique as is every voluntary product of personality. But the reality of religion is not known until it is socially tested and developed; we do not know how we are reacting to God until we know how we are reacting to man. The perfect unity of these two sides of our personality is seen in the life of Jesus, and is ideally continued in His Church.³

In this chapter, as throughout this book, the appeal is to experience—always the ultimate appeal. The authority of the Bible or the Church becomes an empty name, when

¹ A. N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 47.

² The advice given to Wesley in his early search for religion (*Journal*, I, p. 469, note: quoted from Moore's *Life*, I, p. 162).

³ See further Ch. VI.

not reinforced by it. " Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be ; why then should we desire to be deceived ? " ¹ But if the interpretation of Christian experience here attempted is accepted as at least broadly true, then we may say that the psychology of experience confirms the results of the historical evolution of doctrine. In the initial emphasis on personality all else is latent--the ethical content, the power of divine grace, the deliverance into a new fellowship of Spirit, the dependence on the energies of this fellowship and its expansion into corporate realization. There is a unity in this interpretation of Christian experience which is impressive ; it seems to hang together in a truthful way. All goes back to that first emphasis on personality and reminds us that the metaphysical reality of human life and history is of cardinal importance to the Christian. The fundamental " judgment of value " is, " the conviction of the essential greatness of man and the infinite nature of the values revealed in his life. " ²

¹ Butler, *Sermon upon the Character of Balaam*, towards end.

² Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 236.

CHAPTER II

THE REALITY OF SPIRIT

SIR JAMES STEPHEN, in his well-known essay on Richard Baxter, after reviewing that writer's enormous literary output in the interests of religion, proceeds to ask why "expostulations and arguments of which almost all admit the justice, and the truth of which none can disprove, should fall so ineffectually on the ear, and should so seldom reach the heart". He justly replies that it is because of the "formidable alliance of Sense and Imagination."¹ This constant factor should be remembered in any attempt to establish and defend the claims of Christian experience.

For all of us, and inevitably, the handicap of imagination is with the body against the spirit, and the material seems more real than the spiritual, at least to the natural man. The greatest service to religion which reason can render is to shew that this apparent "reality" is partly due to imagination, and that a rational use of imagination

¹ "The rational soul contemplates means only in reference to their ends; whilst the sensuous nature reposes in means alone, and looks no further. Imagination, alternately the ally of each, most readily lends her powerful aid to the ignobler party. Her golden hues are more easily employed to exalt and refine the grossness of appetite, than to impart brilliancy and allurements to objects brought within the sphere of human vision by the exercise of faith and hope. Her draperies are adjusted with greater facility to clothe the nakedness and to conceal the shame of those things with which she is most conversant, than to embellish the forms and add grace to the proportions of things obscurely disclosed at few and transient intervals" (*Essays in Ecclesiastical Biography*, Ed. 2, 1850, Vol. II, pp. 56, 57).

would shew us the greater intrinsic reality of things spiritual.

The fundamental source of indifference or antagonism to religious experience is, then, its deficient appeal to the imagination. But this fact is often veiled by specious forms of reasoning which vary from age to age. We must not ignore the genuineness of the difficulties felt by many as to the validity of the experience; but neither must we forget that instinct or prejudice may often clothe itself in the forms of reason. To these objections others may be added in subtle combination, which do spring from a rational source, and help to determine our attitude towards religion. "The shades of the rainbow are not so nice, and the sands of the seashore are not such a multitude, as are all the subtle, shifting, blending forms of thought and of circumstances that go to determine the character of us and of our acts."¹ The forms of our reasoning will vary from age to age, and it is instructive to consider for a moment their successive appearance in our own country since the Reformation.² The faith of the Protestant was essentially a return to religious experience as authoritative against the claims of the Church. When the freshness of that return was lost, and the exigencies of controversy required an external authority comparable with that of a visible institution such as Catholicism, there arose an inevitable appeal to Scripture as interpreted by that experience over against the appeal to it as interpreted by the tradition of the Church. But it is of the greatest importance to remember that in making religious experience the basis to-day of the reconstruction of theology we are simply doing what every revival of religion does, whether it appeal to

¹ Gladstone, in *Morley's Life*, I, 196.

² See, more fully, the latter part of Ch. XI

Scripture directly or come to it through the authority of the visible institution. As soon as the vitality of the new experience wanes, so soon does the greater imaginability of things material re-assert itself against the claim of things spiritual. The delayed reformation of religion in this country may be said to have begun in the seventeenth century, when it was marked by many erratic and extravagant outbursts of fanaticism. Yet the seventeenth century in its many-hued sectarian life, shews a new and genuine conviction of the reality of the Spirit. In the eighteenth century, the earlier half shews the loss of this vitality, the consequent challenge of Deism, and the crude issues raised between the natural and the supernatural. The Evangelical Revival in the latter half marks a new escape from this rationalism and a new emotionalism, to be followed by the scientific enthusiasms and achievements of the nineteenth century. The reality of "spirit" in man seemed overwhelmed by the proof of his evolutionary origin; the process of natural evolution, seen against the background of the stellar universe, seemed to many to leave no room for, and to dispense with, the necessity of "Spirit" in any transcendent sense. Within our own century, the challenge has taken a new form; it has become psychological. This is partly due to the comparative study of religion and religions, in connection with anthropology, and partly to the study of abnormal psychology and of psycho-analysis. Along both lines, it seems possible to many to explain religious experience from a lower source, and therefore to discount their assumed origin in "Spirit". The whole development is curiously like that of the Victorian naturalism, only that now the challenge comes to the inner experience instead of to the outer constitution and lineage of man. "The New Psychology", as it has come to be called,

similarly throws the emphasis on the process rather than on the product, and asserts of the human mind that :

" Its most fundamental activities are non-rational and largely unconscious activities. The power of conscious reasoning is a later development, playing but a minor part, even in the most highly developed human being, on the surface, so to speak, of the firmly built edifice of instincts, emotions, and desires, which form the main structure of the mental organism. In many cases the apparent importance of rational activity is seen to be illusory, forming as it were a mere cloak for the action of deep-seated instincts and desires."¹

It is neither possible nor necessary to attempt here any statement or criticism of the technical side of this development, even though we confined ourselves to the application of its results to religious experience. When the "New" psychology comes to be seen in its perspective, and restrained within its proper scientific realm, apart from metaphysical speculations, it will probably be found to have made a genuine contribution to our knowledge of the human consciousness, though on a much smaller scale than its votaries and enthusiasts have claimed. So far as concerns the use made of this contribution to discredit the validity of religious experience, it will be sufficient to notice the general grounds for interpreting this experience as valid, grounds which remain firm against the new challenge as much as against the older ones.²

I. The first and fundamental question to be answered is this : is our religious experience any less "real" than

¹ Tansley, *The New Psychology*, p. 24.

² See also my essay on "The Validity of Christian Experience" in the volume called *The Future of Christianity* (ed. Marchant).

any other part of our experience? We should first make clear to ourselves what we mean by "religious experience". Like all other kinds of experience it involves both an "experiencing" and an "experienced",¹ the experienced being necessarily interpreted in the very process of experiencing, so that experience always means a content and an interpretation of it. The difference between "religious" and "ordinary" experience is not so much that of content as of interpretation; anything that enters into human consciousness is capable of a religious interpretation, whilst much that is labelled "religion" fails to be interpreted religiously at all. The higher and more intelligent forms of religious experience are chiefly of three kinds. There is the experience of human life as interpretable in terms of divine control—all that the Christian means by the providence of God. There is the experience of the spiritual "values" of life, interpreted as divinely authoritative, as when "duty" is regarded as divine law. Finally there is the more or less intermittent experience interpreted as personal fellowship with God, ranging from the early conviction of a Newman "making me rest in the thought of two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator"² up to the mystical experience of St. Paul's, "Your life is hid with Christ in God".³ How full and continuous this communion may be to the saints is well illustrated by Stephen Grellet's practice of evening self-examination: "My enquiry was not so much whether I had retired from the world to wait upon God, as whether I had retired from God's presence to harbour worldly thoughts."⁴

¹ Cf. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution*, p. 39.

² *Apologia*, p. 4.

³ Col. III. 3.

⁴ *Memoirs of Stephen Grellet*, by Benjamin Seebohm, I, p. 42.

If such an experience as this is to be "real" in the metaphysical, as it is assuredly real in the psychological, sense, we must posit the "real" existence of both the human spirit and the divine. There are religions which analyze the human soul into mere phenomena, such as the Buddhist. There are others that teach its complete absorption into the divine being, such as the Brahmanistic. The Christian experience with which we are concerned postulates the reality of the human spirit and the divine, and their continued real co-existence, as the necessary condition of "fellowship".

Little need be said here about the reality of the ego of ordinary consciousness, which is, of course, the ego of the religious experience. We may still hold fast to the position of Descartes. As Professor James Ward forcibly states it, "however much assailed or disowned, the concept of a 'self' or conscious subject is to be found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological writers whatever—not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who treats it as a fiction."¹

A sufficient answer to all attempts to dissolve our consciousness into a mere series of feelings is still to be found in the classic words of John Stuart Mill,—“If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.”²

There must therefore be an experiencing subject, if

¹ *Psychological Principles*, p. 35, cf. p. 30.

² *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, ed. 5, p. 248.

there is to be an experience. But the psychological object of experience does not necessarily correspond with any metaphysical reality. Those who have entered into the higher types of religious experience would say, and often have said, that they are as conscious of the reality of God as of themselves. We cannot, however, make this assumption so long as the alternative before us remains open, that all such experience is illusory. Indeed, the study of different forms of religion constantly reminds us of the anthropomorphism of human conceptions of God.

There is no escape from the fact that we project ourselves into our idea of God; an Amos and a Hosea cannot possibly conceive Him in the same way. The great diversity of forms under which God is conceived, and their evident relation to the mental outlook and environment of the conceiver, have given rise in our own times to the question whether the idea itself is anything more than the illusory product of auto-suggestion. For many, this line of thought finds confirmation in recent psychology. The more play we allow to the subconscious and the instinctive in our experience, the more possible it is, whilst we accept the testimony of believers as perfectly sincere, to offer a self-contained explanation of it. They are the victims of their own needs and desires, their repressed wishes and aspirations finding relief in the creation of this vast mythology which supports "religion." The weaker self craves for a stronger self, and calls that idea of a stronger self God.

The first answer to this criticism of religious experience is not to deny or even to minimize the auto-constructive element in it, but to point out that exactly the same thing holds of all experience. The subjectivity of our individual conceptions of the external world is largely concealed, because imagination gives to material things a

greater apparent reality, and there is sufficient common ground for the practical purposes of life. But modern psychology since Locke has itself taught us that the qualities we attribute to material objects are really experiences of our own, differing with each person according to his degree of sensibility. The page of print on which I am looking would become a different "object of vision" if I changed my spectacles or could change my eyes. Suppose it is the page of some sacred book in Oriental script; will it be the same to the housemaid who lifts the book to dust beneath it, to the compositor who set it up, without knowing more than its alphabet, the scholar who sees it through a long perspective of philological history, the devotee who accepts its revelation as divine?

To such arguments, the reply is often made by the "plain" man from Dr. Johnson onwards, "Surely, there is a difference between this kind of auto-construction and that which characterizes religious experience? In regard to the book something is admittedly there, common to all, though some can see more in it than others. The housemaid, the compositor, the scholar and the devotee would all agree that there was a white paper with black marks upon it. What is there which corresponds with this in our alleged experience of God?" We cannot deal with this objection simply by saying that "whiteness" and "blackness" are visual sensations, and that "paper" is itself a mental concept of a complex character, true as these statements are. We must go on to say that the external "reality" of the piece of paper is accepted as somehow given in the experience, and not to be distinguished from it, and that the ultimate proof that this "givenness" is not illusory can never be more than the general agreement of others,

and the general congruity of things, and the general persistence of our perceptions in regard to it. But this is exactly the kind of confirmation we get to the non-illusory character of religious experience in general (as distinct from this or that form of it). In some fashion or other it is practically universal, however limited the higher forms of its development in the race, as a whole. Some form of religion is normal. It is so far congruous with the rest of our experience that it becomes a moral and social factor of the highest importance ; it has to be seriously reckoned with and is interrelated with the highest spiritual values. The very test of the genuineness of religious experience is usually that it will not let us go, and often that we yield to it only after a more or less protracted struggle. We ought not to expect to find God by tactual and visual experience (though many have so sought and claimed to find Him), because He is not one object of experience amongst others. The recognition of Him ought to give a new quality to all experience, and so we should experience Him *in and through* all other objects made sacramental to His revelation,¹ rather than *among* them, just as the meaning of the printed page is given in and through the black marks upon it, and not side by side with them. Moreover, there are necessary personal conditions for this experience of God, just as there are for the scholar's philology and the believer's reverence. But if we except the greater imaginative vividness with which we can visualize a material object, there is no psychological ground at all for thinking it more real than one we call spiritual. We may claim that both subject and object are given in the conscious experience. The philosopher postulates the metaphysical reality of the subject ; the believer, implicitly a meta-

¹ See Ch. III.

physician, postulates that of the object, which is just as necessary philosophically *to those who share the experience*, though the interpretation is here religious, not philosophical. Reason is a true ally of religion, but the ultimate proof of the reality of God is always some way of experiencing Him.

Doubtless many (at least in non-religious circles) think religion to be an illusion because they are unconsciously using the notion of "cause" in a too limited sense. They expect to find the supernatural in the chinks and crannies of human experience, and so they miss the immanent presence of God manifest in the operation of many "secondary causes". But there are many also, who having started out with some kind of religion, have left it behind, because they are really suffering from a "value-complex" (to use the favourite term of psycho-analysis). Their sense of the value and validity of religion is so bound up with particular theories of its development in experience that they cannot dissociate them, and the invalidation of the associated theory is the disproof of the value. But to learn that adolescence is an important factor in most conversions, or that the Church is in some aspects the sublimation of the gregarious instinct, or that our idea of God is always a projection of our own consciousness, so far as its form is concerned, ought not to invalidate the fact that men are converted, and that the Church does foster a new life, or that God is the satisfying Reality offered to our soul's dissatisfactions. We must not forget that "the laws which govern the working of the human mind are just as much God's laws as those by which the planets revolve in their orbits."¹ These fuller and more accurate analyses of the manner in which men may come to experience

¹ Underwood, *Conversion*, p. 194.

God should and ultimately will bring them closer to Him. For, as we shall see in the course of our argument, the true discovery of transcendence is through immanence, the true authority of God is intrinsic, needing no substantiation from without, as though He could ever come to us with a testimonial from somebody else. But the first step in the argument for His reality is to see that religious experience, whether true or false in its inferences, is just as much a part of the "reality" of human life as any other part of our experience. As Baron von Hügel put it, in his fine study of this subject: "The claim to trans-human validity continues upon the whole as present, operative, clear, in the religious intimations, as it continues present, operative, clear, in the intimations of the reality of an external world."¹

II. The second question to be faced is this—granting that religious experience is not to be ruled out *a priori* as illusory, any more than any other kind of experience, can that particular "reality" which is postulated by it claim to be supernatural, in the sense of superhuman? Is there a transcendent reality, active within human experience by the control of human life, the authoritative assertion of spiritual values, the intuitive consciousness of the mystic? Or is religion, whilst not due to the auto-suggestion of the individual, after all due to nothing more than the impact of the society upon the individual? Many attempts have been, and are still being made, to simplify religion and to relieve it of its metaphysical problems in this way. The most notable of these was Positivism, which claims to be "a human religion". Religion becomes a form of sociology, not only because the activities of religion are a social product, but also because Humanity is made the object of worship and

¹ *Essays*, First Series, p. 44.

service.¹ But we cannot worship that humanity to which we ourselves belong unless we idealize it into something super-human, itself calling for explanation. Anthropological attempts to offer "a consciousness of social ideals and values which is genuinely religious"² are similarly doomed to fail, for when they become genuinely religious they cease to be purely social. If we say "that religion reflects the fundamental life-experiences of man and that the driving impulses in these experiences are the most elemental instincts, such as food and sex",³ and have no more to say than this, however true it may be, we have not come within sight of religion at all. Durkheim criticizes Comte's attempt to organize a religion on the basis of a dead past, but his own reduction of religion to a product of social life⁴ does not meet with more success, for the very life-breath of religion is in its appeal to the super-human and the super-social; take away that faith, and religion ceases to be itself. Underneath all the varying history of religious experience, there is the inherent assertion of something really beyond ourselves, and not a mere idealization of ourselves. When that assertion is rejected, the characteristic quality of the experience is lost. The primitive urge of "Nature" in the individual and the race does not yield an adequate basis for the religious experience—unless we so personify it as to assume the very thing which we are seeking to explain away. The history of the higher religions confirms this. Primitive Buddhism offered an abstract truth without any theology for the salvation of men; but the logic of human need soon transformed it into a genuine

¹ Cf. Caldecott and Mackintosh, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*, p. 317.

² Ames, *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, p. 397.

³ *ib.*, p. 50.

⁴ *Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse*², p. 611,

religion, with its founder in the central place, wearing the halo of transcendence. It is by that later Buddhism that the ethical philosophies of China have had to reinforce themselves, for ethics alone can never supply a religion.

The problem as to the validity of ethics is closely related to that before us, for the higher forms of religion take up the moral values into themselves. The theories of utilitarianism and evolutionary ethics would explain moral values by the social history and environment. The central criticism of all such theories of "Right by social vote"¹ is that such theories do not explain our moral judgments, either of ourselves or of others. In both there is the difference of attitude which distinguishes moral fault from mere blunder; in both, the approval of e.g. self-sacrifice (as against self-interest) which may be socially inexpedient—we may think of the end of Meredith's novel, *Beauchamp's Career*, and of the words, "This is what we have in exchange for Beauchamp!" when the highly gifted hero has been drowned in rescuing an "insignificant bit of mudbank life." In morality as in religion there is something involved in the very essence of the experience (because belonging to the nature of personality), which refuses to be explained by a lower than itself, and points us forward to some higher plane of reality for its necessary explanation. Both witness to something that is of ourselves, and therefore has a history; but both also witness to something that is not of ourselves, but must be beyond and greater than ourselves. This something may be conceived teleologically and jurally, as by the Hebrew prophets, who base the idea of duty on the will and law of God, or ideally, as by Plato, for whom morality leads to the true expression and

¹ Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, Bk. II, Ch. II, sec. 2.

realization of the self. But morality, like the religion within which it comes to be incorporated, always points to *transcendent* reality, without which its authoritative-ness remains inexplicable.

Whatever be the ultimate ground of religious experience, it is important to notice that it is not piece-meal and fragmentary, not one element amongst others, not even something subtly interwoven with them, so much as something revealed (to the believer) in and through them. The very reason why the term "supernatural" has fallen into disuse with many writers is that it makes an artificial distinction from the "natural". We prefer to conceive the transcendent as immanent. Religious experience is not primarily or chiefly a peculiar field of experience in a larger estate; it is rather an *intensive* culture of common ground; any phase of our common experience can become religious, and any part of our religious experience has other aspects and features, since it is psychologically mediated. This inseparable blending of the human and superhuman in religious experience has most important consequences, of which two should be mentioned here. In the first place it gives rise to those very problems of religious experience which we are discussing. Because this experience is never purely and wholly "religious", because it always involves physical or psychical media (even for the mystic who claims immediacy of contact with God), we may always offer an explanation in terms of these lower aspects of the experience, and ignore the higher. We may, e.g., explain the Church-consciousness as an instance of the gregarious instinct, as it doubtless is, though the question ought to remain open whether it is not something more *as well*. A second result of the intimate blending of the human and the superhuman in religious experience is

the *moral* challenge, involved in the disguise which religious truth of necessity assumes. The religious values have to be judged for their own sake, and by their intrinsic worth. The psychological analysis of such experience is constantly urging the challenge upon us; the more fully we explain, the less possible is it to assert the "supernatural" in the old, easy, and wrong antithesis to the natural. But the result is that the examined and tested religious conviction has now a moral quality of its own. This is well expressed by Phillips Brooks, in regard to the Beatitudes: "how exquisitely these two lights play through them and harmonise with one another, the light that comes to any duty from the command of God that we should do it, and the light which the same duty wins because we ourselves perceive that it is the right thing to do. The essence of every beatitude is in the human heart, and yet the human heart loves to hear the utterance of the beatitudes from the mouth of God, as if they were His arbitrary enactments."¹

For all those, therefore, who know religious experience from within, it contains a reference to some superhuman reality which is either implicit or (usually) explicit, as in the quotation just given. Into the larger confirmation of this reference, the proof of its validity that may be drawn from experience as a whole, and constitutes the subject-matter of the philosophy of religion, we cannot of course here enter; our concern is with the nature of this reality, which brings us to the third fundamental question.

III. Is this superhuman reality "spiritual", and is "Spirit" the best name to give to it? Here we plainly need to recall enough of the history of the term to make its meaning intelligible.² Its lineage runs back through

¹ *The Influence of Jesus*, p. 15. ² See Introduction (3).

the New Testament into both the Hebrew and the Greek conceptions. For the Hebrew, "spirit" (*ruach*) meant primarily the wind, though the wind conceived as superhuman power, and not in our naturalistic way. Hence it came to denote superhuman energy exerted in a man or manifested through him, and ultimately the principle of his life, a synonym of the more usual term for the breath-soul (*nephesh*). Yet it always kept something of the higher suggestion of origin and nature—it denoted primarily the higher side of man's psychical life, and it was always potentially suggestive of the origin of that life in God as creator and sustainer, that is, of the transcendent meaning of spirit. To the Greek, and especially the Stoic, the term owed its connotation of immanent principle, the permeative principle of the life of the world: after passing through the same early stages of meaning as did the Hebrew term (wind and breath), *pneuma* gained a scientific or philosophical connotation, as over against the religious suggestion of the corresponding Hebrew term. In the New Testament, the Greek term largely continues the Hebrew meaning, but with an increased emphasis on the immanence of God, and (in Paul) with the absorption of the whole Christian experience into the range of His activity. The use of the term in the New Testament ranges from a psycho-physical energy of the abnormal kind to the personal presence of God or Christ, conceived as Spirit. At the lower limit, it is fitly used to denote the supernatural; at the higher, it passes into personality. The wide range makes the term "spirit" particularly useful for our subject, which has so many elusive aspects, and varies so much according to the experience of the individual, and his power of discrimination. To which of the possible meanings of "spirit"

does the higher religious experience most fitly affiliate itself ?

The whole trend of our argument suggests the highest of all. This extra-human reality must be super-human, not sub-human, because of its personal activity and kinship with the spiritual nature of man himself. We can indeed argue that spirit (as personal) is the only reality we know, that it becomes in fact "our canon of reality".¹ Primitive animism explained its universe by ascribing "soul" or "spirit" to all activities external to itself. Crude as was the working out of this principle, a great truth underlies it, and in a sense the higher philosophy must ever return to it. If we cannot explain the universe by the one reality we know directly in it, our own consciousness, then there is nothing by which we can ever hope to explain it. Moreover, personality is the highest of all the categories we can conceive. We conjecture degrees of reality below it ; but we have not yet succeeded in conceiving any degree that is above it, other than a more perfect form of itself.²

The category of "Spirit" in the form of personality is needed to explain each of those three chief forms of religious experience to which reference has been made. The acceptance of an order of "Nature" as intelligible involves a recognition of the reality of "Spirit" beyond us, as the source and home of the intelligence we see objectified in the natural order ; the demand is intensified when our experience of "Nature" becomes religious, by the recognition of some control of our lives according to a purpose, wise, loving and perhaps ultimately artistic. This religious faith does not displace

¹ Illingworth, *Personality Human and Divine*, p. 43.

² This is not to be taken as committing us to "pluralism" or to anything more than the assertion of "idealism" in general, over against "naturalism."

Nature, but penetrates beyond it to "Spirit" and comes back to interpret it as spiritual. Similarly, the sense of authoritative values in life, which give so much of the content to the higher religious experience, must imply personality as their home. The ideal character of duty and truth and beauty, the fact that they are ever beyond our utmost achieving, suggests that they are not the projection of the present possessions of the race beyond our horizon, but the revelation of some more perfect personality to whom our ideal is the real; they lie ahead of us, not behind. We are fully entitled to argue that the consciousness of moral obligation is essentially a consciousness of God.¹ This legitimate inference from the "spiritual" values to the Spirit whose possession they are is transcended on the highest levels of religious experience—that of conscious fellowship with God. That fellowship is the logical outcome of all lower forms of religious experience, as personality is of all lower forms of existence. Such fellowship presupposes and assumes a personality in God not less real than in our consciousness of ourselves, a self-consciousness of God as Spirit, as when Paul compares the two personalities in this respect (1 Cor. II. 11), "For who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man which is in him? even so the things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God". We are just as warranted in asserting the reality of God conceived as self-conscious Spirit, in order to explain our fellowship with Him, as we are in accepting the reality of self-conscious spirits around us in human life, in order to explain social intercourse.

A full discussion of the three questions so cursorily reviewed, and of the three conclusions that religious experience is not illusory, that it implies superhuman

¹ Cf. Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, p. 135.

reality, and that this reality is Spirit, would require many volumes. But the review is sufficient to indicate both the modern problems to be met by the theologian, and the new insight into the nature and work of the Spirit of God (or of God as Spirit) which are his reward. None of these questions could have been present to the patristic thinker, for they are the outcome of that post-Reformation development which was indicated at the beginning. That is the chief reason why the formulation of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the fourth century, and the resultant doctrine of the Holy Trinity, are apt to be found so unsatisfying to the modern thinker. There had been a long and keen controversy as to the Second Person before the Nicene formula was reached—that Jesus Christ was “God of God, Light of Light, Very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance (*homoousion*) with the Father”—and there was to be a long and still keener controversy before that conclusion could be vindicated and established in the Catholic Church. But what was there to correspond with this in regard to the Third Person? At Nicaea, there was the bare mention of the Holy Spirit, without any definition of His work or His Person. Cyril of Jerusalem in his *Catechetical Lectures* of 347–8 confines himself virtually to the work of the Spirit, and recommends that we “enquire not curiously into His nature or hypostasis” (xvi. 24). It was not until Athanasius wrote to Serapion in 358–9 that the doctrine of the Holy Spirit was discussed controversially, and then the discussion (such as it is) turns on the analogy to be maintained with the results reached concerning the Son. The arguments of Basil of Cæsarea and of Gregory of Nazianzus from the work to the person of the Holy Spirit are based on the authority of Scripture rather than on the direct appeal

to experience. The Creed ascribed to the Council of Constantinople in 381 expanded the brief reference of Nicaea into a confession of the Spirit, "Holy, Sovereign and Life-giving, Who proceedeth from the Father ; Who with the Father and the Son is together worshipped and glorified ; Who spake by the prophets"—which contributes little to the ultimate issues. Broadly speaking, we may say that the Catholic doctrine of the Holy Spirit was reached by a simple transference of the victorious doctrine of the Son to the Third Person, without any adequate discussion of the new problems,¹ least of all any discussion of them on the basis of Christian experience, the only true basis of a doctrine of the Spirit. May we not say that the "Arian Controversy" of the Holy Spirit is to be found in the centuries since the Reformation, in those very problems which have been before us, and that we are only now beginning to see the new approach to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity through a doctrine of the Spirit based on experience ? The fourth century, by the very manner of its approach to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, divorced the work from the Person. It is our opportunity to return to the standpoint of the New Testament, and to put the work of the Spirit into the foreground of discussion—with all the rich gains of centuries of conflict virtually concerned with the nature and validity of that work. Such, at any rate, will be the aim of the present attempt.

¹ See further, Ch. XI. The brief Macedonian Controversy was little more than an echo of the Arian ; as Loofs remarks (*Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, VIII, p. 229), "Macedonianism was simply the Homoiousianism which, on account of the doctrine of the Spirit, broke away from the Homoiousians adhering to the Nicene Creed."

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF SPIRIT

RECENT tendencies in theology, as illustrated, for example, in the well-known book by Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, have rightly urged us to a deeper sense of the divine transcendence, in fact, of God's unlikeness to man. Yet it remains true, as always, that the fundamental assumption of philosophy and theology, whenever it seeks to pass beyond the human horizon, is God's likeness to man, and that essential kinship without which we could know nothing at all about Him. It is implied in our very vocabulary; what can "Spirit" mean in relation to God, if it be not akin to "spirit" in man? Our highest category is personality, with its essential attribute of spirithood. We cannot use anything greater in relation to the beyond, and we cannot use anything less without foreclosing the issue, and making ourselves more than God. We find, therefore, that this assumption is implicit or explicit in whatever has been said about Him. It is implicit in the words of Jesus, "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him?"¹ It is explicit in the words of Gregory of Nyssa, when he draws a parallel between the mystery of personality in man and in God: "since the nature of our mind, which is the likeness of the Creator, evades our knowledge, it has an accurate resemblance to the superior nature, figuring by

¹ Matt. vii. 11; cf. 1 Cor. ii. 11, Heb. xii. 9, John xiv. 9.

its own unknowableness the incomprehensible Nature.”¹ The Hebrew psalmist thought of the divine king as enthroned upon a shrouded mountain—“clouds and darkness are round about Him”; but the unshakable foundation was visible, since “righteousness and justice are the basis of His throne”, qualities which are the idealization of man’s moral consciousness.²

The assumption is essential to the central doctrine of the Christian faith, the Incarnation, and there is a deep suggestiveness in Sadhu Sundar Singh’s vision:³

“When I entered heaven for the first time I looked all round me and then I asked: ‘Where is God?’ and they answered and said unto me: ‘God is seen here as little as on earth, for God is infinite. But Christ is here, He is the image of the Invisible God, and only in Him can anyone see God, either here or upon earth.’”

Only on this assumption can the human spirit climb, with reverent boldness, the steps of the throne of God, the steps of that idealization of human spirithood which it sees historically realized in Jesus Christ, into the darkness of God’s incomprehensible nature, sure of finding there Spirit akin to itself, though infinitely beyond itself. That implicit faith of every theism finds its amplest warrant in the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, as in the familiar words:⁴

“’Tis the weakness in strength, that I cry for! my flesh, that I seek
In the Godhead! I seek and I find it. O Saul, it shall be
A Face like my face that receives thee; a Man like to me,
Thou shalt love and be loved by, for ever: a Hand like this hand
Shall throw open the gates of new life to thee! See the Christ
stand!”

¹ *On the Making of Man*, XI; E.T. in P.N.F., p. 397.

² Ps. xcvi, 2.

³ As quoted in Heiler’s book, *The Gospel of Sadhu Sundar Singh*, p. 145.

⁴ R. Browning, *Saul*, xviii.

On this assumption, therefore, the argument of the present chapter rests. We shall try to gather the outstanding attributes of spirit in man, in the belief that these will enter into the connotation of Spirit as applied to God. This is the Christian "epistemology"—its theory of knowledge.

I. If we may use the term "spirit" to denote our human self-consciousness, the first thing we may say about it is that spirit operates as a unifying centre. The ego reaches consciousness of its own being (so far as our experience goes), by selecting and co-ordinating its own essential content from the mass of "material" presented to it by the world in which it lives.¹ Shelley's famous figure compared life with "a dome of many-coloured glass", which "stains the white radiance of Eternity". We might adapt this figure to the unifying activity of the spirit of man, by saying that that spirit is a kaleidoscope² which gives the symmetry and beauty of an ordered pattern to the heap of coloured fragments which it makes its own. We shall best keep near to practical experience by thinking of the admirable words of an educationist :³

"Let us consider our practice in early education. As soon as the child's physical life is fairly well established we begin to say that for half an hour or an hour every day the child shall *attend* to some one thing. For at first the child is a mass of chaotic interests and impulses whose notice is attracted and fixed altogether by external occurrences ; but we insist that for a period every day he shall not allow himself to be distracted

¹ For the so-called "multiple personality" of pathology, see the note on p. 269 (Ch. XII).

² Cf. the use made of the same figure in regard to the divine Spirit, Introduction (2).

³ Temple, *The Nature of Personality*, pp. 28, 29.

by anything. That period is called lessons. It scarcely matters what subject is taught: the vital matter is that the child should learn 'attention' in general. Gradually that period is extended, and the whole system of regulations, called 'discipline', is developed, till 'lessons' and 'discipline' together cover nearly the whole of life: then the external pressure is relaxed again, and the individual is set free in the sense that he is now left to the guidance of the habits which discipline has created in him; and the educator may say—"I have created a will in you; at first you were a mere mass of impulses; I have co-ordinated and systematized those impulses so that now you have a real will and purpose of your own; I have forced you into freedom; now go and exercise that freedom."

That which the educator is here said to do may equally well be regarded as the revelation of the operation of spirit as a unifying centre. If it were otherwise, the work of education in any true sense would be unfulfilled and unfulfillable. But, granting the truth of this conception of education, we may go on to claim that religious education completes and crowns the development which so-called "secular" education begins. One supreme aim of religious education is "conversion" (in the broadest sense of the term), and conversion may be taken to "denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities".¹ The point of interest for us is that religious experience issues in, or rather consists of, a unification of man's spirit, which is again a revelation

¹ W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 189.

of the potentialities of that spirit. Of course, this does not mean that spirit is ever static, resting in an achieved unity. The very nature of man is to be a unity in the making, rather than a unity made. The movement is part of the nature; as Illingworth puts it, "in describing anything which has a history, that history must be taken into account as constituting part of the full meaning of the thing."¹ But we can see enough of the direction and character of "spiritual" activity to ascribe this unifying function to spirit as one of its essentials—a unifying function which in view of its products may be called creative. The apostle Paul, in fact, drew a parallel between the story of creation in the first chapter of Genesis and the experience of the believer in whose heart the light of Christ has shone (2 Cor. iv. 6). That which he states theologically may also be stated psychologically, and in that psychological process the human spirit (under the power of the divine) is seen to act as a unifying and therefore creative centre. The whole process of such creation "is to be accepted, not as an unexplained and puzzling exception to an otherwise intelligible scheme of things, but as itself the illuminative fact in which the meaning of the whole infinite process may be read."² It will save us from misleading and perilous inferences from the human spirit to the divine if we note here that the achieved unity of spirit is apparently quite different from the unity of what we call matter. In Professor Webb's words, "The unity of the Mind or Soul is of quite a different kind from that of the Body. . . . The Body as a material system is included within a vaster material system. The other parts of this

¹ *Personality Human and Divine*, p. 23; cf. Underhill, *The Life of the Spirit and the Life of To-day*, p. 55.

² A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*¹, p. 428.

system are external to it and excluded by it. On the other hand the Mind or Soul connects itself with what we may figuratively call its environment not by *excluding* it from but by *including it within* the unity of its own experience."¹ This fact has some important consequences when we speculate as to the Godhead. A doctrine of the Holy Trinity which naïvely assumes that the "Persons" of the Godhead can be conceived in terms of body (as some forms of the "social" theory almost seem to do) has neglected the fact that the human spirit, and therefore presumably the divine Spirit, unifies by inclusion within itself, and that all conceptions which do not recognize this fundamental fact of the inclusive unity of God as Spirit are certainly untrue to human experience of spirit. At a later stage of the argument this fact will point us towards an Augustinian approach to the doctrine of the Trinity, an approach which at least does not sacrifice the unity of the Godhead.

The unifying activity of spirit within our experience finds other applications besides those illustrated in the rise of its own self-consciousness. There is that unity of past and present which underlies our sense of personal identity and so much else in our experience, and the extension of this unity into the future, so that "man lives before and after". The ethical and religious consequences of this unification of the time-process within us are familiar to us all—in the sense of personal responsibility and the power over us of the ideal, or in the sense of guilt and the faith which declares that "your life is hid with Christ in God". We are not here concerned with the many and difficult problems attaching to the time-process in our experience, both psychologically and metaphysically; for the level of the present

¹ *Divine Personality and Human Life*, pp. 272, 273.

argument it is enough to note that whilst the human spirit essentially transcends spatial relations, it is also capable of a partial transcendence of the temporal, or at least such a transfiguration of them as to suggest some far greater transformation wrought within and by the Eternal Spirit. It is true that all our attempts to conceive what the world means to God must break down somewhere, and that the vision of things *sub specie æternitatis* must always be for man an unrealized ideal. Yet it is an ideal of unity that springs from our own experience of a partial unification within our spirits, and is therefore—on our cardinal assumption—no baseless fabric, but legitimate and inevitable speculation. In some sense or other, both for the confident affirmations of intuitive faith, and for the more sober and cautious logic of the intellect, the divine Spirit must act as the unifying centre of that which we could not else rightly call the "Universe".

II. A second characteristic of spirit is seen in its social implications. The quotation from Bishop Temple's account of education has already suggested this ; the rise of self-consciousness is conditioned by, and dependent on, the action of other selves, consciously or unconsciously directed to this end.

As Baldwin¹ puts it :

"a man is a social outcome rather than a social unit" . . .

"Society, we may say, is the form of natural organization which ethical personalities come into in their growth. So also, on the side of the individual, we may define ethical personality as the form of natural development which individuals grow into who live in social relationships."

¹ *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 96, 571

The individual side of this growth is emphasized by McDougall :¹

" we find that the idea of the self and the self-regarding sentiment are essentially social products ; that their development is effected by constant interplay between personalities, between the self and society ; that, for this reason, the complex conception of self thus attained implies constant reference to others and to society in general, and is, in fact, not merely a conception of self, but always of one's self in relation to other selves."

We have long ceased to think of society as an artificial and arbitrary combination of already existent individuals ; social life is the necessary condition for the growth of the individual self, and at the same time it is the revelation of inherent and intrinsic capacities of that self.² The content of the spirit is social ; an essential and inalienable attribute of spirit is its sociality, its dependence on relationship to other spirits in order to realize itself, a dependence apparent, most of all, in the unsociable man. As Mandell Creighton has put it :

" Life is a sum of relationships. There is no independent or self-centred existence. I am what I am in relation to others ; and I know myself by seeing myself reflected in my influence on others, my power of touching their lives and weaving their life and mine into some connected and satisfactory scheme which contains them all and points to further developments. . . . Relationships, founded on a sense of lasting affection, are the sole realities of life."³

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 180.

² Cf. Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, p. 147, " Personality is always social." An imperfect statement of this fact (at a lower level) is to call man a gregarious animal ; but the higher implications of a " society " should be noted.

³ *Life and Letters*, II, pp. 211-213.

It is, then, from the social implications of "spirit" that the whole development of morality proceeds. The structure of human society is necessary for the working out of this development, and conditions it all along the line, so that it is tempting to say, as many have said, that morality is simply a social product. But it would be much nearer the truth to say that society is a spiritual product, and that its external forms of existence come into being because the spiritual units which compose it are essentially social in their inner nature. Thus, when the Hebrew prophets demanded social justice and mercy as the first condition of well-being, they were simply working out the unconscious logic of "spirit" in man. But they did much more than this. They taught that this moral relation of men was the first condition of worship, and essential to true religion, and that the relation of Yahweh to Israel was not so much nationalistic as moral. The relation of God to men thus sprang from His own nature. He revealed himself in human history as Creator, Ruler and Redeemer, calling His people Israel into fellowship with Himself. Thus Yahweh was essentially social in His nature, which is another way of saying that He is spiritual. The New Testament Gospel continues and develops this ethical and religious movement of the Old Testament, and that which underlies both is the great venture of faith, made by the Hebrew prophets and their successors, that what is true of the human spirit is far truer of the Divine. The Christian doctrine of the divine Fatherhood may be regarded as the explication of the nature of divine Spirit, the working out of its social implications. But, though man here as always has advanced from the human to the divine, it is also a necessary part of the truth to say that the revelation of the divine in history and in the sonship of Jesus Christ

throws its penetrating light upon the human. Except for the divine Spirit in His historic work and transcendent powers, we should not have known as we do the nature of spirit in man. In these realms, we cannot possibly separate "discovery" and "revelation", the activity of the human and the divine. But in the light of the realized revelation, we come back to see its warrant already in the nature of human spirit, finding its highest life in relation with other spirits, and realizing its life at the highest in sacrificial devotion and unselfish love. It is through such experiences that men serve their apprenticeship to the knowledge of the divine unselfishness which constitutes the Gospel. A selfish man, i.e. a man whose spiritual nature is yet undeveloped in its social relations, cannot "know" the Gospel of an unselfish God, in the deep Biblical sense of knowledge, though its proclamation may awaken him to the discovery of his own stunted growth. "He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen cannot love God whom he hath not seen."¹

In the light, therefore, of the social implications of the human spirit we have a disclosure of the true nature of the divine, and a rational basis for the historic claims of the Gospel of the Incarnation, and of its ultimate redemptive motive. We more readily and naturally believe that God commends His own love toward us in the death of Christ when we think of the divine nature as working out in full perfection that which is revealed fitfully and imperfectly in the human—as the Apostle, indeed, suggests by his "peradventure for the good man some one would even dare to die" (Rom. v. 7). We may even say that our faith in the love of God for man ultimately rests on the nature of spirit as never content to dwell

¹ 1 John iv. 20.

alone in the desert, never really exhibited in those Epicurean gods, "who haunt

The lucid interspace of world and world,
Where never creeps a cloud, or moves a wind,
Nor ever falls the least white star of snow,
Nor ever lowest roll of thunder moans,
Nor sound of human sorrow mounts to mar
Their sacred everlasting calm!"¹

The truer logic is that of the mystic who penetrates to the nature of spirit and of its social implications and says :

But Thou must need me since I need Thee so,
Crying through day and night for love of Thee !²

III. The third characteristic of spirit is its power to transform that which is presented to it. Whatever be the ultimate relation of body and mind, of matter and spirit, there is that *prima facie* difference between them which warrants the familiar antithesis. We are compelled to think of the physiological data of a sensation, for example, as something quite other than the sensation itself ; indeed, the modern psychologist may speak of the "psychological inexplicability of sensation" as the "fundamental reality" of his science.³

The neurological phenomena are transformed into something else when we see them as sensations ; they have been baptized, so to speak, into the spirit of man, when they emerge in consciousness. This particular transformation (which we know from within) seems to be repeated in some manner or other at the different levels with which the respective sciences deal. As we pass from physics to chemistry, and from chemistry to biology, and from biology to psychology, and from psychology to

¹ Tennyson, *Lucretius*.

² A. E. Waite, in *Oxford Book of Mystical Verse*, p. 438.

³ James Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 103.

ethics, we constantly notice that the phenomena of the lower level reappear on the higher, yet transformed into something new. On any spiritual view of nature this fact is significant, and its presence may be held to shew that our view of nature should be spiritual. At any rate within the human consciousness we see the alchemy of spirit continually in operation, as in the psychological process by which the sensation becomes a perception, and perceptions are built up into the conceptions which make intellectual activity possible. The mind is far other than a passive recipient of "impressions"; it is through and through an active transforming agent, always doing something with what is presented to it.¹

In the realms of moral and religious activity, this transforming power of spirit is not less continuous and important. In these realms, the fact of prime importance is the *meaning* of the experience, its relation to the responsible moral agent or believer in God. The higher we go, the further away we get from the mere event, and the more depends on the attitude of the man to it. So important is this activity of spirit in the transformation of meanings that Wordsworth has not hesitated to give it the highest rank of all, in his "Character of the Happy Warrior."

Who, doomed to go in company with Pain,
And Fear, and Bloodshed, miserable train !
Turns his necessity to glorious gain ;
In face of these doth exercise a power
Which is our human nature's highest dower ;
Controls them and subdues, transmutes, bereaves
Of their bad influence, and their good receives.

¹ A special aspect of this power, brought into prominence by the "New Psychology" is afforded by "sublimation"—the transference of instinctive energies such as the sex instinct, to social or "ideal" activities, which implies a transformation of meaning. (See McDougall, *Abnormal Psychology*, pp. 473-476).

This transforming power of spirit is of the greatest practical importance in our religious experience, and therefore in our ultimate theology and metaphysic. The checks and hindrances which thwart every human life are to one man simply bad "luck", to another the inevitable and impersonal working of natural law, to another the malignant action of some mysterious hostile power, to yet another the wise disposition of a heavenly Father. The difference is not in the actual series of events, but in the attitude of the different men. We might be tempted to say loosely that they shared a common "experience". Yet this is not true; the difference is in the activity of spirit which transforms the raw material of experience into something experienced by that particular spirit. There can be no more striking example of this than the transformation of the Cross of Christ from the wooden instrument of a dreamer's death to the supreme altar of the Christian faith, whether we think of His own view of His death as a redeeming ransom, or that of Paul in regard to the stumbling-block of a crucified Messiah. Within the individual life the most familiar example is that of conversion. From one point of view, it is, as we have seen, an example of the unifying activity of spirit, but the resultant personality equally shews the power of spirit to transform the past and the present and the future. Former vices are now regarded by the Christian under the religious category of sins, involving the new element of guilt; the present opportunity of helping another man becomes a positive call of God to service; the mystery of the body's death is not a step into the dark, but the entrance from the twilight of this world into the warmth and light of the Father's home. This is the point of Jeremy Taylor's prayer: "Lord, turn my necessities into virtue; the works of nature into the works of

grace ; by making them orderly, regular, temperate, subordinate and profitable to ends beyond their own proper efficacy.”¹

In that typical prayer we see in what the Christian transformation really consists ; it means that spirit is moving upwards towards Spirit, and seeking to share some higher conception of the meaning of life. We may indeed so far generalize as to say that every solution or partial solution of the ultimate problems of life is some form of reference to a postulated higher meaning, so that we look down from a higher level on the tangled paths and obstructive buildings, and see them as in an airman’s photograph of the country beneath him. It may be held for example that there is no strictly psychological solution of the problem of human freedom ; we seem on that level of psychology to move in a closed circle of motive, attention, interest, character, which leaves no room for the self to enter as an efficient agent ; yet from the higher level of personality we may more or less clearly see that all this is taken up into the reality of personality, so that the fact of freedom is safe-guarded.²

This transforming activity of the human spirit is so comprehensive that we may be tempted to see in it a complete escape from the evil of that spirit’s past history. If the meaning of that past is what matters, and this meaning can be so changed by a change of attitude, such as that of Christian conversion, is not salvation sufficiently defined as an adequate change of will ? But we encounter in the fact of “ sin ” something that will not yield itself to such human transformation. Whilst I retain the sense of personal identity, no change of will on my part can

¹ *Holy Living*, Ch. I, *ad fin.*

² Cf. *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, by H. Wheeler Robinson, p. 292.

alter the two facts that "I have *sinned*", and that "*I have sinned*". It is true that the *consequences* of sin in human experience may be utterly transformed and even gladly accepted by the penitent heart, as both justice and discipline and a stimulus to new consecration, and a man may cry, with Myers' "St. Paul", "Purge from the sin, but never from the pain." But here, as elsewhere in Christian theology, sin shows itself to be a surd, an irrational element. The temporal penalty lies within our transforming power, but not the Godward aspect of sin, its guilt. The rebellion of spirit against Spirit, and (for the Christian) the churlish repudiation of, or indifference to "grace", have an eternal significance, at least in the sense of lying beyond time. This is the testimony of Christian experience as a whole, and it is confirmed by the permanent place of a doctrine of Atonement in Christian theology, and by the ideas of propitiation and sacrifice in so many religions. That which proves impossible for man is referred, in however clumsy and inadequate a fashion, to God. Perhaps there is no more vital question for a doctrine of atonement than this—how does divine Spirit succeed where human spirit fails, in the transformation of the guilt of sin?

In the transforming activity of the human spirit we have a suggestive line of approach to the conceivable transformation of the meaning of human history when taken up into the divine Spirit. Part of that change will be seen in the actual transformation of human spirits under the influence of the divine. It may well be that the residual part, concerned with "the reality of history", which creates the primary problem of atonement, consists in a transformation of the meaning of guilt analogous, though on a far higher level, to the transformation of the consequences of sin within our present experience. The very

consciousness of guilt implies that there is something in sin that concerns the divine Spirit. But if it concerns Him, He cannot leave it out of His reckoning; He cannot adequately deal with it by simply ignoring it. On the other hand, Holy Spirit cannot be brought into relation with sin except through suffering, if we follow the experience of human sainthood. The relation of the saint to the sinner always involves suffering, the suffering of holiness accepting the burden of sin. In proportion to the holiness of the saint, the guilt of the sinner is in some degree already transformed into the suffering of the saint. Imperfect as the analogy must be, yet it seems to suggest the relation of the holy grace of divine Spirit to the guilt of human spirit, and the vision of a world redeemed from its guilt as well as from the power of its sin, in such a way of spiritual transformation that the final result is nobler and richer than a sinless world could ever have been.

IV. Finally, there is the characteristic use by spirit of media, or "degrees of reality" lower than itself, as in the relation of soul to body. We do not indeed know exactly what that relation is, but we know it must be of the most intimate kind, so that animism, ancient or modern, does not seem to do justice to it. Professor Pringle-Pattison finds it sufficient to think of "the living body as the embodied soul"¹ on the lines of Aristotle, and this view has an interesting kinship with Hebrew ideas of psychology, according to which human personality consists of an animated body, and not, as in the Platonic conception, an incarnate soul.² We can hardly speak with any scientific accuracy of "cause and effect" when we are dealing with

¹ *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 92.

² See my essay on "Hebrew Psychology" in *The People and the Book*, p. 362.

factors so disparate as are consciousness and its physiological data or accompaniments. In fact, as we have no experience of disembodied spirit, and can certainly have no experience of body except in terms of consciousness, we shall keep much closer to the actual evidence if we do not try to separate them. But this is to admit as a characteristic of spirit within our present experience (reserving all questions of what may lie beyond death) that it always functions through body, that is through something lower than itself. This does not apply only to communications with others; it characterizes the whole inner life, both in its actual functioning and in its psychical products.¹ The whole content of consciousness has been built up around the unifying centre, and through that content the ego has come to self-consciousness; from the very beginning (within the limits of our experience) the body is essential to the spirit of man. It would not be fanciful to call this characteristic the sacramentalizing activity of spirit, if we may use the term in the broadest sense.² In using this term, there is no intention to pronounce beforehand on any particular theory of the Sacraments in ecclesiastical usage. But, on any adequate theory, they and the Incarnation raise the ultimate problem of nature and history by their union (in some sense or other) of the spiritual and the material—the problem of the universal and the particular. We find it at the very centre of our own consciousness in the intimate relation of soul and

¹ Thus the alleged "immediacy" of mystical experience can be only relative. Cf. Tennant, *The Concept of Sin*, p. 229; Lechler, *Lehre vom heiligen Geiste*, II, p. 267: "unsre Natur duldet es nicht dass wir den Geist denken ohne Natur."

² On this, see Ch. VII, where it will be argued that the sacramental character of the ecclesiastical rites must belong to the whole act rather than to the elements in themselves. The sacramental transformation is linked to the "sublimation" of faith, not to any change wrought in elements at a lower level than personality.

body. Their union is, indeed, not yet a realized unity. Spirit is always tending to unify, but in our experience it has not yet unified the body to itself, and the apostle Paul expected that there would have to be a "spiritual" body before deliverance from the "flesh" could be complete. Our life is always something of a compromise—a continued struggle, even at the best, to express and articulate the higher through the lower, and at the worst, the tragedy of a captive spirit, ever unreconciled to its bondage of sense.

We can see, also, that the indwelling of the divine Spirit in humanity, whether by the Incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, or by the continuance of His presence through the Holy Spirit in the hearts of believers, must always involve a "kenosis", a humiliation and an acceptance of the lower as the medium of the higher, though this principle of limitation need not imply the duality of mind and matter. We have here, indeed, a true parallel, in the reverse direction, to the transforming activity of spirit. As there we saw spirit constantly taking up the lower into itself, and thereby giving it a new meaning, and consequently a new reality, so here we see spirit necessarily embodying itself in the lower, in order to express and realize itself. This is the great systole and diastole of Spirit (reflected in spirit), the heart-beats of God, the interplay of transcendence and immanence, never adequately stated in any intellectualistic categories, but recognizable in activities at least adumbrated in the activities of our own spirits, in their whole and concrete personality. If this be true, the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, like the Christian doctrine of Atonement, finds its confirmation in the doctrine of the Spirit, and the general trend of our argument points to the ultimate unity of mind (Spirit) and

matter. "Matter" must be ultimately spiritual, however much lower its level of reality than "Mind".

It need hardly be said that every paragraph, indeed, almost every sentence in this division of the subject, has entered but a little way into the realm of the great problems and discussions of philosophy and theology through many generations. Yet even so cursory a review of the nature of spirit and Spirit as this may enable us to reach a point of view materially contributing to our interpretation of life. We have seen spirit in man unifying, socializing, transforming and sacramentalizing the material offered to it, and we have carried these activities in some measure up to the divine Spirit, on the ground of essential kinship between spirit and Spirit. (All this implies that "values" as well as "facts" have a real place in the universe.) Through all these and other activities, the unity of spirit is maintained, and the activities are not successive or divisible, but simultaneous and distinguishable only for thought. They are aspects of the one and indivisible operation of spirit, its dynamic movement and self-realization. On the human side, this movement is upwards to the divine; on the divine side, this movement is downwards towards the human—if spatial figures may be used in a non-spatial realm of thought. The Christian faith and the Christian creed are the historic manifestation of this philosophy of spirit and Spirit. Let us so far anticipate the aim of this book by trying to translate these abstract terms into the more familiar and concrete language of Christian experience. A typical expression of the working faith of the modern Christian might be something like this. In every man there is something of God, which Christ claims. Loyalty to that claim means new strength of character, new power to serve men, new peace of heart with God; it makes of

life a fascinating adventure, with somebody caring for us all the way. If we go on, we shall win through, though we stagger under a cross, for in death as in life, we belong to God. There we have the upward dynamic of spirit. On the other hand, among the primary assertions of a Christian creed, there are these. In the fulness of the time, God sent forth His Son to be the Saviour of the world ; Jesus Christ was God manifest in the flesh ; He gave His life a ransom for many ; God raised Him from the dead, has committed to Him the issues of time and eternity, and through Him gives the Holy Spirit¹ to them that obey God. The only way of salvation is that of repentance towards God, faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and new birth through the Holy Spirit. There we have the downward dynamic of Spirit. The initiative is divine : the priority is God's ; " we love, because He first loved us." When Phillips Brooks near the end of his life was asked by a young clergyman what had been its secret, the most essential and striking part of his answer was this :

" All experience comes to be but more and more pressure of His life on ours. . . . Less and less, I think, grows the consciousness of seeking God. Greater and greater grows the certainty that He is seeking us and giving Himself to us to the complete measure of our present capacity." (*Life*, II, p. 871).

¹ The phrase is, of course, Scriptural and not philosophical ; the spiritual cannot be " given " in the sense in which the material can be given.

CHAPTER IV

THE REVELATION OF SPIRIT

SIR RICHARD STEELE'S famous compliment to Lady Elizabeth Hastings, "To love her is a liberal education", is more than a brilliant epigram; it states the fundamental principle of all education, which is the contact of spirit with spirit. The whole technique and discipline of knowledge is a means to this end, and a means already revealing the end. Language itself is not a merely mechanical device for the communication of thought; language is more or less crystallized thinking, and its very structure is a revelation of spirit. The natural sciences are robbed of their highest function when they are pursued simply as the technique of a trade or profession; they are the interpretation of an intelligible world, and their data are the alphabet of spirit. The social environment into which we are born is more than the cradle of individual existence; it is a necessary medium through which we establish contact, primarily with the spirits of our contemporaries, secondarily with those of our predecessors. In this way, history in the largest sense of the term becomes the material of education—the history that yet lives in the society to which we belong, and the history that reaches us through the records of the past: "a good book is the precious life-blood of a master-spirit, embalmed and treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life."¹ History fulfils that

¹ Milton, *Areopagitica*, p. 8 of "Temple Classics" Ed.

function because it is the revelation of Spirit through spirit to spirit, and the devout mind will ever be led to pray with James Martineau, "Awaken us to feel how great a thing it is to live at the end of so many ages, heirs to the thoughts of the wise, the labours of the good, the prayers of the devout."¹

I. But, before we try to consider the content of this revelation of Spirit through the history of the natural world and of human life, there is a cardinal principle to be remembered, which we have found to belong to the nature of spirit as such. This is the principle of "kenosis", i.e. the self-emptying and humiliation of spirit when it expresses itself, as it always must, in "degrees of reality" lower than itself. This principle is presented to us at the very centre of our human experience, in the intimate relation and co-operation of body and mind. Every revelation of our own consciousness to other spirits involves the use of media which limit and modify that consciousness. This fact seen from the lower level of the medium gives us the "sacramental" principle, since the physical acquires a new and higher meaning when it is taken up into the psychical order. But, seen from the higher level, it gives us the principle of kenosis, since the spiritual lays aside some of its own attributes and powers when clothing itself in the material.

We may speak with most confidence of the application of this principle in the realm of art, for here man is seen most clearly as creative spirit. His spirit, finely touched, seeks the fine issue of artistic expression in this or that medium. Lafcadio Hearn² well expresses this consciousness of "religious" inspiration: "I think art gives a new faith . . . could I create something I felt

¹ *Home Prayers*, p. 6.

² In a letter quoted in Meynell's *Life of Francis Thompson*, p. 23.

to be sublime, I should feel also that the Unknowable had selected me for a mouthpiece, for a medium of utterance in the holy cycling of its eternal purpose, and I should know the pride of the prophet that has seen the face of God." But the instinctive endeavour to express the commanding vision is met by what we may call the recalcitrancy of the particular medium. When the difficulties of technique have been laboriously overcome, there always remains the limitation of that chosen medium, whether it be pigments on canvas, or the sound-waves of air, or the block of marble, or the rhythmic use of words. Sir Claude Phillips, for example, in his essay on "What the Brush cannot Paint",¹ selects the lines beginning "How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank", as uttering something that is quite beyond the reach of pictorial art. We cannot translate a symphony into a poem, because the form in each case is so essentially wedded to the matter that, as a work of art, the marriage is indissoluble. Each medium prescribes its own range of ideal possibility. Not only so, but every medium is confessedly inadequate to the artist's ideal, so that the poet cries with Francis Thompson, "For ever the songs I sing are sad, With the songs I never sing."²

If then, we are seeking to elicit from the natural world its revelation of Spirit we must expect a similar limitation of that which can be expressed through this particular medium, quite apart from our speculations as to the precise nature and cause of the limitation. Plato conceived God to work on a pre-existent chaos, the disorder of which in the necessity of things could never be reduced to perfect order, so that this formless material "brings division, conflict and change into the life of the created

¹ *Emotion in Art*, pp. 35-50, ² *Life*, p. 305,

universe".¹ Leibnitz traced the evil of the universe to the principle of finitude: "the creatures have their perfections from the influence of God, but they have their imperfections from their own nature, which is incapable of existing without limits,"² an explanation which applies to human life as well as to the order of inanimate Nature. The apostle Paul reverses the Platonic explanation, and sees in the travail-pangs of Nature the curse that followed on human sin (Rom. VIII. 21, 22). The common feature in these and all similar explanations is the recognition that the medium, or the medium as we know it, is inadequate to the expression of the creative art of God; from which it follows that the revelation of Spirit discerned in the product must be subject to the principle of kenosis.

The consequences of this principle for a philosophy of revelation are by no means unimportant. If we accept it as true (and we have seen that it is a deduction from our intimate experience of the relation of spirit to body) we shall not look for a complete revelation of Spirit in any one realm of expression, and we shall be prepared to consider the possible emergence of alien elements, at least where other spirits than the divine are active. From some quiet hillside by night we may look up to the perfect order and beauty of the starry sky, and down upon the gaudy lights and colours and discordant din of a village fair. There are some attributes of Spirit revealed in the sky above that are not very obvious in the crowd beneath; yet there are immeasurably greater revelations of Spirit in the interplay of human lives than the sky can ever afford. The kenosis involved when Holy Spirit dwells

¹ Edward Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, I, p. 245; cf. James Adam, *The Religious Teachers of Greece*, p. 362.

² *Monadology*, § 42.

in sinful men, raises new issues as compared with the kenosis involved in creation, or in the Incarnation of the holy Son of God in a sinless human personality. It is easy to forget the great miracle of grace which underlies the simplest experience of the divine presence; but it is implied in every believer's consciousness of unworthiness. "Where wast Thou, my dearest Lord, when my heart was full of darkness and filth?" the Lord answered, "I was within thy heart, my daughter."¹ Yet the testimony of Christian experience confirms the evidence of ordinary consciousness, and warrants us in carrying our principle throughout the whole realm of revelation.² In the light of the principle of kenosis, therefore, we shall neither look for a revelation of Spirit divorced from any medium, and consequently inexpressible, nor reject such revelation because it is conditioned by the medium it necessarily employs. This is not intended to minimize the value of "mystical" communion with God; but the quality of immediacy must always be relative in human experience, which is always psychically, even if not physically, mediated.

II. Our present concern is not to demonstrate the truth of theism on the basis of the order of Nature; unless the data of religious experience are in our premise, the God of religion will not be in our conclusion.³ We ask simply what those who already believe in the reality and know some of the activities of spirit may find revealed through the external world of Nature. The educational significance of science at once suggests part of the answer. Human intelligence implies the intelligibility of Nature. If Nature

¹ St. Catherine of Siena, quoted by Barns, in a note to Scupoli's *Spiritual Combat*, p. 280.

² Cf. "The Kenosis of the Spirit" by H. Wheeler Robinson, in *The Expository Times*, of August, 1924.

³ Cf. Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, p. 82.

were not intelligible, no science would be possible, no self-conscious and intelligent life conceivable. It is the order of Nature that educates us in orderly thinking, and so brings out the latent capacities of spirit. This is possible only through "that recognition of the intelligible by intelligence, that greeting of spirit by spirit, for which idealists have always contended."¹

Every step forward in scientific discovery, the location of an unknown planet by mathematical reasoning, the ascription of malarial fever to the bite of the mosquito, the application of radio-activity to diagnosis or curative treatment, depends on this intelligibility and continuous order. The passion for scientific truth is a spiritual passion; the glow of conviction by which a mathematical proof is transformed into an intrinsic reality is a spiritual conviction.² It is true that Nature never lives up to the ideal of mathematics, the most abstract of the sciences, and the theory of relativity has shewn that even the statement of the fundamental laws of motion is subject to modification in the time-space realm of physics. But, when allowance is made for the limitations of the medium, and for the still greater limitations due to our ignorance of so much that has yet to be learnt of Nature's ways, we are justified in saying that "the more we know of the world, the more it becomes like a home in which the religious can breathe freely."³ In saying this, we include in the revelation of spirit in Nature, not only intelligibility, order and continuity, but also progress and beauty. There, is of course, a peril in using such a word

¹ Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II, p. 254.

² Cf. J. St. Loe Strachey, *The Adventure of Living*, pp. 125, 126, where he describes the thrill of intellectual truth experienced in his first discovery of the logic of Euclid I, 47. "Come what might, $a^2=b^2+c^2$."

³ J. A. Thomson, *Science and Religion*, p. 175.

as "progress", which may so easily lend itself to the fallacies of the old argument from "design", the flank of which has been turned by evolution. But some word is needed to describe the increasing differentiation and integration of Nature and the higher values which are reached by this process.¹

The revelation of beauty in Nature—"one impulse from a vernal wood"—cannot be explained away as a mere by-product of no spiritual significance, or as a mere means to the end of survival in organic evolution. There is a quality in natural beauty which refuses reduction to something lower than itself, and constantly becomes a communication of spirit to spirit in the higher consciousness of man. The high priest of this true religion is Wordsworth, and its gospel is recorded in "Tintern Abbey", where the beauty of Nature is claimed as the medium of both ethical motive and religious trust, because it is sacramental by the immanent presence of active spirit. But the poet uses there the adjective "sublime" to describe this ultimate recognition and response, and the sense of Nature's sublimity is something distinct from, though often related to, the sense of Nature's beauty. An essential element in that which is rightly called "sublime" is the exalted and lofty, that which is beyond us, whether in physical magnitude or in spiritual quality. The physical magnitudes of Nature are so far the medium of the revelation of spirit as they help to give us a true perspective of things *within their own order*; they are misleading when they are made a ground for disparagement of that to which they have no direct relation—the spiritual magnitudes. The whole of the sterner side of Nature has its sublime aspect. But what are we to say of the ethical quality of the revelation of spirit in Nature?

¹ J. A. Thomson, *Science and Religion*, p. 173.

The anthropomorphic discussion of the moral character of Nature is avoided by a recognition of the principle of kenosis. Whatever Nature ultimately is, it is a medium that imposes limitations on the revelation.¹ The ascription of the creation and conservation of Nature to the one God we worship through Christ may easily induce us to make ethical demands on Nature which will be disappointed, and may then lead to an equally ill-grounded denunciation of Nature's immoralities, such as that of John Stuart Mill. But just as we have been led to recognize the existence of the "numinous" in God (the realm of His being that is not *prima facie* reducible to ethical terms, but belongs rather to the realm of "holiness" in its original sense), so Nature may exhibit a non-moral or sub-moral realm below us in the scale of reality, that will not be without ultimate significance for our moral development. One aspect of this, for example, has been urged by Baron von Hügel²—the purification of the human spirit by its clash with the impersonal, the sanction of a determined world (like that of ancient eschatologies) in a world personally determinable. There is real need that we should not expect every revelation of Spirit to be made in the moralizing terms of a sermon. It may be granted that this leaves us with the problem of reconciling the God of Nature with the God of morality ;

¹ Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of God*, p. 415 : "Contingency is written across the face of nature—not in the sense that what happens is not determined by natural law, but in the sense that it appears to be *only* so determined, and cannot, in its detail, be brought within the scope of any rational or beneficent purpose."

² *The Mystical Element in Religion*, II, pp. 378 ff.; cf. Webb. op. cit., p. 73. As a parallel to the moral judgment of Nature as "red in tooth and claw" we may note the denunciation of Christianity as cruel and inhuman by a Chinese who had seen the anatomical illustrations in the book of a Christian medical missionary, without understanding their purpose (Timothy Richard, *Forty-five Years in China*, pp. 89 f.).

but what if we are not intended to find that reconciliation on terms lower than those of religion, with its vision of God reconciling and redeeming by a new spiritual initiative?

III. Over against Nature's characteristic revelation of Spirit in terms of intelligence, beauty and sublimity, we have the higher revelation through human personality, in terms of individuality, moral consciousness and religious aspiration. Whatever individuality may belong to things as distinct from persons, it is not anything that science can recognize, for science is concerned with universals, and its explanations are given in terms common to several individuals.¹ It is the emergence of personal self-consciousness which first reveals the meaning of individuality.² The unique attribute of all *my* experience is that it is *mine*, and not somebody else's. We may, of course, explain this away (cf. the tendencies of Absolute Idealism) as being more or less of an illusion. But if we take it seriously, it must point to a kenosis of Spirit of a kind different from any yet exhibited. From the external point of view, every human life may be regarded as revealing something of God. At high levels of life, we may recognize the truth of the prophet Jeremiah's claim to be predestinate of God: "Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee"—so that the prophet was, as Duhm finely puts it, a thought of God, pre-existing in His mind before his human existence. Even when it is much more difficult to discern the union of the human spirit with

¹ Cf. Webb, *Divine Personality and Human Life*, pp. 197 ff. "Universals" is here the equivalent of what is general; strictly speaking, we are taken into philosophy when we use the term "universal".

² It also shows the process of unification, as was argued in Ch. III, and will be further developed in the treatment of Christian experience.

the divine Spirit, we may think as Matthew Arnold does of Heine :

The Spirit of the world,
Beholding the absurdity of men—
Their vaunts, their feats—let a sardonic smile,
For one short moment, wander o'er his lips.
That smile was Heine !

Yet when we have recognized the prophetic message and the sardonic smile as both in their different ways a revelation of Spirit, we still remain conscious that Jeremiah was more than such a message from God's lips as Heine was more than such a smile upon them. Each of us exists for himself as well as for God and is " subject " as well as " object " ; to each of us belongs a world of unique happenings, as is well brought out in some words which Thomas Hardy has put into the mouth of one of his heroines, at a tragic crisis of her life :

" they will never, never realize that it was my single opportunity of existence, as well as of doing my duty, which they are regarding ; they will not feel that what to them is but a thought, easily held in those two words of pity, ' Poor girl ! ' was a whole life to me ; as full of hours, minutes and peculiar minutes, of hopes and dreads, smiles, whisperings, tears, as theirs ; that it was my world, what is to them their world, and they in that life of mine, however much I cared for them, only as the thought I seem to them to be."¹

In regard to the revelation of divine Spirit through human personality, one feature is of supreme importance—the unity of the consciousness of what is revealed as being both God's and our own. Revelation often claims, and in the higher values must claim, a general

¹ *Desperate Remedies*, XIII, 4.

validity; yet in the manner of its realization there is the uniqueness and individuality of personal discovery. We may regard these as different "aspects" of the unity of Spirit, or different "factors" in the production of that unity. The terms are not interchangeable, for "aspects" puts the emphasis on the ultimate unity, and "factors" on the real co-operation of man and God, wherein two distinct philosophies are implied, as far apart as are, say, Absolute Idealism and Pluralism. Our present concern, however, is not to discuss these and other attempts to solve the problem, but to notice that our experience achieves that which our philosophy has not yet attained—it reconciles the universal and the particular in the unity of a revelation of what is God's, and at the same time, and not less really, mine. The moral passion for social righteousness cherished by the Hebrew prophet was a genuine "revelation" of higher values, yet it was not less a personal "discovery", and these were blended into the unity of an experience which underlies the prophet's "Thus saith the Lord". We can give a psychological analysis of that experience which yields us no more than "Thus saith the prophet", whilst a dogmatic theory of inspiration has sometimes claimed that the message was wholly divine. The truth does not lie between these extremes but above them, in the unity of an experience which we cannot explain, but cannot deny, the unity of the fellowship of the human spirit with the divine.

The world of moral consciousness, to which reference has just been made, belongs strictly to the realm of persons. Morality implies the relation of personal agents in responsible activity, and in this sense Nature is non-moral. It is perhaps only by more or less of anthropomorphism (as in primitive animism) that we speak of

Nature's "altruism" when we note the working of animal instincts, such as the parental and social. Whatever evolutionary preparation is made for the moral consciousness below man, it is on the plane of the self-consciousness of human personality that the moral revelation begins. We have seen that morality is developed through social relation, and the essential sociality of spirit. The conflicts of morality to which its positive achievements are due, are not simply between the sociality of spirit and the "egoism" of natural instinct passed up into self-consciousness; we are as anthropomorphic when we speak of Nature's egoism as when we speak of her altruism. It is Nature's *indifference* to moral issues that often seems her most terrible feature. What Nature seems to offer us is the stern inevitability of things, the determinism which asserts itself so strongly in the economic necessities that seem to govern society; egoism and altruism, in the full sense of the words, are first displayed by the personal members of that society. We have here another example of the transforming power of spirit, which we have seen to be essential to its being. When Nature is lifted up to the level of spiritual consciousness, it becomes necessarily subject to morality, and economic necessities are themselves summoned before the tribunal of the moral consciousness. Within that consciousness, the salient fact of experience is the union of otherness and selfhood in the sense of moral obligation, so that duty is at once a law and an ideal. For those who believe that there is no adequate explanation of morality which does not trace it back to the ultimate pressure of Spirit upon spirit, every act of moral choice becomes a new revelation of God. Nor is even the immoral choice left without the testimony of His presence; the remorse that may follow in the track of the evil choice demonstrates the divine as

emphatically as the approbation of a conscience void of offence towards God and man,¹ and indeed "a killing sin" may be needed to "stab my spirit broad awake".² From a higher standpoint, however, a real difference emerges between the good and the evil choice. The good choice makes the divine Spirit more apparent, because more really present in the world; the evil choice denies Him, rebels against Him, brings into existence something that is wholly alien to Him, and constitutes a new challenge both to our own thought and to God's purpose. It is at this point that the moral problem passes into the religious.

In the ethical religions, such as the religion of Israel's prophets, the moral consciousness of the race is taken up into its religious faith, both as to God's character and God's requirements. But religious faith marks and constitutes a new level of revelation. Religious aspiration has been aptly compared with the putting forth of tendrils by the plant to seek and find support through some strength beyond its own, and we cannot think that these tendrils simply coil on themselves.³ The religious interpretation is that every exhibition of religious strength witnesses to unseen Spirit, the invisible reality to which the visible tendrils cling. The religious interpretation brings into play a new factor of the highest importance, the religious experience in the full and proper sense. God may gird Cyrus for his imperial task whilst he remains unconscious of that help (Isa. XLV. 5); but until the consciousness of Cyrus is evoked, he neither enters into a religious relation nor gains the larger help of the knowledge that he is being helped. The idols of Babylon are a burden for beasts, needing to be helped; the God of Israel, said the prophet, glories in

¹ Cf. the notable passage in Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, p. 109.

² R. L. Stevenson, *The Celestial Surgeon*.

³ J. A. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

being a burden-bearer (Isa. XLVI. 1-4). With such conceptions, we pass from the ethical to the redemptive plane of religion—unless we refuse to make any ultimate distinction, and regard redemption as the divine morality, Spirit's burden of spirit. The open secret of the universe is "a God who lives in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares in the life of his finite creatures, bearing in and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the suffering without which they cannot be made perfect."¹

IV. The revelation of Spirit in human personality consists, therefore, in an experience of fellowship with God whether the experienced values are moral, intellectual or aesthetic. In this fellowship we can never hope to analyse exactly the human and the divine contributions ; genuine religious experience springs from their most intimate and subtle blending. The declarations we make about it will vary greatly in their emphasis on the one factor or the other, though the deeper and more advanced the experience the more the emphasis tends to fall on the divine Spirit, even to the often *alleged* exclusion of the human. But spirit, even in the overwhelming presence of the divine Spirit, is always active, and never wholly passive, though relatively it may be so described, and there can be no revelation of the divine into which the human does not, however infinitesimally, enter. Religiously this presents no difficulty ; there is no disturbance in such a thought as came to John Foster, as he worshipped in the Battersea Meeting :² "To the continent of Human Nature, I am a small *island* near its coast ; to the Divine Existence I am a small *peninsula*." But philosophically, some of the greatest problems of human thought come

¹ Pringle-Pattison, op. cit., p. 411.

² *Life and Correspondence*, by J. E. Ryland, 1846, Vol. I, p. 183.

into sight at this point, the problems that are the touchstones of all systems of philosophy, and can never attain a final solution, because we can handle them only from the manward and never from the Godward side. How can there be room within infinite Spirit for the finite individuation of spirits? What is the relation of the universal to the particular, or of the eternal to the temporal? How can man's struggle to achieve involve real issues when his religious consciousness is forever demanding that the unachieved already exists in God? Is human history a reality in any sense that does not make man's consciousness of *real* participation in it illusory?

Such questions as these—all closely related to each other—are of cardinal importance both to the discussion of revelation and to the whole subject of this book. The point of view here taken is that human history is a reality, not simply as the unfolding of a divine purpose and the revelation of a divine nature, but as the realization of human spirit according to its own consciousness of a new and unique value. It is here that the actual existence of moral evil becomes philosophically important. If we cannot explain its presence—and no system of philosophy has rationally explained it without explaining it away—we must be content to call it a surd, an irrational element, a "sin", i.e. a rebellion against God (to take the most familiar religious description). This implies a real activity of man in the exercise of his moral freedom. But it also implies a limitation of God within the temporal sphere, which must be, for an adequate conception of God, a self-limitation. Whether this disturbing element in the moral realm is related to the "recalcitrancy" of Nature (as it might be on a theory of pan-psychism, ascribing some measure of will and initiative to forms of existence lower than man), or

whether it begins only with personal spirit, we have here a most powerful warning against sacrificing religious realities to philosophic unity.

If our consciousness of real activity is not illusory, then the perspective of human history cannot be envisaged as the biology of an organism. We can never reduce the writing of history to an exact science, because there are not only life-forces but living *agents* at work. It may be useful or necessary to abstract from these, and trace the development of nations, the rise and fall of communities, as though they could be analysed into impersonal terms. But "the key to the meaning of historic development is not to be found in a generalized conception of the process as a whole but in the psychical life of individual selves".¹ This implies real human initiative, though it must not be taken to imply "a universe of chance". In differing ways and degrees, these free activities are achieving the unity of a divine purpose. They may be irreconcilably opposed to one another; yet their clash and interaction may realize a truth larger than either group has seen. We cannot analyse history into such free activity (of course within the material and economic conditions) on the one hand, and the divine purpose that embraces it on the other; but to believe that such a unity including both is being constantly achieved is simply to postulate for the race what we know to be true of the individual life in its religious fellowship with God. In this experience we are conscious of something that is both ours and His, without "interference" with either activity; the very quality of the experience is in this reciprocity. However dimly we may envisage the same unity of man's work and God's on the broad expanse of human history, and however

¹ Galloway: *The Principles of Religious Development*, p. 17; he goes on to quote Sigwart's saying that psychical events in men are the real kernel of history.

imperfect the achievement of spiritual values, we may claim that here also there is a positive addition to those values through their "realization" in the human generations, and through it a revelation of divine Spirit, which the tragic side of human history does not obliterate. Indeed the tragedy may but serve to bring out the true significance of the spiritual values, as Plato felt with his crucified "just man" and Shakespeare must have felt with his strangled Cordelia.

When we try to conceive the possible goal of human history, apart from philosophical or theological considerations, we meet our inherent difficulty in a new form. We must agree that "neither the idea of a perfect final state in time nor that of endless progress in time satisfies the demands of a consistent theory".¹ We cannot be content to sacrifice the rights of the present to the future, and to regard all human spirits save those of the last generation as merely means to an end, nor can we rest in the thought of unlimited movement towards a never to be reached goal. The difficulty arises from the very nature of spirit. It so transcends its setting that we are in any of its representatives flung back from time on eternity, and eternity that is necessarily present. Time and change must be in some sense real, since they appear to be bound up with the reality of moral growth and religious experience; yet time and change cannot be all, unless man's spirit be a mocking illusion—for man already rises above time and change into the conception of eternity. Neither the Pluralism of James nor the Pantheism of Spinoza seems to leave adequate foothold for religious experience. We seem to be urged towards an acknowledgment of the relativity of time, in the sense that it is the necessary form in which the experience of

¹ Galloway, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

something beyond itself is revealed to us. That something will not be static, but dynamic, to correspond with the activity of our experience. Its higher equivalent will not, therefore, be eternity in the sense of a summation of time, or even simultaneity, but rather that divine purpose which man in his own degree may share with God (see Ch. XII). The whole creation expresses this purpose, though the fuller realization of it is reached only in the realm of personal consciousness, and more especially, of personal fellowship with God.

In the Christian interpretation time is real, but real as the revelation of the eternal purpose, however broken and imperfect by the limitations of the media that revelation may be. For the revelation of the divine Spirit, history is essential, since only history could reveal that continuous interaction of the human and the divine which is of the very essence of the revelation. Both Judaism and Christianity are historical religions, in the sense that the history constitutes the objective revelation of a redemptive God. The grace of God comes to mean His entrance into human history by a redemptive deliverance from the captivity of Egypt or the darker captivity of sin and death. A new light falls on the idea of progress through Christian theology. The spirits of just men made perfect are gathered into a new society beyond and above death; yet their development is linked here with the creation of a new society on earth. If it is a paradox that men must serve and contribute to the earthly in order to grow into the heavenly, and test their love for God by their love for their brethren here, yet it is a paradox that is true to the double-sided character of Christian experience. The supernatural setting to human history which Christian theology provides is a witness to the transcendent, without which the immanent is forever "orphaned."

In Tagore's striking sentence, "If the world remained still and final, then it would be a prison-house of orphaned facts which had lost their freedom of truth, the truth that is infinite."¹

V. In our survey of the revelation of Spirit in Nature, human personality, and human history, we have made none of those assumptions as to the authority of revelation which particular religions have put forward on behalf of their sacred books or their official hierarchy. It has been sufficient to appeal to the general facts of human experience, the general testimony to a fellowship between the human spirit and the divine, however mediated. The evidence that God has so given Himself to man has been found in the fact that men have recognized Him under whatever apparent disguise, and have freely responded to the offered fellowship. In other words, the authority of the revelation has been found in its intrinsic character; the presence of God is proved by the quality of the experience. In every question of religious authority, this must always be the final court of appeal. All authority that is real is ultimately intrinsic, and all authority that is intrinsic is ultimately divine authority.² We must carefully distinguish such ultimate authority from the influences that prepare for its recognition, the shaping influences of our education which open our eyes to the meaning of Nature, of our own inner life, and of human history. These influences are not authoritative in the intrinsic, but only in the extrinsic sense. As a matter of fact, they exercise power over us as something external to our own personality; not until they are freely admitted to its inner citadel of the will can they become authoritative in the full sense—

¹ Rabindranath Tagore, *Personality*, p. 61. We may compare the words, "I will not leave you orphans" (John xiv. 18).

² Cf. Iverach, *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, II, p. 253.

and then they are transformed into the self-evidencing presence of God.

To say this is to decide our position in regard to the authority of Bible or Church. They are authoritative in the secondary sense only ; they are pedagogic, leading us to God and not replacing Him. They remain and will remain the great means of grace, but they can never be grace itself. They are media through which God can reveal Himself, and they are this because they are the record of or the witness to a genuine experience of fellowship with God.

That which was itself the product of experience (in the prophets and apostles) became in turn the shaper of new experience ; the records of Scripture and the interpretative tradition of the Church (found in every community, and not least where it is explicitly denied) became sacramental media, and claimed or seemed to claim an authority of their own. Even on grounds of experience such secondary authority rightly belongs to them ; the controversy will be as to the degree of emphasis that falls on each. We may think of Aquinas, Calvin and Schleiermacher as three outstanding and epoch-making types. Aquinas doubtless regarded the Scriptures as the one absolutely certain revelation,¹ but his whole system of thought emphasizes the authority of the Church in regard to revealed religion. Calvin illustrates the Protestant appeal to the authority of the Bible, without this recognition of the authority of the Church ;² for it he substitutes the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti* as confirmation, of which more will have to be said (Ch. VIII). Schleiermacher returns to the explicit primacy of experience, and introduces the emphasis of the present age. This does

¹ Cf. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, E.T., VI, p. 156.

² *Institutes*, I, 8.

not mean that each man is a law to himself, thus raising a subjective attitude to a universal norm. As was said in the General Introduction to this series, the appeal to experience means the appeal to the experience of the whole race of men, so far as they have shared in the Christian consciousness—an appeal as broad in its principle as that made within this chapter. The Christian consciousness of God is always, as we have said, the final court of appeal, however much it may be hidden from men's eyes by what may seem the rightfully delegated "authority" of lower and more external tribunals. In that Christian consciousness there is a simplicity and depth like that of our consciousness in general. In all consciousness, subject and object are "given" in the unity of experience, and given together (see Ch. II). In the supreme experience of fellowship with God, man is conscious of himself and of Him, but of himself as surrendered to God, Whose authority is His nature, and Whose nature is Love.

We may best see the authority of revelation in its intrinsic nature and its intimate recognition by thinking of the teaching of Jesus. At the outset of His ministry He astonished men, "for he taught them as having authority, and not as the scribes" (Mark I. 22). Before any "Messianic" or other official dignity was ascribed to Jesus, which would give Him authority in their eyes, the impact of the truth He taught, and the manner of its delivery, won assent and obedience. So at the end of that ministry, on the way to Emmaus, the two disciples blamed themselves for not having recognized their unknown companion by the intrinsic truth of His words: "Was not our heart burning within us, while he spake to us in the way, while he opened to us the scriptures?" (Luke xxiv. 32).

PART II

THE WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

See p 172

The Mediation of the Spirit of God
thru the Grace of Christ.
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CHAPTER V

THE SPIRIT AND THE INCARNATION

THE subject of inquiry in the first part of this book was conceived in the widest possible manner. The term "Spirit" was used to denote the highest reality which thought can discover within or behind or above our whole experience of Nature, history and religion, and our own consciousness of personality. It was argued that this experience implied the reality of "Spirit" as no mere projection of our self-consciousness, but as both its ground and its goal, and that the nature of spirit in ourselves afforded the legitimate and sufficient basis for inference as to the attributes of ultimate Spirit. We reviewed the triple revelation of this Spirit in Nature, Personality and History, without special regard to the Christian revelation, to which we now turn. Our present task is to examine this particular revelation of Spirit, and to relate it to the general principles and conclusions already reached.

I. On the threshold of our more direct study of the Christian experience, we do well to remember that its claim to originality depends on its source in a unique fact—the emergence into history of Jesus Christ. The very quality of the experience is bound up with the uniqueness of that fact.¹ Historically, the experience would

¹ Of course, every fact is "unique" and every religion has "unique" elements, but the word "unique" is used here simply to imply that nowhere else in history is there such a revelation of divine through human personality—with all the consequences of this conviction.

have been quite different, if it had been at all, without faith in the uniqueness. The refusal of Christianity to become a syncretistic element in other faiths—unfortunately not always accompanied by the refusal to make them a syncretistic element in her own—is the clearest testimony to this faith, and history has fully justified that refusal—for those faiths of the Roman world are dead, and the faith of Christ still lives. In this quality Christianity displayed a natural piety, for Judaism has been not less proud of her uniqueness, and the pride of the child goes back to that of the mother, and rightly belongs to the lineage. In this sense the two fine statues of Christianity and Judaism at the south door of Strassburg Cathedral which depict haughty triumph and downcast defeat are as untrue to history as to the finer spirit of Christ; neither has Judaism lost the noble pride that springs from the conscious possession of truth, nor has Christianity conquered except by the spirit (not the sign) of the Cross. Our sympathies should be rather with the crushed reed in the hands of Judaism than with the Cross of Constantine in the hands of her rival. The true uniqueness of Christianity goes back to her Founder's proud humility, the spirit in which He stood before Pilate. Even so, Christians have believed that God in Christ stands before the tribunal of man, suffering for and with man, and at last overcoming man by the grace of that very suffering, never by the legionaries of Pilate. No word is more characteristic of the Christian revelation than "grace", and its definition must be found in Jesus Christ.¹

No one can study carefully the Synoptic record of the

¹ The conception of God which Jesus both reveals and realizes is that of One whose concern is with sinful men, and this idea, with its consequences, had no contemporary parallel. Cf. Holl, *Urchristentum und Religionsgeschichte*, pp. 16, 17.

ministry of Jesus, especially in its simplest form in the second Gospel, without becoming conscious of the note of *authority* which underlies it. Jesus was fully conscious of possessing authority, and from the outset He made others conscious of it—not only those who obeyed His “Follow Me”, but also less intimate circles of men who contrasted the freshness of His authoritative utterances with the monotonous traditionalism of the scribes. Yet this authority was brought to bear on them less by explicit “claims” than by the sheer intrinsic quality of His person and work. The responsive recognition of it was allowed to shape itself gradually and imperfectly, as we may see from that most illuminative conversation at Cæsarea Philippi. Even when His disciples had gone so far as to recognize in Him the Messiah, their conception of what this involved was far other than His, and remained so until His Cross compelled a new interpretation of His purpose and a new proclamation of His emphasis.

Though Jesus accepted the category of Messiahship, yet as shaped by His thought it became a new creation. He seems to have approached it through the dominant conception of Sonship, and His Messianic consciousness is to be interpreted through the filial, and not *vice versa*. But it also seems clear that He blended with the figure of the Messiah the idea of the suffering Servant in Isaiah LIII.¹ His Messiahship was upheld within by the consciousness of a most intimate filial relation to His heavenly Father, but it was realized without through the unique acceptance of the rôle of the Servant whose final victory was to be won through apparent defeat. How far this blending of the two conceptions was consciously achieved from the beginning of His ministry is a debatable question ;

¹ For the proof of this, see *The Cross of the Servant* (Ch. III), by H. Wheeler Robinson.

but the most natural interpretation of the temptation is that He had accepted the Cross, at least in principle, from the very beginning of His ministry. The voice at the baptism confirms this view, for its message combines the two ideals of Messiah and Servant. There is no evidence that this combination had previously been made by Jewish thought, and we must regard it as the most original feature of His presentation of the grace of God. The death of Jesus, like His life, was unique in its significance.

It was fitting, therefore, that this unique life and death should be crowned by the resurrection. The more detailed discussion of that event lies beyond our limits ; it must suffice to say that without acceptance of the fact as real (whatever be the interpretation of its details) it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain either the history of the Church or the rationality of the world's history. We are compelled to criticize the records of the resurrection, and the experience behind them, in a way that would have been impossible to those who shared it ; there are difficulties for us which did not exist at all for them. But, on the other hand, we have an enormous and ever-increasing body of evidence at our disposal, which was not available for them. We have not seen the risen Christ, as Paul claimed to have done, but we have known generation after generation of Christian life and thought unrolling itself in the power of the faith that the Lord is risen indeed. Unless we bring to the interpretation of the Gospels preconceptions and prejudices which we have no right to bring, it is more reasonable to accept the testimony of the first disciples to the fact of the continued existence and presence of Him whom they had known than to suppose that Christianity is a delusion based upon an illusion.

We must not, however, imagine that the faith of the Christian Church has ever been simply retrospective. Our modern interest in the history of the human life of Jesus has brought great and permanent gains to our knowledge of Him, but there are definite limits to the value of that knowledge for Christian faith. "In the New Testament", it has been truly said, "we enter a little world of men who are doing more than looking back to Jesus; they are looking up to him, revering him as well as remembering him, and revering him as divine."¹ The centre of gravity of the New Testament is not on earth but in heaven. All its writers in their differing ways may be said to have shared in the vision of Stephen, the vision of the Son of Man standing at the right hand of God. New powers and glories are His, and His realm of action is infinitely widened. His apparent defeat on earth becomes an accomplished victory in heaven. His is the Spirit of God, His the final judgment-seat. This has become the characteristic confidence of the Christian in all the generations. He is sure that in all the vast, untravelled realms of space, in all the infinite possibilities of a new order of being, and of life on a new plane, there will be no real surprises for him, in the great things of character, destiny and relationship. He sees death stripping from men so much that seemed essential to well-being and happiness, and then he looks within the veil, through the rent flesh of his Lord and Saviour,² and he knows he will be at home where Christ is. The human life of Jesus, brief and broken as it was, has realized, once and for all, the truths of eternity. Jesus of Nazareth gave us by life and teaching, by death and resurrection, the moral and spiritual principles

¹ Moffatt, *The Approach to the New Testament*, p. 163.

² Heb. x. 20.

which rule the universe of God. The Beatitudes become to faith more than the transient aphorisms of a Jewish Rabbi ; they are seen to be the very laws of the Kingdom of God, laws of heaven as well as of earth. The simple incidents of daily intercourse with others which mark the story of Jesus, Who followed no prearranged plan, but took life as it came to Him, glow with all the beauty of the richly coloured window when the light within is kindled, the light of an eternal meaning, that makes such things true for ever, and everywhere. The tragic ignominy of the Cross proves to be but the disguise of divine grace, victorious through defeat, divine grace taking upon itself the burden of man's sin, not at one moment of time only, but throughout eternity. The resurrection becomes no isolated challenge to faith, but the revelation and example of spiritual power, working in every Christian, so that Christ is indeed the first-fruits of a great harvest. It is just because these incidents of earth are taken up into the unseen world, and made central there in the risen and exalted Christ, that genuine Christian faith rings with such glorious confidence. "Never", says one who writes of the life beyond death, "never in any experience of God here or hereafter, by saint or sinner, will God reveal Himself other than as we know Him in Christ Jesus."¹

It was to disciples alone that the Risen Christ was revealed, and that still holds true. The authority of Christ is something that must be seen, rather than argued. It rests on His intrinsic character, not on what we or other men may say about Him. He must be seen to be known, and He must be known before He can be understood. That is the foundation of a sound modern apologetic—the appeal to experience. But it is ancient as well as modern,

¹ R. G. Macintyre, *The Other Side of Death*, p. 320.

it is implicit in the method of Jesus, Who wins men's trust that He may train them into larger truth, Who waits until the chosen moment (at Cæsarea Philippi) before He asks them to interpret Himself. We see it illustrated in the Johannine discourses of the Upper Room, when the disciples press their bewildered questions upon Him, and He answers them, not so much by words as by the reference to Himself.¹ Peter asks, "Why cannot I follow thee now?" and is told of the humbling experience that will bring him into the same path; Thomas asks, "How know we the way?" and is told "I am the way"; Philip says, "Shew us the Father", and is told, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father"; Judas, not Iscariot, asks, "Why wilt thou manifest thyself to us and not to the world?" and is told, "If a man love me, He will keep my word". These are not evasions; they are answers that go deeper just because they are indirect. In a deep and real sense, Christ is the one answer to our many questions, and we gain that answer by the experience of Him, not by a number of statements about Him. He becomes to us the centre of life, because our life finds its only satisfaction in Him, and then, as we interpret life from this new experience, He becomes the centre of thought. As the iron filings arrange themselves by pattern and order in the magnetic field, so our many scattered thoughts and purposes fall into their places, in proportion as He becomes central. It is not easy to say which of these two facts is the more impressive—that Jesus Christ, ever insisting on the absolute kingly rule of God, should have so centred the faith of men upon Himself, or that having made such unique claims for Himself, He Who would not stoop to use the weapons of the world,

¹ The illustration is valid for Christian experience when the Fourth Gospel was written, even if we hesitate about the historicity of this conversation.

should so draw all men to Him as He does. It is in that undeniable fact of experience that His authority at last rests; He does what He does by being what He is.

It is clear that the place of Christ in the subsequent faith and experience of His disciples has been unique, just as were His life, death and resurrection. Neither Muhammed nor even the Buddha has been so identified with Deity as the risen Lord. Whether we think of the continuity of that lordship or the variety of appeals which it has proved capable of answering in successive generations or in the course of a single life's development, we are bound to admit the challenge of a new fact, to which some definite reply must be given.

We cannot explain this new fact by any ordinary categories. Jesus Christ is still unexplained. The ever-extending grave-yard of theories about Him¹ preaches by its very contrast the resurrection and the life. Who is this who can compel each of the generations to think of Him as central, though they forever fail to solve the mystery of His person? In this respect we might almost say that the most salient fact about Christ is His inexplicability. The nearer we come to His real humanity, the more does the personality revealed open up into unsolved problems, raising issues far beyond those which attach to all human personality. If these are ignored the resultant portrait of Christ is as unsatisfying as the descriptions or doctrines which ignore or minimize the real humanity. The Gospels "tell the story of a human life; but humanity is not the last word about it."²

¹ C. E. Raven, in *The Creator Spirit*, p. 235, referring to the way in which Jesus transcends His interpreters, speaks of "the ingenuity of those who would make of Jesus a pacifist, or a 'Die-hard,' a dreamer or a Rotarian, a social reformer, a mystic or an Apocalypticist," and gives examples of each of these attempts.

² Temple, *Christus Veritas*, p. 123.

A presentation of Christ which shews Him simply as a man among men, however great, without that sense of mystery which painters once suggested by the halo, is like the truncated reproductions of the Sistine Madonna, which shew nothing but the mother with the babe. The artist was wiser, for he depicted also the cloud-wrapped earth on to which the Virgin steps, with its representative human forms, the looped curtains, the veil of mystery from which she issues, the two child-angels in the foreground, looking up with such absorbed gaze, and the host of dimly-seen angelic faces beyond the parted curtains. Raphael's conception was not that of an Italian mother and her child, but that of the mystery of the Virgin bringing the incarnate Son of God forth from eternity into time.

We have in Jesus, then, the test case of the objectivity of the divine revelation. The difficulties already encountered recur again, though on a higher level. If we say that He is a revelation of Spirit in the form of human personality, the highest achievement of the race, and say no more than this, we may keep the results already reached, but we shall not keep the sense of a unique disclosure, a confirmation and culmination of all other revelation, which Christian faith has found in Him. If, on the other hand, we say that in Jesus Christ God entered the world as never before or since, thus constituting an incomparable fact of history, we shall certainly lose the power to explain Him completely by our previous categories, though they may still help us towards a partial understanding of the new fact. This does not mean that we are to take refuge in a hasty dualism, beneath the shelter of Chalcedon. The new fact may, after all, be related to the old realities as is the flower to the root, the flower that we should never have inferred from the root.

Our fundamental assumption was the ultimate kinship of God and man, and we must not lightly surrender this.

The present chapter is, of course, not intended to be a Christology. It can do little more than shew the beginnings in history of the particular "work of the Holy Spirit" with which we are here concerned. It merely offers such explanation as can be given of the way in which the Holy Spirit became the "other Paraclete", continuing the work of Christ and mediating the real presence of God to men.

II. There is a striking sentence of Bishop Ridding that "God's magnet is a man of God electrified by the Spirit of God."¹ We express one side of it by saying that truth must become incarnate to make its appeal to us. Much of our moral development proceeds by the hardly conscious or wholly unconscious assimilation of social ideals. But we can all remember definite moments of awakening to some higher moral consciousness by the difference of another man's attitude or action from our own. His generosity rebuked our selfishness; his Christian forbearance our natural indignation. The higher quality of his outlook on life was self-evidencing and needed no external confirmation. We knew at once and as by intuition that he was right and we were wrong, and we were puzzled at our own blindness to something we ought to have seen as well as he. There may have followed a certain diminution of the first impression, and a relapse to our customary standards and conduct; but something has been revealed to us, of which the authority over us is indisputable. The revelation came, as moral revelation must always come, through its incarnation in a person.

¹ *George Ridding*, by his wife, p. 241.

The appeal of the humanity of Jesus is, *prima facie*, not so much a new method of revelation as the exaltation of the old—the revelation of higher truth and reality through personal intercourse. But everything here depends on the quality of the personality, and a difference of degree becomes—as at all levels of our experience—a difference of kind. A sinless Person is a unique phenomenon, and we cannot say, *a priori*, to what extent He will reveal Spirit. To know this, we are thrown back on the actual experience of man brought into relation with such a person. It is far from easy to study the history of the Incarnation impartially, and from this natural standpoint. Yet it is of great importance that we should at least attempt this, if we would understand the Gospels. Their record is already coloured by theological and philosophical prepossessions, the Synoptic as well as the Johannine, for the “fact of Christ” already presupposes our interpretation of the fact. But behind these prepossessions, we have to look for a Man in simple, natural intercourse with men—a Man who persistently evaded a verbal answer to the question, “By what authority doest thou these things?” yet all the more exercised supreme authority over those who knew Him best, by virtue of being what He was. If, to the convinced Christian, the Incarnation is a revelation, to the natural man it was, *and still is*, a disguise of divine authority, since the divine appears at first to be simply human.

The characteristic features of the revelation of Spirit through human personality in general, as distinct from that through Nature, are individuality, morality, and religious aspiration (see Ch. IV). The revelation of Spirit through Jesus of Nazareth shews each of these features in the highest degree. The Synoptic portrait of Jesus in particular shews a person of marked individuality,

unmistakable for any other character of history. The man in some respects most like Him—Francis of Assisi—approached Him only through conscious imitation. Jesus is a prophet, yet no one can miss the difference between Him and the contemporary prophet, John the Baptist. He is a religious teacher, yet He disregards most of the conventions of the religious teachers of His time, both in matter and manner. He enters into a great religious inheritance, yet He treats it on occasion with literally shocking freedom. Towards certain classes of the community He is singularly tender; towards others, not less singularly stern. He is capable of deep emotion and fierce anger, in word and deed. He has His personal likes and dislikes amongst men, His characteristic turns of speech and half-playful humour, His love of the indirect approach to truth, and of meeting a question with a question. He knows exactly what He wants from life; He makes us feel that He has cast up His accounts with God, and is free to pay His debts to men. He is the strong Man of Zix's painting, not the emasculated Christ of the picture-books—the strong Man Whose muscles shew as He strides down the mountain side at the dawn after thinking things out alone through the night. His outer demeanour is as vivid and clear as His inner consciousness is remote and elusive—and both the revelation and the withholding are the marks of individuality at its highest. If Spirit is revealed in Jesus of Nazareth, then the intensity of human individuality is not alien to that revelation.

Not less apparent is His prophetic emphasis on the ethical interpretation of religion. We cannot turn Him into an artist delighting in the natural beauty of bird and flower, for His references to Nature are characteristically Hebrew—they are all subdued to ethical religion and religious ethics. We cannot transform Him into a Greek

philosopher, for He is impatient with those who, like the Sadducees with their questioning about immortality, would settle such things on purely intellectual lines. The one thing that matters is how men stand with God, and the one test of that is how they stand with men.¹ He changes the centre of gravity of social life, not by criticizing its forms from without, but by revealing its motives within, as in the Sermon on the Mount. This change of emphasis is characteristic of Spirit, which works increasingly from within rather than from without.

The dominant motive of His recorded life is, however, to do the will of His Father in heaven. Man's religious aspiration here attains its stable equilibrium and perfect peace. The union of His spirit with the divine Spirit is so complete that He enters into the Father's redemptive purpose, and voluntarily accepts the Cross as a necessary ransom for many. Whatever else has to be said about Him, on the human side He still remains man's unattained ideal of moral and religious achievement. This fact of experience, apart from the particular theological or philosophical explanations we may be led to give of it, must be our starting-point. Here, in some supreme sense, Spirit has found an adequate revelation in human personality, and the kinship of spirit and Spirit is confirmed. So close and intimate is the relation of Spirit to this personality that the idea of the Spirit acquires new elements, and the activity of Spirit takes new forms. This is conveniently marked by speaking of "the Holy Spirit" from this point, so far as we are concerned with the Spirit as active through the Incarnation. The consciousness of this intimacy is already seen in the records of the life of Jesus. Those who knew Him best had

¹ Cf. the Sermon on the Mount, and the Parable of Judgment (Matt. xxv. 31 ff.).

to explain the impact upon them of spiritual energies to a degree hitherto unknown, working through this human personality—not only a new revelation of life, but a new motive in life, and a new horizon for life. In Him, the divine grace made a new appeal to human freedom, and initiated a new fellowship with the Father. Their explanations of these facts of their experience were many and varied; but foremost amongst them all was the resort to a conception already familiar through the Old Testament, and extended through the influence of contemporary Hellenistic thought—the idea of the Spirit of God.

So far as the Synoptic conception of the Spirit of God is concerned, there is little need to go beyond the idea of the Spirit found in the Old Testament. That idea, especially in its earlier forms, will seem crude enough in the light of the larger philosophical conception of Spirit employed in the first part of this book. But the term “Spirit” is historically derived from Hebrew conceptions,¹ though enlarged through the Hellenistic connotation of the corresponding term *pneuma*. Thus we are justified historically in connecting the dominant Hebrew idea of an invasive energy with the dominant Greek idea of immanence. The Old Testament term for “Spirit” (*ruach*) originally and throughout the Old Testament denoted “wind”, and the wind of the desert is the typically impressive phenomenon of mystery and power.² At the same time, this mysterious power was at first conceived as non-moral and non-rational, like the demonic world of extra-human agencies. Upon this raw material, as in so many other realms, the prophetic consciousness of Israel worked its great transformation. The prophets

¹ Through the Vulgate rendering “spiritus”; see the *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v.

² See the Introduction,

ethicized the conception of Yahweh and ultimately led towards the extension of His domain over all the energies of life. This had a twofold result. On the one hand, the life-breath of man was ascribed to the creative inspiration of Yahweh, and itself came to be known by the term “ spirit ” as well as by the earlier term “ soul ” (*nephesh*). On the other hand, the extra-human energies which might still find abnormal manifestation in man’s life were brought under the sway of Yahweh. Thus Hebrew thought intuitively reached the consciousness of that kinship between God and man which has been the basis of our philosophical argument, and Hebrew thought also provided the great and undamental conception of the “ Spirit ”, destined to be not less influential for Christian theology than that equally characteristic contribution of Hellenism denoted by “ Logos ”. The Hebrew-Jewish thought had thus found its own way of relating man to God, and of conceiving God as actively present in human consciousness and life. If the Hebrew-Jewish employment of the term “ Spirit ” seems to us narrow and anthropomorphic by comparison with the wider horizon of the Greek equivalent *pneuma*, we must not ignore the religious gain of this concentration. As Irving F. Wood remarks, in relation to the Biblical idea as a whole, “ The seemingly simple fact of dropping the relation to external nature from the idea of the Spirit forms the greatest single crisis in its history ”.¹ This concentration, as he points out, saved Judaism from the naturalistic conceptions of God on the one hand, and from the predominantly metaphysical on the other. The truth of this remark will be apparent as we consider the use of the Jewish idea of “ Spirit ” in the Synoptic presentation of Jesus.

¹ *The Spirit of God in Biblical Literature*, p. 76.

The Messianic consciousness of Jesus, interpreted according to contemporary ideas, already implied a close and intimate relation between Himself as Messiah and the Spirit of God.¹ According to Isaiah xi. 1 ff. the anointed Prince of Davidic stock who is to inaugurate a new and supernatural order of life is equipped for his office by the Spirit of Yahweh resting permanently upon him. Through this he is endowed with the true qualities of a ruler, such as discernment, executive justice and pious regard for the helpless. Similar qualities ascribed to the same source belong to the Messiah depicted in the "Psalms of Solomon" (xvii. 40-42), which give the Pharisaic ideal of less than a century before the Christian era. This Messianic consciousness of Jesus in regard to the Spirit would be reinforced by the conception of the Servant of Yahweh which He assimilated to it. It was by the Spirit of Yahweh that the Servant was endowed for missionary work amongst the nations.² It is at least appropriate that according to the narrative of Luke (iv. 16 ff.) this consciousness of Jesus became explicit in the synagogue of Nazareth, i.e. in a thoroughly Jewish setting. Jesus there took to Himself words which originally declared the prophet to be anointed for a task like that of the Servant.³

The story of the baptism of Jesus in its simplest and earliest form⁴ says that He saw the heavens being rent asunder and the Spirit coming down upon Him like a dove, whilst a voice from heaven said, "Thou art my Son, the beloved, in Thee have I delight". According to this account, therefore, the vision and the audition were confined to Jesus.⁵ The spoken words are drawn partly

¹ Cf. Schaeder, *Das Geistproblem der Theologie*, p. 171.

² Isa. xlii. 1; cf. Matt. xii. 17 ff.

³ Isa. lxi. 1 ff.

⁴ Mark i. 10, 11.

⁵ Matthew and Luke imply that they were shared by others, the former by putting the message into the form of a public declaration

from the description of the Messianic king in the second Psalm (ver. 7) and partly from that of the Servant of Yahweh (Isa. XLII. 1). They thus suggest a twofold though blended consciousness in Jesus, that He was now spiritually anointed to that Messianic vocation into which His own filial consciousness (Luke II. 40 ff.) had by this time grown—a vocation to be fulfilled in the Spirit of the Servant. Thus the water-baptism was also a Spirit-baptism, the New Testament equivalent to the “prophetic symbolism” of the Old Testament. Mark says that Jesus was at once urged by the Spirit (conceived as remaining within Him) into the desert of His temptation.¹ Luke says that He returned from the Jordan full of the Holy Spirit (iv. 1). Here we may see the simple Christology of the primitive community. Peter, for example, is doubtless referring to the baptism when, after speaking of John the Baptist, he shews “how God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Spirit and with power, so that He went about doing good and healing all that were oppressed by the devil, for God was with Him”.² To the same source—Messianic inspiration—are ascribed the instructions given by the risen Christ to His apostles.³

The temptation of Jesus is thus brought into closest relation with the baptism; Jesus faces His initial trial in the strength of the newly-given Spirit of God. The content of His new consciousness is shewn by the narratives of Matthew and Luke. Jesus interpreted His

(III. 17), the latter by saying that the dove came down in bodily shape (III. 22). The Fourth Gospel explicitly states that John saw the vision and bore witness to it (I. 32, 33). For the symbolism of the dove, see Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, I, p. 49. It may point to the brooding Spirit of God at the creation (Gen. I. 2), and suggest that a creative moment had been reached in the consciousness of Jesus: cf. 2 Cor. iv. 6.

¹ I. 12; cf. Matt. iv. 1.

² Acts x. 38.

³ Acts I. 2 ff.

Messianic vocation as involving the rejection of the common expectations concerning the Messiah, whether of the "transcendent" or the "Davidic" type. This is clearest in the third scene of the Matthew-version, where Jesus refuses to win the kingdoms of the world at the price of disloyalty to God. But the refusals to make bread from the stones and to leap into the ravine are of similar character. In Peake's words, "They test the conviction of His sonship, which must rest on the inward witness of the Spirit and the voice of God, a conviction which must, to be of avail for Him, stand above all need of confirmation by signs and wonders."¹ Luke, who connects Jesus and the Spirit more fully and frequently than the other Synoptists, represents Him as continually led about by the Spirit in the desert, and as returning to Galilee in the power of the Spirit.²

It is Luke alone who records a "spiritual" or psychic experience of Jesus which is of prophetic character, with every mark of verisimilitude (x. 21 ff.). When the seventy return and joyfully report to Him their success in the overthrow of demonic powers, He shares their happiness, though He characteristically turns their thought from the manifested power to its ultimate source: "At that hour Jesus exulted in the Holy Spirit and said, 'I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that Thou didst hide these things from the wise and understanding and didst reveal them unto babes.'" There is no other instance of a similar "prophetic" heightening of the consciousness of Jesus, but in close connection with this, mention is made by Him of the vision which He apparently

¹ "The Messiah and the Son of Man" in the *John Rylands Library Bulletin*, Jan., 1924 (Vol. VIII. 1), p. 59. Cf. Temple, *Mens Creatrix*, p. 313: "In rejecting the three temptations, He has resolved that He will not cajole, He will not coerce, and He will not demonstrate."

² iv. 1 and 14.

saw when He sent out the seventy—the vision of Satan falling from heaven like a flash of lightning. We seem here to get a glimpse of the prophetic consciousness of Jesus, though it might be misleading to call it “ecstatic”. It is apparently under the spiritual inspiration of this experience that Jesus makes the remarkable declaration of His absolute authority: “All things have been delivered unto me of my Father, and no one knoweth who the Son is save the Father, and who the Father is save the Son, and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal Him”.¹

This intimate inter-relation of the Spirit with His own consciousness comes out still more explicitly in the important reference to His casting out of demons by the Spirit of God,² which Jesus identifies with the coming of God’s kingly rule. It is not easy to exaggerate the importance of this side of His saving work for His own generation, remote as it seems from our own needs. In Jesus and His disciples the Kingdom of God came with power, and the first proof of that power was seen in the overthrow of those demonic beings who were supposed to afflict human life with so many of its ills. Jesus of Nazareth, according to Peter,³ was a man approved of God “by mighty powers and wonders and signs which God did by Him in the midst of you,” and the primary meaning of “powers” here is seen in the acknowledgment of the contemporaries of Jesus, that “with authority and power He commandeth the unclean spirits and they

¹ Luke x. 22. Apart from the explicit statement of ver. 21, the Lucan context is much more convincing than that of Matt. xi. 27.

² Matt. xii. 28. Professor C. H. Dodd suggests to me that the saying may be the point of departure in the teaching of Jesus for the idea of the Spirit as the *'arrabôn* (earnest) of the consummated Kingdom of God. For the identification of the coming of the Kingdom with the coming of the Spirit, see the reading of Luke xi. 2, recorded in Streeter, *The Four Gospels*, p. 277.

³ Acts ii. 22.

come out.”¹ In Jesus the kingdom of God joins issue with the kingdom of Satan, and the immediate arena is these demon-haunted men and women.² Indeed, anyone who wishes to know the New Testament connotation of “Spirit” must use his concordance also for the term “power”, which is its chief content. The ministry of Jesus is a ministry of power, and that power is ascribed in parallel passages to “the Spirit of God” and “the finger of God”—a significant variation³ to remind us that the Synoptic conception of the Spirit is theological rather than psychological, and denotes an external energy rather than a subjective consciousness.

The Spirit of God is also brought into direct relation with Jesus in the accounts of His supernatural birth found in Matthew and Luke, of which Paul shews no knowledge and the Fourth Gospel makes no mention. According to Matthew (i. 18–20), Mary is “found to be with child from Holy Spirit. . . . that which is begotten in her is from Holy Spirit”. In the fuller narrative of Luke (i. 35) Gabriel announces to her, “Holy Spirit shall come upon thee and power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; wherefore also that which is begotten shall be called holy, Son of God.” Here the thought-forms seem to be still directly continuous with those of the Old Testament, and there is no need to resort to the theory of ethnic influence upon the birth-narratives. There is no suggestion in them or in the Old Testament preparation for them that a supernatural birth was necessary in order to eliminate the taint of sin in human personality. The underlying thought of the birth-narratives is twofold, and in both respects it is thoroughly congruous with the

¹ Luke iv. 36.

² Cf. Wendland, *Die Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur*, p. 215.

³ Matt. xii. 28, cf. Luke xi. 20.

thought of the Old Testament. On the one hand there is the mystery of the physiological processes of conception and birth as an appropriate sphere for the divine activity,¹ which controls life from the moment of conception onwards, and in so doing realizes "a thought of God".² On the other hand, there is the idea of Spirit as acting in and through persons to personal ends, especially to explain the extraordinary and abnormal.³ According to the close inter-relation of the Hebrew ideas of body and soul, the divine shaping of the body in the womb was the real creation of the personality. Thus, in effect, what the birth-narratives say is that this unique Person, who had a unique issue to His life, had also a unique beginning. There is nothing in the Synoptics which carries us further back into the mystery of the pre-existence of Christ.

The Old Testament atmosphere of the Synoptic Gospels in their allusions to the Spirit of God is continued also in the singularly few references to this subject in the teaching of Jesus. The most remarkable of these is that in which He declares blasphemy against the Spirit to be beyond forgiveness. The original form of the saying seems to be that of Mark III. 28-30.⁴ Mark expressly identifies the blasphemy in question with the words, "It is an unclean spirit that he has" (30), i.e. His power over the demons was due to an unholy alliance

¹ See *The Christian Doctrine of Man* (p. 14), by H. Wheeler Robinson.

² So Duhm, commenting on Jer. I. 5.

³ Note that the event occurs within the context of a group-experience of "inspiration" (Zechariah, Anna, Simeon).

⁴ Paralleled in Matt. XII. 31 (see Driver, Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, IV, p. 588). In Matt. XII. 32, paralleled by Luke XII. 10, a contrast is drawn between blasphemy against Jesus Himself, which may be forgiven, and that against the Holy Spirit, which is beyond forgiveness.

with their ruler (22). Such a judgment, under the influence of prejudice, meant that all moral distinctions were obscured, and we may explain the passionate indignation of Jesus against such an attitude as Swete does: "The man who was capable of calling good evil, of painting the Source of holiness in the colours of Hell, was beyond repentance and therefore beyond forgiveness; his sin must pass with him unremitted into the next æon, to which the earthly mission of the Saviour did not extend."¹

The only other Synoptic passage which calls for present notice is that of Mark XIII. 11, where Jesus tells a group of His disciples not to be anxious about what they are to say when they are being taken before tribunals, but to rely on "the inspiration of the moment", which will be veritably the voice of the Holy Spirit. "We have here," as Swete remarks,² "the germ of the doctrine of the 'other Paraclete' or Advocate, which is developed in the fourth Gospel." It undoubtedly agrees with the experience of Christian confessors and martyrs, and continues the Old Testament doctrine of the Spirit as given *ad hoc*.

It may seem surprising that there is so little explicit reference to the Holy Spirit in the Synoptic teaching of Jesus, seeing that the experience of the power of the Spirit initiated and maintained His ministry, and that the experience itself became so characteristic of subsequent Christian life and thought. Yet in this relative silence there is a striking parallel to the similar silence of the greater prophets of the Old Testament. The unity of a complete surrender to God, and His abiding presence, such as is revealed in the most impressive saying of Matthew XI. 27 f. ("All things have been delivered unto me of my Father," etc.) seems to have raised Him above

¹ *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, p. 117. ² *ib.*, p. 122

the consideration of "ways and means".¹ He may well have spoken at greater length than the Synoptics record of the relation of the Spirit to the needs of His disciples, and this may be the nucleus of that Johannine presentation of His teaching about the other Paraclete which will be noticed in the next chapter. But the simplicity and immediacy of His own communion with the Father, revealed in all His words and ways, lifted Him above those needs of thought and life, and belong to the uniqueness of His experience of God. In this respect, as in so many others, the fourth Gospel may rightly interpret the silence of the Synoptics, when it speaks of "the Father abiding in Me" (xiv. 10, cf. x. 38, etc.). This is in harmony with the Pauline reference to Jesus as designated the Son of God with (full) power, according to (His own) holy spirit by the resurrection of the dead (Rom. i. 4).

There is no hesitation, then, in the testimony of the Gospels to the reality of Christ's humanity as the vehicle of the Spirit. If this humanity had not been real, the revelation of Spirit in the Incarnation would have lacked its most essential means, would indeed have moved on a lower level of possibility than in the life of many a victorious saint. The reality of history is known and felt most intensely in the reality of moral life. Here, in man's forever broken and imperfect obedience, there is something being achieved to which the perfect "obedience" of Nature can never attain; here in the rounded and perfect obedience of Jesus Christ, the Spirit found unique realization and revelation. The real struggle of Gethsemane is the condition of the real victory of Calvary. It is this reality of history which made the Christian faith the envy of Gnosticism, with its long continued endeavour

¹ Cf. E. F. Scott, *The Spirit in the New Testament*, pp. 78-80.

to appropriate the Jesus of history to its own speculations, that they might live by His life-blood. It is this ethical foundation in human personality which distinguishes the Christian faith from the contemporary rivals to it which sprang from one or another form of naturalism, e.g. the Mithra cult. In full accord with this foundation, the best *preparatio evangelica* is still a hunger and thirst after righteousness, like that which brought the greatest of all the disciples of Christ, Saul the Pharisee, to faith in Him. To give full emphasis to the real humanity of Jesus Christ has its inevitable perils, as the history of the thought of the Church about Him so clearly shews. It is temptingly easy to simplify the problems of Christology by the way of Adoptianism—to think of Him as simply the Man on whom the Spirit of God came, in order to raise Him to His unique place and function. But a solution so easy must surely be wrong in view of all the great issues. We must take warning by its dualism, and seek some deeper answer in the thought of such a realization of human personality as brings out its fundamental kinship with the divine, so real a union of the human spirit with the divine that God becomes incarnate in the human life.

III. Within the period covered by the New Testament the new fact of history—Jesus Christ—created a new order of experience of the Holy Spirit, viz. a personal relation to God through Christ. We can trace this through at least four successive stages. The first of these belongs to the life of Jesus on earth, when He gathered around Him those whom He was bringing into a new relation to His Father. The visible presence of Jesus and the companionship with Him were the sufficient media. In following Him they were obeying the commandments of God, and already belonged to that

kingly rule of God which was, they thought, so soon to be gloriously consummated before the eyes of all men. This was their ardent hope; but the manner of its realization was to be far other than they had expected. Their teacher and Messiah was snatched from them by death. For a moment they were left wistfully saying: "We were hoping that it was He who was about to redeem Israel." But this episode of disillusionment was speedily ended through the new faith in His resurrection, and a second stage of experience was thus inaugurated.

The early chapters of Acts shew us a group of believing men and women waiting for they know not what, save that their Lord's presence and power will be revealed to them and to the world. The experience of Pentecost gave a new intensity and content to the old form of faith in the activity of the Spirit of God. The discovery of new powers within their fellowship, expressed in a remarkable physical and psychical experience, was to them the revelation of the divine presence and activity. The crucified but risen and exalted Messiah was equipping them for their task of proclaiming and initiating the kingly rule of God. Their equipment was now in a measure comparable with His own, for the Spirit of God which had rested on the Messiah from His baptism now came upon them, and it was the Lord's gift to them: "He hath poured forth this which ye do now see and hear." As individual men of their own generation were brought to make the confession, "Jesus is the Messiah", these new believers shared in the new experience and were baptized in the Spirit of power.

The third stage in the new order of experience was initiated by the great apostle of the new faith, who was one of these new believers. His initial experience was a vision of the risen Lord Himself, the full objectivity of

which he never doubted. But it is characteristic of Paul's moral and spiritual emphasis that he translated this experience into the terms: "it pleased God to reveal His Son in me." This new emphasis had most important consequences for the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. To Paul is due the sublimation of the Jewish-Christian conception of the Spirit which had implicitly and explicitly continued that of the Old Testament. Paul, in fact, did for the Christian doctrine of the Spirit what the greater Hebrew prophets had done for its Old Testament predecessor. They had shared in the abnormal phenomena of Spirit displayed by primitive prophecy, but they thrust these to the circumference of their life, the centre of which became a direct moral and spiritual fellowship with God. So was it with Paul. He personally shared in the phenomena recorded in the Acts, such as the gift of tongues, but his real interest was in the moral and spiritual character which was the finest fruit of the Spirit, and in the practical service to the community, within the fellowship of love, which was the highest gift of the Spirit. At the heart of these convictions there was his experience of what we should call "mystical" union with the risen Lord through His Spirit. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of this experience either for Paul's own life and teaching or for the Christian Church.

The fourth stage in the new order is the Church's experience of the Spirit, as reflected in the fourth Gospel. Here, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter, Christ is conceived as still present in the community He has created, and present by "another Paraclete" who continues His work: "He shall take of mine and shall declare it unto you." Because of this presence the Sacraments are charged with a new spiritual power, and the very words of Christ's teaching, remembered by the

Church, become sacramental.¹ Through the Church, the Holy Spirit will convict the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment.

These Pauline and Johannine experiences bring us at once face to face with the implicates of the deepest Christian experience of our own, or any, generation. The Spirit of God has become so blended with the person of Christ that there is no practical difference for Paul between the indwelling Spirit and the indwelling Christ, and he can indeed speak of the Lord the Spirit. As for the Church, her highest claim upon men and the very condition of her ultimate triumph are in the real presence of her Lord in the midst, which means the real presence and activity of the Holy Spirit. It is important, therefore, that we should try to understand exactly what this doctrine means for Christian experience.

Psychologically, the newness of the experience depended on the idea of the Spirit as mediated through the personality of Jesus Christ. The intimate blending of memories or records of His human personality with the exhaustless energies of God affected both aspects of the new unity. On the one hand the human personality was magnified, raised (as the mathematicians say) to the *n*th power, unaltered in quality but immeasurably increased in quantity. Some such consciousness as this lies behind the words, "It is expedient for you that I go away", as well as in the deeper meaning of those other words, "I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me." On the other hand,—and this is what specially concerns us here—the concept of the Spirit is itself profoundly modified by the new union. We may compare the change wrought in the concept of the Spirit with that wrought in the concept of God by the ethical theism of the eighth

¹ John vi. 63, *et passim*.

century prophets of Israel. But whereas they added their own fragmentary and imperfect consciousness and conscience to the idea of God, thus revealing Him in many parts and in many manners, the psychological identification of the personality of Jesus Christ with the Spirit of God had even more profound consequences. The Hebrew development created a new idea of God in heaven, the Christian created a new idea of God on earth. The real presence of the Father, dimly or clearly realized in the human fellowship of His Son, was now accessible, and in yet more intimate fashion, to all believers throughout the world. The concept of the Spirit was clarified, and the abnormalities of "spiritual" phenomena had to meet such tests as Paul applied to them, tests inspired by the question, "Is this the Spirit of Christ?" A new and rich content was given to the energies of the Spirit, and this content was nothing less than the whole personality of Jesus Christ. The Spirit of God was personalized as never before, whilst the holiness of the Spirit was ethicized as never before. Such, from a purely psychological point of view, was the transformation in life and teaching wrought by the new faith.

When we pass from psychology to metaphysics by asking what truth there is, then or now, in these concepts, we have to face the issue discussed in principle in the second chapter of this book. We can never prove the truth of such ideas by a purely external demonstration divorced from the internal response of faith. We cannot submit the Holy Spirit of Christ to the tests of sight and touch. We cannot separate Spirit from the media of its manifestation, any more than we can separate our own spirits from our bodies. The testimony of our ordinary consciousness of self is of such a nature that we postulate something we call "spirit" in order to explain it, and

the only proof of our postulate is that we cannot do without it, and that it does explain the consciousness. Such, also, in the last resort, is the "proof" of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as continuing the presence and power of Christ. How this doctrine emerged has been traced in brief outline. It was created historically, as a postulate of Christian experience, using the thought-forms of its ancestry and environment. The experience was inexplicable to those men without the truth of the postulate. The conviction of the Church has retained the postulate and developed its meaning, because the Church has continued to know the presence of God through Christ.

Though, however, we cannot possibly offer a proof from without of an experience within, there are some considerations which may help us to hold to the postulate more firmly and more intelligibly. Prior to and beyond the borders of the Christian revelation, we have found the highest revelation of Spirit in human personality. We have now seen that this kind of revelation is crowned in the human personality of Jesus Christ. When that height had once been reached, God as Spirit could not be content with lower levels. He must bring the transfiguring vision of the mountain into the valleys of human life. No higher personality could be created, but a new and more intimate relation to men was now possible. After Jesus Christ, Spirit could not be less than personal in its manifestation, and personal in the full sense of Christ's personality. A new fact emerges, just as when oxygen and hydrogen are combined in certain proportions there is a new fact which reveals the unsuspected qualities of both. Human personality is seen to be spiritual; Spirit is seen to be personal. The personality of the Holy Spirit is not to be regarded as a borrowed or reflected personality simply because the revelation of it

is thus linked with the personality of Jesus Christ. On the contrary, personality belongs to the very nature of Spirit, and Spirit borrows not its essence, but only its form and historical content from the human personality of Christ.

It is sometimes asked what necessity there is for this doctrine of the Holy Spirit. Is it not enough to say that we have fellowship with God through Christ? does not the introduction of yet another intermediary rob Christian experience of its chief glory, the immediate presence of God to faith? Yes, if Spirit is only a vague "something", a spiritual ether for the messages of a distant God. Yes, again, if the analysis proper and necessary to thought were taken to imply an actual separation in experience, as the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity will shew. But the very life-breath of the conception of the Spirit is unity of operation with the Father and the Son. As God was present in the world through Christ, so is God through Christ present in the Holy Spirit.¹ Unreflective Christian experience may seem able to dispense with such analysis, as when prayer is offered simply to Christ as God. Fortunately, the Christian experience of the Holy Spirit does not depend on an accurate pneumatology. But, other conditions equal, the more accurate our thought, the more vital will be our experience of God, and the pious reluctance to think out the issues of faith is often made the device of sloth or sentimentality. Indeed, unrationalized piety is always at the mercy of fanaticism, just as undevout rationalism ceases to be religion at all. The presence of God through Christ in the Spirit is not to be attenuated to the influence upon us of a historical memory of Christ, though psychologically it is mediated by such a memory. Apart

¹ "The Spirit is the method of Christ's presence": Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, p. 272.

from the Spirit, there is a lacuna in our thought, and a lacuna in our thought may easily become a lacuna in our experience. The doctrine cannot replace the experience, but, if true, is surely capable of confirming and enriching it.

If God through Christ is really present with us, then His presence is a spiritual fact, and a spiritual fact demands a spiritual explanation. That explanation we begin to give when we learn to say "God is Spirit".

A "Christocentric" theology may therefore fail to be centred in God, unless we see that the problem of Christ passes into that of the Spirit.¹ But it is not less clear that we cannot discuss these issues from without; we have not the data for discussion unless, in some degree, we stand within. Our judgment of the Christian experience from without is likely to be as futile as that of Festus, who summed up the issue between Paul and his accusers by saying that it concerned "Jesus, who was dead, whom Paul affirmed to be alive".² To such tenuity may the Christian experience be reduced, when seen from without—the experience which, when described from within, signifies that "I live, and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me".³

¹ Cf. Schaeder, *Theozentrische Theologie*, I, pp. 27, 28.

² Acts xxv. 19.

³ Gal. ii. 20.

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of believers. 172

CHAPTER VI

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE CHURCH

IN the Epistle most directly concerned with the nature and purpose of the Church three metaphors are employed to characterize it, and in each of them the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit is stated or implied. The Church is the temple of God, built on the foundation of (Christian) apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus as its cornerstone and constructive principle, to be a habitation of God in the Spirit.¹ The Church is the body of Christ, Who is its head; the moral unity of its members should correspond with the unity of the animating Spirit, that it may grow into the fulness of Christ.² The Church is the bride of Christ, loved by Him to the point of sacrificial surrender, cleansed by Him through a baptism resulting in unblemished consecration (a baptism of water which represents the inner baptism of the one Spirit).³ All these metaphors imply the unity of the Church, but that of the temple also suggests its dignity, that of the body its co-operation, that of the bride its purity. We should not forget that these metaphors were fashioned in an age when the Church had no actual building to call her own, no settled organization to constitute her unity, not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, to make her attractive in the eyes of the world. The dignity, harmony and purity

¹ Eph. ii. 20, 21.

² Eph. i. 23, ii. 14-16, iv. 4, 12, 16, v. 23, 30.

³ Eph. v. 25-27; cf. i. 13, 14, iii. 16, iv. 23, 30, v. 18, vi. 18.

which characterized her were a creation of the Spirit, not yet materialized in visible forms. These characteristics were not inherent possessions ; they were all derived from her adoption by God the Father, to whom she had access through Christ in one Spirit.¹

If we ask what is the most characteristic and comprehensive work of the Holy Spirit, according to the New Testament, there can be little doubt that we should answer in the one word, "fellowship". When the Apostle expands his usual simple benediction—"The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with you"—into the triple form which we employ,² he does it by going behind the grace of Christ to the love of God which inspired it, and by coming forward into the Church's experience of fellowship with the Father, through that grace, a fellowship created by the Holy Spirit. But fellowship with God so essentially means fellowship with men (since men are inevitably drawn closer together as they approach God) that he makes this fellowship of Christians with one another in the Spirit the basis of his appeals for humble and helpful service.³ The charismatic gifts of the Spirit are all imparted for the service of the fellowship, and His greatest of all gifts is love.⁴ The peculiar fruit of the Spirit is displayed in qualities of character and conduct chiefly affecting fellowship.⁵ Pentecost itself was the practical discovery of the fellowship of believers (cf. Acts II. 42 ff.). Thus the Apostles' Creed is fully warranted in its third article, where "I believe in the Holy Ghost" opens into "the holy catholic Church" and "the communion of

¹ Eph. II. 18.

² 1 Thess. v. 28, etc.; 2 Cor XIII. 14. See further in Ch. X. The underlying meaning of *koinonia* may be a "common possession" of Holy Spirit, but this implies what is said above.

³ Phil. II. 1.

⁴ 1 Cor. XII. 28 ff.; Eph. IV. 11 ff.

⁵ Gal. V. 22, 23.

saints ". We must not confine the work of the Holy Spirit to the creation of fellowship, and still less, of course, to its ecclesiastical expressions ; but we are justified in saying that the Spirit of Jesus Christ always works towards the end of fellowship, and finds His highest expression within its realization.

I. It is worth while to consider the Church simply as a form of human fellowship—one among many others—before we try to examine its theological presuppositions. As such it is a perfectly natural form of "association", in which the principle of "community" finds expression ; to use McIver's useful distinction and figure, associations are the pattern on the web of community.¹ We have learnt to regard the social aspects of human nature as being just as essentially involved in it from the beginning as the individual aspects : "There are no individuals who are not social individuals, and society is nothing more than individuals associated and organized."² Instinctively, therefore, the discovery of a common need or interest will tend to draw men together into some form of association to satisfy or gratify it more effectively. A Co-operative Society is able to substitute wholesale for retail methods of trading, and so to give greater monetary value to its members. An Orchestral or Choral Society can study and render music of a range and character which no isolated musician can ever reach. A learned Association can encourage, organize and adopt the work of its individual members, so as to give it new significance and authority. In all these and the countless other forms of association, there is the general basis of community in human nature, and the special interest, which controls the activities of the association. If that interest be religious, the association still remains subject to all the

¹ *Community*, p. 129.

² *ib.*, p. 69.

laws of human society, whatever higher laws may be brought into operation. Like a learned Association, a Church has periodic meetings, appoints a group of officials with special duties, educates its less advanced members, develops the corporate sense of loyalty and responsibility, presents its claims or conclusions to the external world of men. It is possible to explain all this in terms of the general basis of community and of the special interest, without granting the truth of any of the theological claims made by the Church—and multitudes of people do so explain it to-day.

J. B. Mozley, in his searching discourse on "The Reversal of Human Judgment", has shown how many concealed secondary motives, such as personal ambition, may cloak themselves under the forms and activities of religious zeal, and that *esprit de corps* may be bad as well as good, from a religious standpoint.¹ These lower motives can never be excluded from the visible Church, though they may be transformed by their direction to higher ends than those of egotism. In all social groups, kindred phenomena may be found up to a certain point. There is the instinctive tendency to imitation, seen in animals and in growing children and in grown men. So, through intensive emotion, we get the incidents of a religious "revival"; every revivalist knows how one confession stimulates another. There is the sex element which consciously or unconsciously underlies so much comradeship in Christian work. There is the thrill of leadership and of the response of a group to it, which may so easily be regarded as a proof of special inspiration, yet is found in every social grouping, from the animal

¹ "University Sermons," IV—this has been called "the greatest sermon of modern times" (Brastow, *Representative Modern Preachers*, p. 334).

5 world upwards. The co-operative emotion of a religious assembly, listening to an eloquent speaker, may be paralleled at a political meeting. All these parallel phenomena neither prove nor disprove the truth of the claims made by the Church; they simply shew how the association of men creates new possibilities as compared with those of the individual. Those possibilities may be used for many diverse ends, as when in a Lancashire valley a little group of men who had met in each other's houses for instrumental music found they had common religious interests also, and ultimately developed into a Church.¹ Their religious fellowship began in musical association; their music was carried forward into the service of religion. At what point did their association pass from the "natural" to the "supernatural"? The question just raised is not idle; indeed, the answer is of decisive importance as to what our conception of the Church shall be. Many Christians would not admit that such a group could be a Church at all, however practically valuable to its members might be its religious exercises. They would say that until the individual members were formally incorporated into the historic Church which could trace its descent through properly constituted officials back to the original apostles, the very name "Church" was a misnomer. Many others, again, would say that however desirable or necessary it was that such a group should be regularly recognized and brought into relation with some main body of the Church, the essence of the Church was there from the time at which religious fellowship in the name of Christ was realized. "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in

¹ These "Deighn Layrocks" ("Larks of Dean") became the nucleus of the present Baptist Church at Lumb (*Baptist Quarterly*, IV, 1; January, 1928).

the midst of them ” ; *ubi Christus, ibi ecclesia*.¹ Without discussion of this most important issue, which still divides Christendom, we follow here the second line of thought, which throws us back on the experience of fellowship itself for any test or proof of the “supernatural” character of the Church.

The term “supernatural” is bequeathed to us through a misleading and dangerous antithesis of “natural” and “supernatural”, and some may therefore prefer to use the term “superhuman”. All that is here meant is that element in the life and experience of the Church which links its fellowship with Jesus Christ as God manifest in the flesh. If He is superhuman, then His presence and activity in the fellowship of the Church would also be a superhuman element,² even though psychologically conditioned like any other human experience. The Church at least claims that presence and activity, as differentiating it from every other form of human association. The proof of that presence and activity is unnecessary when Christian faith is strong, and Christian fellowship real ; it is difficult, if not impossible, when Christian faith is weak as it is to-day, and the fellowship of the Church is apt to be a conservatory bloom, needing constant care and attention. This is the real difficulty of our subject, when we claim that the Church is a supernaturally created and sustained fellowship ; yet it is useless to say much about the Holy Spirit unless we can claim this. The difficulty is in regard to those who know the Church only from without ; those who have known its fellowship intimately from within, or have a real experience of the Christian home-life which it nurtures, do not usually hesitate about this claim. With all the failure of the

¹ Cf. Ignatius, *ad Smyrn*, 8 (though with a different application !)

² Col. i. 27.

Church to live up to its great New Testament ideal, there is still to be found in it a quality and character of Christian fellowship that give it a unique place. This goes back to its origin. The social emphasis of the life and teaching of Christ is as unmistakable as the social significance of the death that is a ransom for many ; that social emphasis of Jesus Christ goes back to the social conscience of the prophets of Israel, and forward to the clear testimony of His disciples, " If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen ? " With this test, the practical judgment of the outsider rightly agrees, however superficial or misguided its particular application ; where there is no fellowship, with all its brotherly activities, he sees no true Church. The spirit in which we conduct ecclesiastical controversies is one of the most important of their issues.

II. We have spoken of the real presence and activity of Jesus Christ within the Christian fellowship as the alleged pre-supposition of its existence. But there is a lacuna here of which many Christians seem hardly conscious. The Jesus of history might be superhuman, might be God manifest in the flesh, yet so long as He remained a remote figure of the past, the Church could not say " our fellowship is with the Father and with His Son, Jesus Christ ". A historical memory is not a fellowship. Knowledge of the Gospels does not make the living experience of the Gospel, though it prepares for it. If the fellowship of Christians springs from their fellowship with God as known in Jesus Christ, then He must be as really present to them as they are to one another. There must be mutual activity in a fellowship, as distinct from the one-sided activity of a cherished memory. If, then, there is any truth in the Christian claim to have fellowship with God in Christ, He must be active through His real presence,

and present by His real activity. This is what the New Testament means primarily by the Holy Spirit. Spirit alone can have fellowship with Spirit; anything lower can be no more than a medium or channel of Spirit, even though it be the historical record of Christ's life on earth. Strictly and accurately there is no more spiritual power in that record than there is beauty in the painting of the Sistine Madonna which holds us enthralled before it; these marks on papyrus or canvas are simply a language which Spirit uses to spirit. It would not really have been different, if we had shared with the first disciples the company of Jesus of Nazareth. His human form then, or His memory now, can only mediate the otherwise unseen, unrealized presence of Spirit. God is Spirit, and fellowship with Him is fellowship in Spirit, made possible for us by the concrete utterance, the historical language, of Spirit in history.

Whilst, however, we rightly insist on the real presence and activity of God as Spirit within the consciousness of the Church, we must not, with Schleiermacher, identify the Holy Spirit with the spirit of the community. His three cardinal propositions are that: (1) the Holy Spirit is the union of the divine Being with human nature in the form of the common Spirit animating the community-life of believers; (2) every one regenerated participates in the Holy Spirit, so that there is no life-fellowship with Christ without indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and *vice versa*; (3) the Christian Church, animated by the Holy Spirit, is, in her purity and perfection, the complete image of the Redeemer, and every regenerated individual is a completing element in this fellowship.¹ Up to a certain point, this classical statement brings out the truths already urged, viz. that fellowship is of the essence of the

¹ *Der christliche Glaube*, II, §§ 121-125.

Church and that it is created by the Holy Spirit through the historical work of Christ, and that God is really present in the community through the Holy Spirit. But it does not bring out adequately the transcendent, as it does the immanent, elements of Christian experience. The emphasis falls on the subjective, instead of on the objective, side of the Christian consciousness. The spirit of the community is not something that exists outside of the individual members of the association. That spirit is really existent, but its existence depends on the constituent individuals who share it. Only by a figure of speech can we speak of the personality of a group, or of a "group-mind".¹ The Church's confession of sin, the Church's declaration of faith in a redeeming Christ, the Church's awe and reverence in the presence of God, as expressed in true worship, the Church's acknowledgment of utter dependence on the guidance of the Holy Spirit, all throw the weight of emphasis on the transcendent side of the experience. It is this for which many are standing today, more or less unconsciously, when they exalt the Bible or the Church as an external authority, and deprecate the appeal to experience which has characterized theology since Schleiermacher's time. Schaeder is justified in his main contention for a "theocentric" as opposed to an "anthropocentric" theology², though this by no means involves the abandonment of the appeal to Christian experience as our basis. What it does involve is a more adequate and searching analysis of the consciousness of the Church to bring out the objective as well as the subjective elements, and in their true relation. Just as our philosophy of general experience has driven us back from the study of subjective and objective factors in more or less isolation to the unity of experience in which

¹ See pp. 142, 271. ² *Theozentrische Theologie*, p. 3, et passim.

they are found inseparably together, so our philosophy of Christian experience must bring us back to the unity of faith in Christ.¹ In that unity we find God in Christ really present by His Spirit, and our faith depends in its very nature and operation on the transcendent character of the revelation, whilst it is never "faith" until it is ours by personal appropriation and response. We may compare the unity of the individual and the social elements in the same experience, not less inseparable in the living realization of the Christian faith. The Holy Spirit creates a new individuality in the believer, but the very content of the new individuality is social, issuing in a new consciousness of fellowship. Similarly the Holy Spirit brings man into such a surrender to the overwhelming God of holy love as gives him the consciousness of true freedom and power. He finds *himself* in God.

III. So far we have seen that the forms of the life and work of the Church are as purely natural as those of any other kind of association, but that they are made the shrine of the transcendent-immanent Spirit of God. We have now, in the third place, to consider the relation of body and Spirit, to use the Pauline metaphor,² and we must constantly remember that it is a metaphor, if we are not to materialize its application. The "body" does not essentially denote anything visible or tangible, though its temporal expression requires visible and tangible forms of life; the body is that supra-sensible reality of fellowship into which believers are baptized in one Spirit, for personality, individual or corporate, is never directly seen or handled. The "members" of the body are not so much raw material, out of which a new

¹ See my essay on "The Validity of Christian Experience" in the volume called *The Future of Christianity* (ed. Marchant).

² 1 Cor. xii. 12 ff.

material object is fashioned. They are conscious spirits, brought by the Spirit of God into a new relation to Himself, so that they willingly co-operate with Him. This point is not brought out adequately by New Testament commentators, because they so often fail to interpret Paul's figure by the Hebrew psychology which dominated his thought. According to this, consciousness with its psychical and ethical implicates is not concentrated in the head, or in any central organ, but is diffused through all the members, the flesh itself being a psychical entity. Each part of the body, hand or foot or eye or ear, has its own quasi-independence and moral quality, which it is asked to surrender to the one animating and controlling Spirit, the new soul of the body.¹ The ministry of the Church is conceived in the true sense of the word "ministry"—it is service rendered by individual members to the body as a whole through the inspiration of the Spirit, who brings all the "natural" qualities into this willing service, "What, then, is Apollos? and what is Paul? Ministers through whom ye believed."² The only headship is that of Christ, the Lord the Spirit. The members do not so much "join" a Church, which exists completely without them; they help to constitute it, in their own intrinsic degree, by awakening to their own share in the welfare of the body. The true aspiration of the believer is thus fitly expressed in the well-known sentence of the *Theologica Germanica*: "I would fain be to the Eternal Goodness what his own hand is to a man."³ In this sense we may rightly speak of the Church as the continued

¹ This is parallel and complementary to the argument by which Paul would lead on the Corinthians from plurality of "inspirations" to the one "Spirit" in diversity of operation—the logic of monotheism, of which the Church would thus become an object-lesson to the pagan world.

² 1 Cor. III. 5.

³ *Golden Treasury* edition (trans. Winkworth), p. 32.

Incarnation of Christ. In Fairbairn's words, "As Christ is the incarnation of the love of God, the church is the incarnation of Christ's Spirit and purpose . . . the church is His incarnation as He is God's."¹

The Incarnation of the Eternal Son of God necessarily involved limitation and humiliation; "he emptied himself . . . even unto death, yea the death of the cross."² The same principle of "Kenosis" is implied in the indwelling of the Church by His Spirit. His new earthly body is never commensurate with His personality, never fully adequate to the performance of His purpose. This is recognized by Paul when he speaks of the body as in a state of growth "unto a fullgrown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ."³ Christians are "saints" in the sense of being consecrated to this ideal, not yet in that of having achieved it. The patience of God with the individual life is wonderful; but how much more the patience of God with His Church! He waits to be gracious here through generations and centuries instead of months and years. He accepts the hindrance of His purpose through our partial knowledge, and our reluctance or slowness to learn more, through our half-surrenders and divided interests, through even our virtual denials of that fellowship which *is* the Church. In proportion as we really believe in the presence of the Holy Spirit with the Church which is His body, we shall see the history of the Church as the Spirit's *Via Dolorosa*.⁴

By this divine patience, our impatience with one another and with the Church is continually rebuked. The

¹ *Studies in Religion and Theology*, p. 430.

² Phil. ii. 7, 8. For the connection of the "Kenosis" specially with the Cross, see *The Cross of the Servant* (by H. Wheeler Robinson), pp. 73, 74.

³ Eph. iv. 13.

⁴ See Bushnell's fine chapter, "The Holy Spirit in Vicarious Sacrifice," in his book, *The Vicarious Sacrifice*.

supreme gift of the Spirit is sacrificial love, and the Spirit of the Cross is the Spirit of the *ecclesiola in ecclesia*, the essential mark of the fellowship of the Spirit. We forget that the divine purpose is being achieved all the time, whenever that fellowship is being realized. The visible work of the Church must be carried on, its crusades preached, its ecclesiastical policies considered; yet is it not sometimes good to remember that the Spirit's work is not measured by the seen, and the Spirit's harvests, even under cloudy skies, are continually being gathered? ¹ We think of the Church in cross-section, instead of in perspective, the perspective of eternity. Newman's words about the Church are worth remembering:

"At present, we who live are but one generation out of fifty, which since its formation have been new born into it, and endowed with spiritual life and the hope of glory. Fifty times as many saints are in the invisible world sealed for immortality, as are now struggling on upon earth towards it. . . . The unseen world through God's secret power and mercy encroaches upon this world; and the Church that is seen is just that portion of it by which it encroaches; and thus though the visible Churches of the saints in this world seem rare, and scattered to and fro like islands in the sea, they are in truth but the tops of the everlasting hills, high and vast and deeply rooted, which a deluge covers." ²

However earnestly we may desire, however diligently we ought to seek, the unity of the Church in both faith and order, we must not forget that the unity so emphasized in the New Testament is that of a common

¹ See F. W. H. Myers' fine sonnet, *Fragments*, p. 133.

² *Parochial and Plain Sermons*, Vol. IV, pp. 172, 178.

purpose, rather than of a common organization. A contemporary philosopher has usefully reminded us that a man's attitude towards the divine purpose is *the* religious attitude.¹ In terms of the Christian faith, we may say that the unity of the Church is measured by the degree to which it is animated by the Spirit of the Cross.² This is the will of God which Jesus made His own will. This is alike the law of divine and human conduct. On the divine side it is the grace which the Church declares to the world; on the human, it is the heart of Christian ethics.

IV. The question, "What is the mission of the Church?" may be fitly answered in Bishop Temple's words: "The main function of the Church is religious education, that is to say, the building up of thought and character, conscious and subconscious, in the knowledge of the Love of God, so that the soul is always open to the operation of the Holy Spirit."³ The subject-matter is the Gospel of the Word made flesh; the pupils are both those within, who grow up under the influence of the Gospel, and those without, who may not have even the rudiments of knowledge to begin with. The methods are primarily those of the spoken word of the preacher and teacher. But they are not confined to these, for the sacraments, as we shall see, have an educative and evangelistic value, whilst the existence of the Church itself, as the supreme form of human fellowship, ought always to be, and often is, the noblest form of the preaching of the Word. Indeed, truth can never be captured by the words of the lips; it has always to be translated into life to become the vehicle of the living Spirit of God. It was so with the Incarnation; it remains so with the Church.

¹ Lloyd Morgan, *Life, Mind and Spirit*, p. 291.

² See Chapter I.

³ *Mens Creatrix*, p. 343.

Jesus made fellowship with the Father live before our eyes ; the Church is created to make this still live, through its reflection in human fellowship, and nothing but a living fellowship can really preach the Gospel of the love of God. Here we come to the Johannine conception of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Church. The Holy Spirit convicts the world of sin and righteousness and judgment, not by any direct operation on the hearts of those without, but by His presence in the fellowship of the Church.¹ There men see what they cannot deny, reality rendered in terms of life, the intrinsic testimony to the unseen. This educative work of the Holy Spirit is less articulate, yet in some respects more impressive, than any spoken word. We may compare the effect of different arts upon our emotional life. Music is far less articulate than the poetry which may borrow its rhythms, yet music may interpret the unseen and spiritual realities in realms beyond those of poetry. So the Church mediates the truths articulate in Scripture, yet adds something which Scripture, as such, cannot give. Indeed, truth must always be made incarnate to become power as well as truth.

This raises the important issue of the guidance of the Church into truth by the Holy Spirit. It is a pertinent question how far history demonstrates this. Emphasis on the literal truth of the Scripture or on the complete adequacy of ancient creeds and confessions seems to make the promise unnecessary, except for the interpretation of truth once given. On the other hand, the conception of a living and growing body of Christ seems to carry with it the principle of a real growth in knowledge of the truth. Certainly we may say that, on the analogy of secular teaching, this growth is essential. Every true teacher

¹ John xvi. 7 ff.

knows that he must always be gaining new knowledge himself, in order to impart old knowledge in fresh and convincing fashion. Popular ideas of education, secular or religious, often make it the stereotyped repetition of a text-book, which a gramophone would do more efficiently. But we must always be discovering new truth to be convinced and convincing in regard to the old. So it is with the Church. Unless she is continually led by the Spirit into a deeper realization of God, and therefore a larger truth about Him, her repetition of ancient creeds will fail of its purpose, her devotion to the Bible will become pathetic antiquarianism. As for the new developments of Christian truth, their truth will always be tested by the reaction of Christian life to them, which means the acceptance or rejection of them by the Holy Spirit, as vehicles of His activity. Prior to this final and infallible test, there is the intellectual sifting of new truth by its congruity with the old, not so much in form as in principle. Where there is continuous life, there will be some continuity of principle that will carry us back to the historic basis of the Church. This is the right ground for the study of origins ; they do not limit the truth, but they do form its root.

The authority of the Spirit's teaching, which the Church is commissioned to convey, is real, though not to be identified with the records of Scripture or the findings of the Church in any of its generations. These at most bring us to a human experience of God which must be critically handled, that we may find the divine within the human. The subjective element will always be mingled with the objective—for *this is of the very nature of Christian truth*, and God has safeguarded it from human externalization by this very condition. But the authority of the Spirit is nevertheless real, when we have patience

to find it, and humility to question our own interpretations of it. Here we are brought into the presence of ultimate authority—God. Here, in the sifted and tested experiences of faith, we may know the intrinsic authority of spiritual revelation. That will depend on the mediation of both Scripture and Church, for no man can wholly escape from the tradition in which he has grown up, and no man can hold Christian truth who abandons its historic foundation. Moreover, the testimony of Christian experience to the truth is never wholly individual. The testimony of the Church, like the witness of Scripture, will carry its own great weight, and no man has the right to reject it until he dares to say—on this particular issue—"I am the Church". On such individual-social experience of faith, with all its inter-actions, the truth both of Scripture and of the Church's utterances has been built up. The individual has the right to believe that by God's very nature and purpose, the Holy Spirit is given to them that obey Him, and the Church has the right to say, when it incorporates such faith, "It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us."¹

V. Finally, we have to consider the relation of the Church to the World, so far as this concerns the work of the Holy Spirit. That relation began with a strongly marked antithesis, for the New Testament in general conceives the world as lying more or less in the power of the devil, and it is only in apocalyptic vision not yet realized that the cry is heard, "The kingdom of the world is become the kingdom of our Lord and of His Christ."² It is significant that, when any strongly marked revival of religion occurs, that antithesis tends to be renewed, as in the monastic and Puritan movements of the Church, and in many forms of pietism. It

¹ Acts xv. 28 ; cf. v. 32.

² Rev. xi. 15.

would seem to be necessary both to discipline and to effective evangelism that the antithesis should be continually re-asserted. One form of its assertion is seen in the contrast of the "Catholic" and the "gathered" conceptions of the Church, with all the host of practical problems as to what should constitute Church membership. Yet the practical assertion of the place and function of the Church over against the World must not obscure the plain fact that they are working with the common material of human nature, though to different ends, and that because it is human it can never be wholly severed from the divine. The Old Testament is part of our Bible to remind us that the Spirit of God cannot be confined to the Christian Church. The spiritual history of every believer contains abundant testimony to what the theologian calls *prevenient grace*. The God of the Church is also the God of Nature and of History, and our too ready dualisms often obscure the truth about Him. We shall be nearer that truth if we keep in mind His constant activity as Spirit in the whole extra-ecclesiastical world,¹ whilst emphasizing the unique and supreme activity of His operation through the historic personality and work of Jesus Christ.

We cannot, in fact, identify the kingdom of God with the Church, for the boundary of the one crosses and recrosses that of the other. The Church is here smaller, there larger, than the kingly rule of God, which is what the Kingdom means in the New Testament. Not all within the "visible" Church belong to it, and many belong to it who do not belong to that "visible" Church at all. When we say, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church", we ought to mean, as Seeberg reminds us, "I believe that the true people of God are present in the

¹ See *The Creator Spirit*, by C. E. Raven, *passim*.

historical Church ”;¹ but when we say, “ I believe in the Holy Ghost ”, must we not mean to acknowledge His presence and activity wherever found ? In fact, our ecclesiastical faith to-day greatly needs reinforcement by this larger vision of a realm in which Christian forces are at work, consciously or unconsciously, without definite relation to the ecclesiastical. It is not an easy problem to solve, how the intrinsic worth of this activity shall be recognized without forfeiture of the true function of the Church. Yet the difficulty must not hinder us from the acknowledgment that God was here, though we knew it not, whilst our Bethels are not always His. After all, our theological difficulty is only another form of that which meets all philosophy to-day in finding an interpretation of Nature that shall not be excluded from the comprehension of Spirit. The Christian God is the God of the Universe. With a finite God, at least, Christian faith will never be content. The Christian Gospel of grace loses much of its significance when we no longer say that mercy is mightiest in the Mightiest. Schweitzer’s figure of the warm Gulf Stream within the cold ocean to represent the God of love within the God of the forces of the universe,² leaves us face to face with inexorable questions. All these theological and philosophical issues are bound up with our doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the Church and in the World, and nothing short of an ultimate unity of origin can satisfy us.

Meanwhile the Church remains, in both its spiritual and more material aspects, the chief organ of the Spirit. It belongs to the very nature of Spirit that it must find expression in media lower than itself, and like Christ become poorer in order to enrich. Every visible Church

¹ *Christliche Dogmatik*, II, p. 352.

² *Christianity and the Religions of the World*, p. 78.

of Christ is a compromise, and an adaption of the higher to the lower, even apart from moral faults and spiritual inconsistencies. The finite expression will always be unworthy of the Infinite. Yet, as a recent writer says, something more is necessary than being brought into tune with the Infinite. "We come near to penetrating beneath the surface of life if we find a focus, and I do not know where we can find a better focus than the lighted shrine."¹ If the shrine contain a table of fellowship, and not simply a tomb of memories, and the light be that which lighteth every man coming into the world, and not simply a sanctuary lamp, then the Church is indeed the lighted shrine which human nature needs.

¹ W. Force Stead, *The Shadow of Mount Carmel*, p 150 (a fine example of the spiritual "quest" and pilgrimage).

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CHAPTER VII

THE SPIRIT AND THE SCRIPTURES

LITERARY and historical criticism has done for the Bible what the work of Copernicus and his successors did for the heavens. It has swept away many ancient difficulties, and many speculations of the Ptolemaic order, but it has imposed upon us a harder task of study. The Bible in its historical perspective is not so easy to know as when men could treat it as a consistent text-book of doctrine, or could allegorize its language into anything they liked, and create out of its pages a Delphic oracle ; but then it is better worth knowing, like the heavens on which we look with post-Copernican eyes. We cannot to-day act out the drama of the soul with a dialogue drawn from the Scriptures, after the manner of Bunyan's *Grace Abounding*. Yet, if a truer view of the nature of the Bible meant that we thereby lost the consciousness of its divine inspiration and continued message to our needs, we should be no better than the astronomer who had lost all sense of Nature's beauty and sublimity in his zeal for Kepler and Newton and Einstein.

The Bible as it lies before the "plain man" is likely to make a double impression upon him—that it is a book both like and unlike any other books of which he knows. It is like them because men of like passions with himself speak and act throughout its pages, and are concerned in its creation as a literature. It is unlike them, not simply because God is often represented as speaking directly to

men, but because, to a higher degree than any other book, this body of literature speaks to heart, and mind and conscience. This likeness and unlikeness of the Bible to other books is the twofold testimony of experience, and we neglect one or the other element only to our own loss. Before we come within sight of any issue between "higher criticism" and "verbal inspiration", we are faced by the primary fact that there is both a human and a divine element in the Bible. If we read the Bible only as a human book, we shall lose something that no other book can give; if we read it simply as a divine oracle, we shall never understand it aright.

The more technical study of the Bible, along familiar lines of literary and historical method, of course brings many new facts to light, but does not destroy the first impression. On the one hand, many of the statements made prove to be inconsistent, and subject to correction from within or without the Bible, and many of the writings it contains prove to be much more complex than we supposed, and different in authorship and date, and even in nature, from what they *prima facie* appeared to be. On the other hand, the removal of many difficulties about God and His intercourse with man helps us to hear Him still speaking in and through the Bible, though less directly and with more use of human experience as the medium. But one most important result for our particular subject in this chapter will certainly be brought out by such a study. The whole problem of "inspiration" is pushed back to the prophetic consciousness. Behind the literature, there is a history; within the history there are men who believe, or are represented as believing, that they are "inspired";¹ the fullest information we can get about that belief is in regard to the prophets of Israel and

¹ Cf. Schaeder, *Theozentrische Theologie*, I³, p. 92.

their successors, the Christian apostles. The issue as to the reality and the nature of the inspiration of Scripture turns at last on the issue as to the inspiration of the prophetic consciousness—in other words on a particular case of the fellowship of Spirit and spirit—the issue faced in Part I of this book. The doctrine of the divine inspiration of the Bible may therefore be said to rest on the following five propositions :

(1) The psychology of the prophetic consciousness takes us to a point at which the prophets claim to receive divine truth by divine inspiration.

(2) The truth of this claim stands or falls with the philosophical issues already discussed, and in general with the mediation of the knowledge of God in and through religious experience.

(3) The problem of mediation thus becomes cardinal to inspiration, as it is to the doctrine of the Incarnation, and of the Church and the Sacraments.

(4) The ultimate authority is again seen to be intrinsic and self-evidencing, the voice of the Spirit speaking through these media.

(5) The reception of the message by the spirit of man, already enlightened by the Spirit of God, implies the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti Internum*, the witness of the divine Spirit with the human spirit.

I. It is from the eighth to the sixth centuries before Christ that the prophetic consciousness of Israel is seen at its highest, the particular prophets who concern us most being Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah. They have become the classical types of moral and religious development, and some of their utterances have become its classical expression, such as Hosea's "I desire mercy and not sacrifice". This is but

to say that these men exhibit in the highest degree those features which belong to moral and religious men in general. They are linked to their people by bonds of the strongest sympathy, and they emphasize the need for social justice, compassion and purity, not simply for their own sake, but as the true and essential form of worship of the God of righteousness, mercy and holiness. They conceive Him to be the God ruling over other nations as well as their own, whilst in a peculiar degree the Saviour of Israel. They believe that they are both His messengers and His agents, and that He accomplishes without failure His purposes through them and their word, which is His. Their prophecies are usually related to social, political and international crises, which they are commissioned to interpret to Israel and to the world. Their interpretations, broadly consistent in spirit and in principle, are yet strongly marked by their individual and characteristic forms of thought and speech.

As compared, however, with the moral and religious teaching of another race or of another age, such as our own, they differ in certain forms of thought and manner of utterance, which spring from the psychological characteristics of the Hebrews. Their social sympathies are linked to a strong sense of the corporate personality of Israel, so that the nation is primarily conceived as the unit in morality and religion. Only secondarily and within this corporate consciousness does the sense of an individual relation to God emerge, and this but slowly. They think of human personality as essentially an animated body, and not (like the Greeks) as an incarnated soul. This body, animated by the breath-soul, has a diffused consciousness of its own, in its peripheral organs, as well as those that are central. The result of this conception is not unlike that of the subconsciousness in modern

psychology, though the form is very different. The central control by the heart or the breath-soul was much more limited than the function of the brain with us; they knew nothing of the brain and the nervous system, and could readily conceive such phenomena as those we call "multiple personality", the division of consciousness into its elements or groups of elements. As they thought of normal life being due to the incoming of a principle of life to animate this essential personality of the body, so they could easily conceive an intensification of this incoming, the possession of their consciousness or some part of it by the Spirit of God. It is this accessibility to invasion from without which most strongly distinguishes them from ourselves. Further, these men regard words as deeds, and deeds as words. Their "prophetic symbolism" is a very real part of their message, as their message is a vital contribution to the actual life of the nation. At a higher level they ascribe to their deeds a potency similar to that of "symbolic" or "sympathetic" magic at lower levels of civilization.

These ideas were shared in common by the prophets and the people. But there are some peculiar features of the prophetic experience which, in their own eyes and in those of their people, distinguished them from their fellows, and constituted them prophets, so far as any psychological test could. Their experience was in some sense abnormal. They had visions, auditions, and even trances, not shared by the ordinary man. "The Hand of Yahweh" was felt to rest upon them in strong and even irresistible compulsion. They were under an external control, which it was impossible to withstand. The reception of their messages by themselves has many forms, conditioned by characteristic differences of temperament and occasion; these messages are usually expressed by them in rhythmic

form. In both respects, we note the resemblance to the Delphic oracle, and the beliefs and practices of many peoples. Comparative study of the *forms* of the prophetic consciousness in Israel reveals nothing to distinguish it from similar phenomena elsewhere, nothing to give to their "Thus saith Yahweh" that unique place which it has actually won in history. Their distinction is in the use made of these forms, the moral and spiritual content with which they are filled. The greater prophets pass far beyond these abnormal experiences—not in the sense of being without them, but as leaving them in the outer courts of the temple of religious experience, of which the Holy of Holies is personal fellowship with God in the clear light of an awakened conscience. This we see supremely in the prophet Jeremiah. In him and for him, the issue between true and false prophecy becomes one of intrinsic quality; Yahweh says to him, "If thou wilt take the precious from the common, thou shalt be as my mouth" (xv. 19). It is a value-judgment that constitutes the true prophet, who could not have been distinguished from those prophets he and we call "false" by any merely psychological test. He may still have conceived the divine message as an "invasion" of his own personality, as the reference to "mouth" may suggest; but in fact his experience was rather that of spiritual surrender, controlled from above, than mere spiritualistic mediumship. He was a moral agent in the process.

II. The truth of the prophetic claim to divine inspiration cannot, therefore, be tested by any appeal to the abnormal manner of its reception. As far as our evidence goes, there is nothing here to distinguish the true prophet from the "false", himself often a man who believed in the genuineness of his message. Doubtless even the true prophet was helped to believe in the reality

of his divine commission by the abnormal experience that marked or initiated it; moreover, without such experience, he would not have won the ear of the people; his place would have been among the "wise men" who claimed no *special* inspiration for the occasion of their speech. But we see how little the form of reception affects the content of the prophecies, and we see the great prophets breaking away from such external means of communication, and speaking as those who regularly and consciously hold a place in the council of Yahweh, and enjoy a steady fellowship with Him. The influence of the unusual and dramatic would remain with them, as the accounts of their respective "calls" will shew; but for the most part, their message is the content of their own moral consciousness, raised to the level of religious significance, by its investiture with a divine authority. How did they learn that it was wrong for religion as well as for morals to take advantage of a widow who had nobody to speak for her in the "gate", where the village business was done by the elders, or to indulge in ritual prostitution before Yahweh, as before the Baalim? We can answer only by speaking of an awakened conscience, which means a new value-judgment. They were pioneers of conscience, and the consciousness of a divine commission made them prophets. How did Isaiah know that the Assyrians would not destroy Jerusalem, and Jeremiah that the Babylonians would? We can speak only of a faith in the divine purpose, a reading of the signs of the times in the light of a thought of God learnt in fellowship with Him, a conviction justified by events. Why did Ezekiel outline the future worship of the temple in terms that so deeply influenced the laws and practices of post-exilic Judaism, and why did Deutero-Isaiah call Israel to a missionary career amongst the nations which was

eventually so amply fulfilled? We can only say that it was because sympathy with their people's needs and capacities brought spiritual insight, and faith in the God of Israel gave assurance in the declaration and application of that insight. There is, of course, a quality in these utterances that seems to set them apart from similar utterances of moral and religious experience to-day, a quality partly due to the intensity of their experience and its historic place, and partly to the peculiar forms of Israel's prophetic consciousness. But, as the human ultimate, we find these men of high moral and spiritual development flinging themselves, for all they were worth, on the deepest convictions of their own hearts, convictions of intrinsic worth. "To believe your own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men—that is genius."¹ It was the genius of Israel's prophets, and they became prophets because they dared to believe that it was also true for God.

Inevitably and naturally for such a people, these convictions found expression through an ethical theism, and were ascribed to the clear-cut personality of Yahweh. Their implicit argument is that higher anthropomorphism, which has been the fundamental argument of this book. The crudity of earlier Hebrew ideas of God was the necessary matrix of the later faith that He was not less moral than His creatures. Abstract ideas of morality would have been impossible in Israel. But may we not say more than this? Is there not a deeper truth in an anthropomorphic moralization of God than there can be in any abstract morality or even in a modern "value-judgment" without it? The moral values have come into being within persons, and through their relation with persons; apart from personality morality has no meaning.

¹ Emerson, *Self-Reliance*.

If there is a morality that transcends both our individual consciousness and our social achievements, a morality that is always urging us forward to new endeavours and new ideas, though always working by ways of immanence, this must centre in a reality not lower than personality, as has already been argued. In Israel, history was not only the pioneer of theory (as in some sense, it always is), but entered into its content to a unique degree. Yahweh was the God revealed as active in history ; the prophets claimed Him as active also in conscience. When they said, "Thus saith Yahweh", uttering their deepest convictions in the faith that these were His messages, they were giving the concrete equivalent of the philosophical truth that the values of the human spirit must spring from and depend on the reality of the divine Spirit.

We cannot miss another philosophical assumption that is implicitly made by these prophets—that of the reality of human history. Confident as they are of the divine control of human life, they never treat this life as if it did not matter, or as if it were simply the unfolding of foregone conclusions. The very fact that in the centuries of which we are speaking there was no belief in immortality made the meaning of this unique life on earth the more intense and vital. Where there was no eternity, time assumed some of its qualities. In this arena of human history, the great purpose of God was carried out to real issues by real agents. The author of the Book of Job is teaching prophetic truth in his prologue ; Yahweh is so intimately concerned in the life of earth that He stakes His reputation on the conduct of one man upon it. The gaze of heaven is turned down upon the earth ; there is a breathless expectancy before there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one man who will not sin. Time is real, and eternity is concerned in its issues. We cannot

understand the Bible simply in terms of a revelation. It is the record of a *realization* of God, a positive enrichment of the eternal within and through the temporal.

Thus, along all three lines of the value-judgment, the higher anthropomorphism, and the real worth and meaning of time, we are carried to general issues, belonging to the universal relations of the human spirit with the divine. Just because these universal relations are so directly and powerfully presented in the Bible, it can claim to be a revelation of divine truth *for all men, and for all time*. In such truths there is nothing provincial and transient, for they stand or fall with the reality of all genuinely religious experience. They are embedded in a particular history, which gives a dramatic and picturesque presentation of these issues on the stage of Israel's fortunes and their sequel in the New Testament. But the particularity of the history only makes more effective the presentation of the universal truths, as the historic service of the Bible to religion so amply shews. We do not need to claim that they are true because they have been so successful. They are true intrinsically, because of the nature of spirit in man and in God ; they are true because they can be realized in every recurrent experience of God, down to our own times. The centre from which they spring is the prophetic consciousness, where man's spirit touches God, and that which the Old Testament achieves in the few, the New Testament democratizes through the gospel of Jesus Christ.¹

III. The previous argument has been based on a critical and comparative study of the Bible, with no desire to force a particular theory of inspiration upon it. The general truth seems to be that God has made human

¹ Cf. the " new covenant " of Jeremiah, and the reference to it in the institution of the Lord's Supper.

experience the medium of His revelation whilst co-operating in man's moral and religious advance. He is revealed because He is there. But He is there in the midst of a human experience, and the revelation is *wholly* through that medium, not in the creation of the record alone, but also in the original form of the experience. The revelation must be sought in that experience in its entirety, rather than in particular "texts" taken from it. We may well call the Bible God's drama.¹ But the dramatist does not put the whole, or, necessarily, any part of his direct meaning into the words spoken by this or that character. Those words are related to the whole, and must be judged by the whole, and if we are to know the author's meaning, it must be from the whole rather than from any particular part of the drama. Of course, this general truth does not contradict the fact that some passages will come much nearer to that meaning than others; but this will be because their intensity of utterance is due to the momentum of the drama itself. The thirteenth of 1 Corinthians is itself due to reaction from the ugliness of Corinthian self-assertion.

To realize this general truth is to be saved from many false issues in controversy about the Bible. Its fate does not depend on the proof or disproof of some half-dozen statements in it that are selected for debate. The Bible ought not to be regarded as a field of which the people on one side are wanting to pluck the tares from the wheat, whilst the people on the other are saying that it is all pure wheat. We do better to think, in terms suggested by a fine contrast in the Book of Job (xxviii. 5), of the mine that runs underneath the field, the mine in which the treasure lies, though it is buried in the ore, and has become one with it, and can be extracted only

¹ See last paragraph of chapter.

with greater or less toil. That is why it is rather dangerous to look for inspired "bits" of the Bible, and to make a formal anthology of inspiration—as distinct from that which all lovers of the Bible make for themselves. The human and the divine are too closely mingled, even in the prophetic consciousness, to make such a formal division practicable. In a sense, we may agree with the extremist who says that the Book of Leviticus is as "inspired" as the fourth Gospel. So it is, though not in the sense intended, for it was partly through the ritual of the one, that men were led to the faith of the other—the faith that God must be worshipped in spirit and in truth. The grim pessimism and scepticism of Ecclesiastes, again, by contrast reveal the true nature and worth of the enthusiastic faith of Deutero-Isaiah. So also with the question of historical truth. Our concern is with a *history* in which God is alleged to have been present. If we can substantiate that claim, the greater or less accuracy of the records of it is of relatively little importance. The maxima or minima of the "results of criticism" do not matter very much. But if we cannot make good our claim that God was active in the life and experience of Israel to such a "degree" as becomes virtually a difference in "kind", then we must place the Bible on the same shelf as other sacred Books of the East, and only the specialist will study it.

Thus the doctrine of verbal inspiration is not simply untenable; it is irrelevant. We may compare the doctrine of transubstantiation.¹ It is, for many Christians, apart from its merits or demerits, an unnecessary theory. If God is there, in the Sacrament or in the Word, by a Real

¹ As a matter of fact, the mediaeval doctrine of substance and accidents was actually applied by Reformed theologians to the Scriptures; cf. Otto Ritschl, *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, I, p. 180.

Presence of spiritual reality, it seems unnecessary to devise a theory of His presence in material elements. Those who stand for verbal inspiration or transubstantiation are really standing for the truth of that Real Presence ; what they usually fail to see is that it is possible to experience it and to maintain it, without the particular theory for which they stand.

It is a real help towards the formulation of the doctrine of inspiration to see that it centres in the problem of mediation, like the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Sacraments, and the Church. In each case, we have to conceive how the facts of Christian experience are best explained—the authority and saving grace of our Lord, the realization of His presence in baptism and the Lord's Supper and in the fellowship of believers, and here, the voice of the Spirit of God in the letter of Scripture. In each instance there are peculiar difficulties to be met, but they are all of them difficulties of mediation, i.e. the way in which Spirit can employ that which is lower than its own plane to express itself, and become effective in human life. They are all forms of the central fact of our experience, the union of body with spirit, a union we cannot doubt, yet cannot explain.

As has already been indicated, most of the difficulties once felt about the character of the Bible revelation—the contrast, for example, between the Old Testament and the New—have been removed by the recognition that it is the record of a long historical development extending over twelve centuries. The ancient Church was greatly troubled by this contrast, and some Christians (e.g. Marcion) went to the length of excluding the Old Testament from the Canon altogether. The method of allegory, borrowed from the Stoics through contemporary Hellenist philosophy, enabled the Church to get over this

difficulty, but at the cost of making the Bible often mean what we can clearly see it did not mean. The Protestant appeal to the Scriptures as a text-book of doctrine again did frequent violence to exegesis, and much of it reads strangely enough to us to-day. That appeal was possible only when men's thoughts were in the grip of a powerful system of doctrine, such as Calvinism, which was strong enough to conceal or overcome the weakness of strained exegesis. But as those systems weakened, the Bible again challenged men's thoughts, and its apparent inconsistencies furnished many an argument for infidelity.

With the rise of historical criticism, a new view of the Bible banished such objections, except for the uneducated.

The different levels of thought and conduct which it records and sometimes inculcates are seen to be natural and indeed inevitable when presented in historical perspective. God was working out something *with* man as well as *for* man, and His pace had to be theirs. The modern student of the Bible is not troubled by the fact that one age believes Yahweh to do what a much later age ascribes to Satan (2 Sam. xxiv. 1, and 1 Chron. xxi. 1), or that at Sinai Yahweh is said to visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, whilst in Babylon it is explicitly declared that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father (Exod. xxxiv. 7, and Ezek. xviii. 20). Indeed, these different levels of thought make no small part of the universality of the appeal of the Bible. In every generation there are people at many different stages of moral and religious progress, and there is something in the Bible for every stage.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the view of the Bible in historical perspective offers difficulties of its own of another kind. Chief among these is the question of its authority—how such a record of development can

be an authority for faith and practice—and this requires special notice. But first something should be said of the difficulties that are felt by many about the conclusions of literary criticism, as to the authorship and composition of the books of the Bible. For example, is not the use of pseudonyms, as when Deuteronomy is written in the seventh century, yet in the name of Moses, something that is inconsistent with the divine morality, and unworthy of a divine revelation? Can we think of the Spirit of God as really inspiring the author to utter divine truth in such circumstances? The answer to such questions is that on the human side every act must be judged by the standards of its own age, and that pseudonymity was very differently regarded in the ancient world, and might be used in the first instance without any intention to deceive; on the divine side, the inspiration of divine truth does not wait until men are perfect, or there could be no revelation. Doubtless, our standards of morality are higher than they were in Old Testament times, but who would claim that they are yet as high as they ought to be? We must believe with Whittier that “nothing can be good in Him which evil is in me”, nor can we think that conscious wrong-doing is ever a means of fellowship with or an act of service to the holy God; but it is another thing to maintain, as we certainly must, that God is constantly using men and giving Himself to them, through what may be called their beneficent illusions.¹ God’s ways in revelation are surprising, but then so are His ways in Nature and in Providence. It is difficult to see how there could be a revelation mediated through human experience which did not employ the

¹ Cf. Jer. xx. 7: “O Lord, thou hast deceived me and I was deceived,” and F. W. Robertson’s sermon on “The Illusiveness of Life” (Third Series, pp. 77–89).

contemporary methods of human composition for its record.¹

IV. But, it will be asked, in what does the admitted authority of the Bible consist, seeing that its revelation comes wholly through human media? Does not this make impossible the confident appeal to the Scriptures as affording an infallible direction of faith and conduct? It certainly does, if that is sought in the *letter* of the Word of God to men. But that is a gain rather than a loss. The Bible has often been degraded to the level of the *sortes Virgilianæ*, a verbal oracle mechanically used. On a somewhat higher level, it has been used in the interest of a dogmatic system or of ecclesiastical prejudice to defend doctrines no longer tenable and conduct which most Christians would now condemn. Did not Wesley say, for example, that "the giving up witchcraft is, in effect, giving up the Bible"?² We may confidently claim that the fuller recognition of the principle of mediation, by throwing us back on the inner content of the revelation, instead of its literary expression and record, is part of the unceasing providence of God over His people. At a time when the Bible is ceasing to exercise its influence along the traditional lines, criticism has thrown into prominence the prophetic consciousness of Israel, has shewn its primary importance in the creation of the Old Testament literature, and has won a new devotion from many whom the old interpretation and attitude had failed to retain.

¹ Nor must it be forgotten that a manuscript record is very different from one multiplied by the printing-press; the record may be the property of a single owner, who feels at liberty to alter it to suit himself, and his practical needs. Not a few of our literary problems in regard to the Bible must have arisen in the most innocent of ways, as by the use of ancient writing-materials. Even to these humble details the principle of mediation applies. We must take the Bible as we find it, and let it speak for itself, and then we need not fear for the issue.

² *Journal*, May 25th, 1768.

There is a moral challenge to be encountered in the newer approach to Scripture. We must seek that we may find, knock that it may be opened to us, have within ourselves some spiritual kinship with those whose company we seek, and under whose roof we would enter. That is some sort of guarantee that the authority of Scripture will be in the fullest sense a spiritual authority, one that has not been forced upon us by convention and tradition, but is freely recognized, and gladly obeyed, as the utterance of mind and will truer and finer than our own.

The authority of Scripture finds expression through the record of a rich and varied and extensive religious experience, within which we may discern the activity of God. In the last resort there can be no authority over the spirits God has created, but that of the Father of spirits. No church or man, no prophet or apostle, can write a final and absolute testimonial to God; all they can do is to give us an introduction to Him. When we know Him, as He is known in religious experience, He commands our allegiance simply by being what He is, and doing what He does. The revelation of the Bible is the revelation of a dynamic God, active in history, and that history culminates in the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. So we may say with Forsyth, "In any faith which is more than theistic we commune with an authority which is not simply God, but God as He has bestowed Himself on man, God as actual to historic Humanity and its evil case, God in history, God holy in guilty history, God as He gives Himself for man's sin in the historic Gospel, God our eternal Redeemer in Christ. That Gospel and grace has an authority not only historic but absolute in the experience of Christian men."¹

So presented, the Bible is an authoritative unity,

¹ *The Principle of Authority*, pp. 367, 368.

progressive in method, but continuous in character, with the living unity of root and stem and leaf and flower. We are not dependent on the infallibility of the record (as though a photograph could necessarily reveal more than a painting). Our concern is with the life of the plant, the secret of the flower in the crannied wall, the mystery of God which is in it.¹ We cannot pluck the flower from its plant, and thereby claim to have all we need. There is a true sense in which the authority of Jesus cannot be known rightly apart from the life of the whole people to which He belongs. His use of the Old Testament, which is partly that of His age, or His use of current Jewish apocalyptic, is not to be torn from its setting and made into a formula for all time, any more than His references to the rising and setting of the sun ought to be made into a disproof of Copernicus. His authority as God manifest in the flesh is absolute; but it is a mediated manifestation, a manifestation in the flesh, and we cannot decide *a priori* what limitation of the powers and knowledge of the Eternal Son of God that may involve. His supreme purpose is to shew us the Father, and that suffices us. His authority is intrinsic, consisting in what He is and does, and His own know and recognize His voice. But that voice gathers into the fulness of its tones those of many prophets before Him, and His work is in spiritual continuity with the moral and spiritual revelation of the Old Testament. The Cross of Christ is foreshadowed on the Via Dolorosa of Jeremiah by a spiritual kinship of sacrificial suffering, rather than by the words "a lamb led to the slaughter"; the New Covenant in the Upper Room is a fulfilment of Jeremiah's prophecy, because it

¹ Cf. Alice Meynell's poem, "The Daisy":

what will it be to look
From God's side even of such a simple thing?

belongs to the same great line of a realized fellowship with the Father. The essential truth of sacrificial fellowship with God is not ultimately authoritative because in differing degrees both Jeremiah and Jesus revealed it ; it is authoritative by being what it is, the supreme glory of life, and we say " Jesus is Lord " because in Him we see that supreme glory in its perfection.

The Bible is unique because no other book does bring us into this religion of the Spirit. We need not fear that the comparative study of religion will overthrow this claim, or that we lose anything by inviting the comparison ; no other religion is so central and universal by intrinsic appeal. The voice of the Spirit may be heard through the sacred books of other religions in their own degree, as well as in Nature and history as a whole. The supremacy of the revelation of Spirit as the Holy Spirit of God in Christ does not require us to assert that there is no revelation of truth in other religions. Wherever truth is, there is the God of truth ; wherever God is, there is the authority of God. But our faith in Christ is measured by our confidence in His final victory and universal reign, because of what He is : " Worthy is the Lamb that hath been slain to receive the power ".

The record of this revealing history is contained in a collection of writings gathered into what has come to be called the " Canon " of Scripture. This particular collection came into being for the most part unconsciously, and often through motives and for reasons which seem to us inadequate. It would be difficult to frame any definition of " canonicity " that would justify the exclusion of some of the Apocrypha from the Protestant Canon and the inclusion of some of the books that are within it. We cannot draw an arbitrary line according to authorship or date or language, and it is idle to ask whether Jude was

not inspired when he quoted Enoch (vers. 14-16), or whether Enoch was inspired because he was quoted by Jude. The margins of "canonicity" are historically and materially too undefined to justify a formal claim about the collection, as it is due to some peculiar providence of God, conferring a peculiar authority on the collection as such. We can only use gratefully and diligently the records of the religious experience of Israel, old and new, that we may know the authority of the Spirit of God speaking through them. "Not by the judgments of Church rulers and theologians, but by the appeal they made to the heart and conscience of the early believers, were the New Testament writings separated from the other Christian writings of the day."¹

V. There are two "proof-texts" which have taken a foremost place in arguments for the inspiration of the Bible; rightly interpreted, they corroborate and complete much of what has already been said. The first is the exhortation of the Second Epistle of Peter (i. 19-21) that diligent use be made of the Old Testament, as of a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day of Christ's second coming shall dawn. The Old Testament prophecies have a definite and "objective" meaning, independent of human will in their interpretation, as they were in their origin; "for prophecy was never brought by the will of man, but men spoke from God, being carried along by Holy Spirit". This statement does full justice to the element of divine compulsion which we have traced in the psychology of the prophetic consciousness, though it ignores the human element which we have also found there. The second passage is that in which Paul refers to Timothy's early training in the sacred writings (of the Old Testament): "Every scripture inspired of God is also

¹ Milligan, *The New Testament Documents*, pp. 227, 228.

useful for teaching, for rebuke, for restoration, and for discipline in righteousness”¹ (2 Tim. III. 16). Here the emphasis is not on the divine inspiration of Scripture (which is taken for granted in the attributive adjective “inspired”), but on the religious experience which follows on the use of Scripture, the response of man to its divine message. To Paul, as we know from his teaching elsewhere, such religious experience is wholly within the circle of the Holy Spirit’s activity.

We have here, then, in the two passages, the fundamental facts about the inspiration of the Bible on which the theories of the Reformers were built, when the authority of Scripture had to be magnified against the claims of the Church to interpret it. We say advisedly “theories”, and not “theory”, for there is considerable variety of emphasis and expression. Otto Ritschl, in his thorough examination of the subject,² distinguished four types of theory: (1) that which emphasized the original declaration of the message, without emphasis on its written record; e.g. Melancthon: (2) that which recognized the Scriptures as God’s Word, so far as really canonical, though this Word was not everywhere expressed with equal clearness; e.g. Luther: (3) the simpler form of verbal inspiration, as in Calvin; (4) the more developed form of this, as in Flacius (the first Lutheran to hold verbal inspiration). The first two of these theories allowed co-operation of the human element; the second two made men instruments in the hand of God, and no longer the authors of their writings. Calvin, for example, says explicitly that God is the author of Scripture (*Institutes*, I, 7, 4), that those

¹ The rendering of the A.V., “All Scripture is given by inspiration of God” is possible, but would still leave open the questions as to (a) what books are Scripture, (b) what inspiration means.

² *Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus*, I, pp. 57, 58.

parts where we should have expected His authorship to be least direct, viz. the historical, are "composed at the dictation of the Holy Spirit" (IV, 8, 6), and that the writers of the New Testament are "amanuenses" of the Holy Spirit (IV, 8, 9).

On the other hand, a marked and striking feature of the Reformation doctrine of inspiration in general is the co-ordinate appeal to the inner witness of the Holy Spirit to the authority of Scripture. Again we may take Calvin as our example: "Just as God alone is a fitting witness concerning Himself in His utterance, so also the utterance will not find faith in the hearts of men before it is sealed by the inner witness of the Spirit. The same Spirit, therefore, who spoke by the mouth of the prophets, must of necessity penetrate our hearts to persuade us that what was divinely commanded has been faithfully published." (I, 7, 4). "The Word itself is not fully certain to us unless confirmed by the witness of the Spirit. . . . God sent the same Spirit, by whose virtue He had administered the Word, to complete His own work by the effective confirmation of the Word." (I, 9, 3).

The interest of this doctrine of the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti Internum* (obviously necessary when the Church as the guarantor of the Scriptures fell into the background) is that it is really a recognition of the evidential value of religious experience. The Scriptures do not appeal to all men, and where they do appeal it is because of a particular kind of experience. But we have seen that Christian experience by its very nature presupposes the work of the Holy Spirit. It is "supernatural", not as being opposed to the experience of the "natural", but as transcending it, whilst working immanently. From the beginning, the Spirit of God denotes this supernatural activity. As Denney says,

"The witness of the Spirit, by and with the word in the soul, does not guarantee the historicity of miraculous details, but it does guarantee the presence of a supernatural element in the history recorded. It bars out a criticism which denies the supernatural on principle, and refuses to recognize a unique work of God as in process along this line."¹

It may be objected that this reference to a subjective experience as the guarantee of the objective revelation is the Achilles heel in the argument, and that we do not thereby reach an "external" authority. In a certain sense that is true, though no more true than of any other part of our experience (see Ch. II). The fact is that an authority in religion wholly external to us ceases to be a moral and spiritual authority at all, and could assert itself only on the level of "a law of nature", and even "a law of nature" has to be framed by the human intellect. The very essence of both morality and religion is that there be in them the relation of a person to other persons. On the other hand, this does not leave us open to the charge of mere subjectivity. The experience of other persons in relation to God is as objective as anything else in the universe, if it is real; our personal sympathy with them is necessary to bring us to the conviction that it is real, but the reality does not depend upon our conviction of it. Nor must we look for the reality of the divine revelation in the experience of others along the line of that "piece-meal supernaturalism" which we have already tried and found wanting. In them as in ourselves, the transcendent God is immanent. That transcendence in immanence is historically and experientially expressed by the principle of mediation. On that principle and our attitude to it, depends our whole moral and spiritual

¹ *Studies in Theology*, p. 212.

training as spirits working through sub-spiritual media to a fuller realization of their own nature. With that condition of all our personal experience the divine revelation in the Scriptures is congruous. The human element runs all through, but the divine is manifest in the human, even as it was in the Incarnation itself.

If we recur to the figure of the Bible as a divine drama, then we may say that there are five acts in it—the first when God gathered a nation out of Bedouin tribes, the second when He raised up prophetic teachers with their fragments of truth, the third when exile purged and disciplined the religious consciousness of Israel, the fourth when the tragedy of the Cross of Christ brought man's sin face to face with God's grace, the fifth, when the Holy Spirit began the creation of a fellowship not yet achieved, the inauguration of the kingly rule of God. The momentum of a divine purpose gives unity to the drama and inspiration to those who are called to play their part in this as yet uncompleted fifth act.

I
II
III
IV
V

God is bringing
us to glory
I also when
Paul
says about the
ingathering of his people

The Presence of
CHAPTER VIII
in them

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE SACRAMENTS *h17*

THE Sacraments of the Church, throughout her history, have been both the centre of her most intense experience and the arena of her fiercest doctrinal contests. If that seems a paradox, it is a paradox in semblance only. The two great Sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper are the points at which the scattered rays of her religious life are brought to a focus ; in their concentrated light we see her life and the thought which inspires it, as nowhere else. The idea of the Church is revealed in her idea of the Sacraments. If she thinks little or nothing of them, how can she think much of herself, seeing that these are characteristic acts of the *ecclesia* ? But if she thinks much of that which they concentrate and express, for what should she contend more earnestly than for a worthy interpretation of them ? At first sight, it may seem to the Protestant a tragedy of history that, at the famous conference between Luther and Zwingli in the Castle of Marburg (1529), their agreement on fourteen out of the fifteen articles of the Christian faith should have been nullified by their inability to agree on the fifteenth—the relation of the elements to the Body of Christ in the Lord's Supper. Yet, disastrous as was the resultant division of Lutheran and Reformed Protestantism, it did represent genuine and cardinal differences of conviction, which had to work themselves out in the subsequent history of the two Churches.

The conditions that make a doctrine of the Sacraments a not inadequate test of ecclesiastical position should remind us of the importance of the "atmosphere" in which we approach them. Their significance lies in the meaning we attach to them, rather than in the acts themselves, for a ritual bath and a ritual meal are not distinctive of Christianity. Thus it has been rightly said that there is no very great distinction in St. Paul's interpretation of baptism and of the Lord's Supper, for "both the Sacraments are forms into which we may put as much of the gospel as they will carry; and St. Paul, for his part, practically puts the whole of his gospel into each."¹ The general character of this content may be illustrated fittingly from Herbert's "Temple". When he has crossed the threshold of the church, he is brought face to face with the altar, not the visible and material so much as the invisible and spiritual altar of the contrite heart. He pictures it quaintly in verse shaped into the outward form of the visible and material:

A BROKEN Altar, Lord, thy servant reares,
Made of a heart, and cemented with teares:
Whose parts are as thy hand did frame;
No workmans tool hath touch'd the same.

A Heart alone
Is such a stone,
As nothing but
Thy pow'r doth cut.
Wherefore each part
Of my hard heart
Meets in this frame,
To praise thy name.

That if I chance to hold my peace,
These stones to praise thee may not cease.
O let thy blessed Sacrifice be mine,
And sanctifie this Altar to be thine.

¹ Denney, *The Death of Christ*, p. 137.

From that thought, the first condition of any spiritual doctrine of the Supper, he turns at once to the other essential—the Sacrifice of the Lord—on the details of which he meditates in characteristic fashion. Then he passes in review the cycle of Christian experience which brings the Lord's sacrifice on Calvary to the spiritual altar of the heart, viz. sin and affliction, repentance and faith, prayer, "The Christian plummet sounding heav'n and earth"—the cycle of the Spirit's guidance which prepares the heart for the grace of Holy Communion, wherein another singer of sacramental evangelicalism would join him by the words :

O Thou who camest from above,
The pure, celestial fire to impart,
Kindle a flame of sacred love
On the mean altar of my heart.

Not only George Herbert and Charles Wesley, but all devout Christians meet at that centre. There is always a peril, in any discussion of the Sacraments, that we should allow the examination and estimate of different interpretations to obscure the far greater agreement in all that the Sacraments represent. There is the common experience of fellowship with God, which always implies divine as well as human activity. There is the common faith in God's approach to man through Christ, and specially through His sacrifice on Calvary, which is commemorated in baptism as well as in the Lord's Supper.¹ There is the common realization of man's approach to God in the fellowship of the Holy Spirit, the fellowship of baptism in one Spirit as well as the fellowship of the body and blood of Christ.² It is in regard to the principles and methods of the mediation of the Holy Spirit that the

¹ Romans vi. 3.

² 1 Cor. xii. 13 ; x. 16.

differences arise, and even here there are broad agreements. It has been recently claimed¹ that there are four cardinal principles which might receive general assent, viz. "that in every Sacrament the inward reality is a Divine act; that the Sacraments do not limit God's gracious activity; that true faith and penitence are necessary conditions for the effectual receiving of God's gifts in the Sacraments; and that the soul can receive more in the Sacrament than it is capable of realizing." The last of these would evidently require careful definition, and many Christians would hesitate about it as opening a possible door to what they would call "superstition"; but so long as the emphasis falls on the activity of the Holy Spirit, it must be common Christian ground, for our own consciousness can never be the measure of the Holy Spirit's activity, though it is essential to the highest work of the Holy Spirit.

I. On the basis of experience it may reasonably be asked at the outset, "Can you essentially differentiate the experience which you have in the sacrament from what others . . . associate with prayer or obedience? . . . If we say that certain temperaments feel God best by one means or in one way, and others in another, then do we not concede (more or less) that sacrament and prayer are each in essence an opening of the door to Christ? He at all events is always there."² It might justly be replied by a defender of sacramental grace that the unity of fellowship with God through Christ forbids us to make "essential" differences anywhere, if that fellowship of the Spirit is itself the essence of the Christian experience.

¹ By Canon O. C. Quick at the Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order, as reported in the *Times* of August 15th, 1927.

² T. R. Glover, in an article on "Unity in the Spiritual Fact", in the *Constructive Quarterly*, Vol. II, No. 5, pp. 24, 25.

There is a striking sentence of à Kempis to this effect : " As often as there is devout recollection of the mystery and passion of Christ's incarnation, and the kindling of the love of Him, so often is there mystical communion and invisible refreshment."¹ There is sufficient ground for the place taken by the Sacraments in the life and thought of the Christian Church if they are in fact found to intensify effectively an experience of divine grace which is by no means to be confined to them. We are not arguing in a circle when we say that they are shewn to do this by the place they continue to hold. Some of the definitions of this intenser experience may seem to some of us as arbitrary as the distinction drawn by Israel's preacher between the irrigation of Egypt by the Nile, and the rain that fell from heaven on Israel's land.² But good psychological reasons can be given for this greater intensity as a fact of experience.

In the Sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper (to which our attention in this chapter is confined)³ use is made of both things and words—the water of baptism, the bread and the wine of the Supper, the baptismal formula and the words of institution—and it is useful at the outset to remember that new values may attach to both things and words when they become links in a personal relation. A keepsake, with all its halo of personal associations, has something of the Sacrament about it (in the widest sense of the term) ; it stimulates

¹ *Imitatio Christi*, IV, 10, 6.

² Deut. xi. 10–12. On my suggesting this parallel to an Anglo-Catholic friend, he said he was quite willing to accept it as an illustration of his position in regard to sacramental grace, which was as the rain from heaven. Cf. St. Teresa (of different stages of prayer), *Life*, p. 78.

³ The same principles of interpretation might be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to other " sacraments " of the Church. e.g. the laying on of hands (cf. Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, pp. 382 ff.).

the memory and imagination, and has its own musical undertones or overtones, which cannot be made articulate. Someone¹ has described a boy's discovery of a secret drawer in an old bureau, containing some other boy's hoard of worthless treasures: "Across the void stretch of years I seemed to touch hands a moment with my little comrade of seasons—how many seasons?—long since dead." Even so men have often thought of Nature as a link with the living God. We remember how full of "sacramental" meaning a snowflake could be to Francis Thompson:

Thou couldst not have thought me !
So purely, so palely,
Tinily, surely,
Mightily, frailly,
Insculped and embossed,
With His hammer of wind,
And His graver of frost.²

It is no accident that thought about the Sacraments should bring us into poetry, for poetry and music open a door into reality through which theology, in the narrower sense, cannot pass.³ The more emotional nature of music and the more articulate nature of poetry may be taken to correspond with the "sacramental" value attached to things and to words respectively. There is an intellectual element in the spoken word, which does not, however, by any means exhaust its "sacramental" value. The pupil of a greatly beloved teacher, recalling his first lesson on the Greek declensions, said that when William Medley⁴ wrote

¹ Kenneth Grahame, in "The Golden Age" (*The Secret Drawer*).

² "To a Snow-flake." *Selected Poems*, p. 88.

³ Cf. Francis Thompson's reference to Shelley's perception of "the underlying analogies, the secret subterranean passages between matter and soul; the chromatic scales, whereat we dimly guess, by which the Almighty modulates through all the keys of creation." (*Essay on Shelley*, p. 57 of 1923 ed.).

⁴ Classical Tutor in Rawdon College, Leeds (1869-1908).

doxa on the blackboard the very room seemed full of the "glory" of which he spoke, and in which he seemed to live. It was enough for Edward Irving to look into the face of a dying youth, and say "George, God loves you; be assured of this—*God loves you*", to bring the peace of the great discovery to that death-bed.¹ Here we have human personality added to the spoken word so as to give it a vital content. When a preacher proclaims the Gospel in its simplest form—"God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son"—all the terms used, God, the world, love, and the measurement of love by Christ, will mean much or little according to the human personality behind them, and the hearers in front of them. The Bible itself is no more than a collection of ancient documents till it becomes (as Leo called it) a sacrament, that is, something which is a means by which the divine Spirit becomes active in the heart of reader or hearer.²

The Sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper are, then, the combination of *things* possessing a suggestive symbolism of their own—water, bread and wine—with *words* assumed to have divine authority, which bring the sacramental *acts* into relation with the Christian Gospel, and so enable them to mediate the Christian fellowship with God. All this does not take us very far towards a theory of the Sacraments, since it is only psychological. Yet, if the Christian faith itself is true, the truth which is psychologically mediated must claim some sort of metaphysical justification for that effective mediation. It is, of course, in regard to this mediation that the controversial differences arise. The volume in this series on "The Christian Sacraments" reminds us that "there is a broad division to be recognized between those who connect the presence in some special way with the consecrated elements them-

¹ *Life*, by Mrs. Oliphant, p. 267.

² See Ch VII.

selves, affirming that consecration really changes them, and those who affirm the special presence only in the hearts and souls of faithful worshippers, denying any change in the material elements to be wrought by consecration.”¹ The ultimate ground (so far as a reasoned argument goes) of the former claim may be stated in the words of von Hügel :

“ Christianity is irreducibly *incarnational* ; and this its Incarnationism is already half misunderstood, or half suppressed, if it is taken to mean only a spirituality which, already fully expressed by souls outside of, and prior to, all sense stimulations and visible vehicles and forms, is then simply expressed and handed on in such purely spiritual ways. No : some such stimulations, vehicles and forms are (upon the whole and in the long run) as truly required fully to awaken the religious life as they are to express it and to transmit it, when already fully awakened.”²

He goes on to point out with perfect truth that Quakerism (the extreme antithesis to this position, by its rejection of the Sacraments) “ is steeped in images and convictions that have grown up amongst, that have been handed down by, concrete, historical men, and concrete, historical institutions and cultural acts.” This is perfectly fair ; Quakerism lives and appeals by its psychological mediation of the Spirit of God, and the inner experience has been born of the outer events. To a certain point at least, Protestantism ought to be able to understand and share this emphasis on the incarnational side of religious experience, both because it is itself built on faith in the

¹ O. C. Quick, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

² *Essays*, First Series, pp. 230, 231 (“ The Essentials of Catholicism ”).

Incarnation of the Son of God, and because the mystery of the union of spirit and body in all human personality raises similar issues. We have found a double movement of Spirit in relation to levels of reality lower than itself¹—the upward movement of “transformation”, by which Spirit gives a new meaning to material things, and therefore makes new facts out of them, and the corresponding downward movement of “sacramentalization” by which Spirit always (in our experience) reveals itself and becomes active through the material. We have no experience of disembodied spirit, and Biblical thought makes the body a real element of personality, as is seen in its doctrine of resurrection. “Our nature does not allow us to think of the Spirit without Nature.”² Whether this should lead us to think of the ultimate unity of the spiritual and material as the basis of a sacramental theory cannot here be discussed. But it certainly warns us against any attempt to build such a theory on either the spiritual experience or the material elements taken alone. The Sacraments are *acts*, and in the New Testament they are the acts of believers, its baptism being the entrance of believers into the fellowship of the Spirit, its Eucharist being the renewal and maintenance of that fellowship. Are they also the acts of God?

II. It is possible that we should get nearer to the sacramental experience of the first believers if we approached it through that genuinely Hebrew product, “prophetic symbolism”,³ rather than through the Greek mystery religions (however much they may have influenced the New Testament vocabulary). A striking

¹ See Ch. III, pp. 76 ff, without which the above very condensed statement will hardly be intelligible.

² Lechler, *Die biblische Lehre vom Heiligen Geiste*, II, p. 267.

³ On what follows, see more fully *Old Testament Essays* (Griffin, 1927), pp. 1–17.

feature of the activity of the prophets of Israel was that their spoken word was often accompanied or prefaced by some dramatic act corresponding to that word—as when Isaiah went about Jerusalem in the garb of a captive for three years in connection with his oracle that Egypt and Ethiopia, Israel's supposed helpers, would thus be led into captivity—or as when Jeremiah prefaced his public declaration of the “breaking” of Jerusalem by himself breaking an earthenware flask before a group of witnesses. Such acts are not simply the product of the Oriental temperament, the love of the concrete; they are a more refined form of those acts done on primitive levels of thought which we call mimetic magic, more refined because taken up, like so much else, into the religion of Yahweh, and so transformed in meaning. The act of the prophet is what Paul might have called an *'arrabōn*, an earnest of what will be, a little part of the reality which is yet unseen as a whole. The act is psychologically more intense than the accompanying word, and produces a greater effect on those who perform it and those who witness it, but this is not the whole conception of it. It “realizes” the unseen in the philosophical as well as in the psychological sense; it makes a difference which might be called, in our terminology, ontological. With something of this realism we may conceive the earliest believers (who were Semites) entering the waters of baptism and sharing the bread and the wine. Their acts resembled those of the prophets of Israel; they did something that corresponded with the spoken word, and *helped to bring it about*. This consciousness becomes explicit in the interpretation of the acts which we find in the Pauline epistles. Baptism has a triple aspect in Romans VI. 1-4. It implies the historical events of the death, burial and resurrection of

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Jesus Christ, of which submersion was the suggestive "symbol". It consists of a series of acts on the part of the baptized person, who goes down into the water, is submerged, and rises out of it.¹ It supplies a visible parallel to that spiritual experience of the believer on which Paul insisted as the baptism of the Holy Spirit—his death to sin and his resurrection to newness of life. All these three aspects are implied in the single series of visible acts, and they become sacramental to the participant for whom they have this implication. They constitute something from which the apostle can argue, as from a momentous event. Such significance is warranted in the light of prophetic symbolism, which is so much more than mere "representation". There can be no question here of a charge of sacramental "magic", for the baptized person is a conscious believer, and the efficacy of the rite depends on his conscious and believing participation in it. But equally there can be no question of "mere symbolism", for the act is the partial and fragmentary, but very real accomplishment of a divine work, the work of the Holy Spirit.

In the same way we may explain the sacramental realism of St. Paul's account of the Lord's Supper.² Again, we see that it commemorates the most salient fact of the Gospel—the Christ crucified who gave His body for His disciples and initiated the new covenant in His blood. It consisted of a series of acts which suggestively represented the breaking of this body and the shedding of this blood. It implied a spiritual experience of redemption through Christ, which was renewed by these very acts. Paul says that they "proclaim" or "preach" the Lord's death, i.e. the Lord's Supper is a dramatic confession of

¹ Cf. Sanday and Headlam, *Romans*, l.c.

² 1 Cor. xi. 23 ff.; x. 14 ff.

faith.¹ But in doing this, they do more for believers. The sacramental realism of the apostle is shewn by his warning against communion with demons through heathen sacrifices. These acts "realize" as did baptism the experience of being "in Christ", the mystical union with Him which is the core of the Pauline experience. The visible communion is not simply a picture and parable of the invisible; it is a partial realization of it, incomplete and fragmentary again, but a true *'arrabōn*, in which the body of the visible is brought into unity with the spirit of the invisible by acts like those of "prophetic symbolism".

On the assumption that this is true historical exegesis, it may be asked whether it contributes anything useful to a modern conception of the Sacraments. Can we think of them, on grounds of modern experience and modern thought, in quite the same way as did the earliest believers? Probably not, for no generation thinks quite in the same way as that before it, and the difference is apt to be increased the further back we go. On the other hand, the differences between present-day interpretations cannot represent stable equilibrium, and where there is so much common experience there must be some more fundamental ground of agreement, some common recognition of the divine activity through the Sacraments, notwithstanding the different conceptions of the mediation of the Holy Spirit. Perhaps that ground may ultimately be discovered in a fuller and more adequate philosophical statement of the reality of history, the genuine contribution to the whole of reality made by human acts.² This is not meant to suggest

¹ "Die Verkündigung geschieht nicht mit Worten, sondern durch die gesammte Handlung" (Lietzmann). For the use of the verb, cf. Phil. i. 17, 18.

² See further in Ch. XII.

that the Sacraments can ever be properly explained simply as human acts ; the symbolic acts of the prophets of Israel owed their significance to the fact that they were regarded by their agents and by their spectators as divine acts also. If there is truth in the claim that the witness of the Holy Spirit with our spirits is in the unity of an indissoluble experience, then we may equally claim that the acts in which that experience is incorporated may possess the same unity with its double aspect. To the psychological unity there must correspond a metaphysical unity, if Christian experience is that supernatural reality which it claims to be, and there is no reason why this metaphysical unity (within the limitations of the finite and imperfect) should not extend from thoughts and feelings to acts, in which the volitional aspect of human personality finds its normal expression.

It is evident that this applies without difficulty to the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, in which the participants are conscious and voluntary agents, and that it applies equally to the baptism of believers, as practised in the times of the New Testament, and continued by large numbers of Christians to-day.¹ But it is also obvious that it does not apply to the baptism of infants, as yet unconscious of the significance of the rite. Whether that practice can be adequately defended on the basis of Christian experience may seem doubtful. The Anglican exposition of the Sacraments in this series of volumes throws its chief weight on the Eucharist, and says of baptism :

“The point of the Church's transition out of its missionary youth into the status and responsibilities

¹ It should be remembered that “Baptists” number about ten millions of communicants, and that there are other bodies also, such as the “Churches of Christ”, practising the baptism of believers.

of an established institution was marked by the substitution of infant-baptism for adult-baptism as the normal form of admission into full membership. This change, as we have tried to argue, if it is justified at all, must in the end involve the change of emphasis in baptismal theology of which we have been speaking." (p. 180).

This change of emphasis is said to be that "a sound theology of Baptism requires us to-day to emphasize the symbolic rather than the instrumental aspect of the sacrament, while at the same time we must not allow the instrumental to be wholly absorbed into the symbolic. . . . Baptism is itself a critical and decisive moment in the process of which it is the symbol. It marks and characterises the soul as God's child and member of His family, so that all its subsequent growth in God's grace is but an eliciting or bringing to light of what its baptism implied."¹ On this view, apparently, confirmation becomes the truly "symbolic act" in the sense here suggested, that is, the effective human act (of the person primarily concerned) through which the Holy Spirit finds utterance and accomplishment. The baptism of an infant can, of course, be regarded as an act of dedication by believers, who thereby offer themselves to become a "means of grace" to the growing child. On the other hand, there is the position frankly stated by Dr. N. P. Williams, that "the argument *a praxi ecclesiae* is the only, but also a sufficient, ground for affirming the legitimacy and laudability of Paedo-baptism: and that those who do not trust the instincts of the historic Church to the extent which this argument requires should in logic either abandon the custom altogether or

¹ Op. cit., p. 179.

interpret it as a picturesque and dramatic method of registering the name of the infant as an honorary member of the Christian society".¹

On this, and kindred matters of practice and theory, the Christian Church may long continue to be divided, and no man can foresee the issue, either within the Church or in relation to that larger world without, waiting to be won by the testimony of the Holy Spirit through the Church. But enough has been said to shew two things. The first is that the sacramental issue is not one of those minor and negligible questions which impatient outsiders regard it as being, for it raises great principles and shews wide horizons, affecting the whole nature of the Church and the Gospel of Christ. As a contemporary theologian of Germany has said, "the vital point in our knowledge of the Gospel lies in our answer to the question, how is the Holy Spirit given?"² The second thing to be always remembered by the Church and its theologians is that the Sacraments—on any theory of them—are subsidiary to the reality of the gift of the Holy Spirit, and that the true and only ultimate *eirenicon* of a divided Church will not be found without a deeper experience of His presence, and a fuller and wider recognition of His activity.

¹ *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, p. 552.

² Professor Hirsch, in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1924, Nr. 17. His words are "Als das Kernstück evangelischer Erkenntnis muss doch wohl die Beantwortung der Frage gelten, *quomodo detur spiritus sanctus*."

CHAPTER IX

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE INDIVIDUAL LIFE

IN our survey of the work of the Holy Spirit we have so far seen that in Jesus Christ the Spirit of God revealed through Nature and history finds a unique and adequate vehicle in terms of human personality. This new centre of "realized revelation" or "revealing realization" expands into the corporate personality of the Church, as the Body of Christ. The two great, though subordinate, media of the work of the Holy Spirit are the Scriptures and the Sacraments. The history of the Church might be broadly written in terms of the differing emphasis on these two media, with all the differences of definition of their nature and function. The two main currents of English ecclesiastical life from the seventeenth century onwards, the modified Catholicism of the Anglican Church, and the Protestantism of the Free Churches, respectively illustrate the difference of emphasis.¹ Yet we must not exaggerate this real and important difference of emphasis into an antithesis of principle, as is sometimes done. Both types are sacramental and both are Biblical in their several ways. Individual temperament and experience are apt, especially to-day, to cut right across this broad ecclesiastical distinction, and we may often find the more "sacramental" type of experience within Free Church life, as we find the more "Scriptural" type (in the sense of a dominant

¹ Its nature is well indicated in *The Catholic and Protestant Elements in Christianity*, by O. C. Quick.

emphasis on the Bible) within the Anglican Church. This fact may remind us, when we try to understand the work of the Holy Spirit in the individual life, that both media contribute to the normal Christian experience, and this within the larger setting of Nature and history outlined in the first Part of this book.

In this very variety of emphasis lies the difficulty of any description of the work of the Holy Spirit in the individual life. The individuality of that life would be apparent even within a more or less homogeneous environment, such as is (relatively) afforded by Presbyterian Scotland. But in England the inherent individuality of the experience is complicated by marked differences of environment. We here encounter in theory the facts which in practice underlie the problem of religious education in this country. It is instructive to glance at different types of individual experience, as it is described or "analysed" within these differing environments, if only to realize the importance of the differences. Thus, if we take Cardinal Manning's book, *The Internal Mission of the Holy Ghost*, as an example of the Roman Catholic interpretation of individual experience of the Holy Spirit, we find divine grace conceived as an infused gift of the Spirit, expressed in the three primary "virtues" of faith, hope and charity. Justification is identified with sanctification by the indwelling Spirit, the process by which men are actually made just. The work of grace is further traced in the seven "gifts" of the Spirit, viz. holy fear, piety, fortitude, science, counsel, understanding, wisdom.¹ These habits or dispositions are the powers by which the virtues are developed. The "fruits" of the

¹ These are derived from the prophecy describing the endowment of the Messiah in Isaiah xi. 1-3. The Hebrew text gives six; the Vulgate, following the Septuagint, adds "piety"

Spirit (Gal. 5v. 22, 23) are regarded as products of the virtues or gifts, and serve to express active perfection; the Beatitudes similarly express passive perfection. The Holy Spirit to whom all this development is due "is a reality, like the motion of the earth, which we know in our reason, but cannot detect by any sense; or it is like the circulation of the blood, which we know as a fact, but never perceive all the day long. . . . What He does, He is."¹ The description of individual experience becomes, in fact, a Christian Ethic, of which the dynamic is the inscrutable Holy Spirit.

Over against this relatively simple formula we may set the classical Protestant analysis of individual experience made in the Shorter Catechism of the Presbyterian Church. Its first thirty questions are a compendium of Calvinistic theology; only when the great articles of faith have been rigorously defined are we allowed to look at the actual experience of the Christian—with the result that that experience is necessarily analysed in theological formulae, after the manner of scholasticism. Four great marks of the experience are found on its Godward side—effectual calling, justification, adoption and sanctification; then, and only then, are we introduced to the manward side—faith and repentance. The excessive intellectualism of this approach has in our own generation become apparent to almost all; the emotions and the will of man count for more in our modern psychology of religion than they did in the seventeenth century, and the logic of a preconceived system counts for less. Even if we were to take a seventeenth century appeal to experience, such as Robert Barclay's *An Apology for the True Christian Divinity*, which begins with the discussion of "Immediate Revelation" by the Spirit,—even so the

¹ Op. cit., pp. 462, 468.

sequel takes up the successive items of Puritan theology, as seen from this Quaker standpoint, and the "propositions" come between us and that direct observation of the Spirit's work which is our modern interest, to say nothing of that failure to allow for the mediation of the Spirit's activity through Church and Bible which has already been under notice. We need to get closer to the living facts of Christian experience than is allowed by a descriptive Biblical ethics or a theological system on preconceived lines.

I. Here we must necessarily follow the method of modern psychology—not the "New Psychology" which is the fashion of the hour, and lends its jargon (as a mark of date) to so many books of our time, but that method of experimental observation which may be said to begin with Wundt.¹ The basic principle here is insistence on that unity of consciousness which has been before us throughout. The whole of personality is in some sense behind every one of its acts and experiences. Any analysis we are able to make must be an analysis of operation or functioning, not of the ultimate nature of consciousness. Thus the modern psychologist speaks of the "stream" of consciousness to represent its continuous unbroken flow. As we walk by some river, with the sound of its ceaseless rippling in our ears, we may think of the springs among the hills from which it flows, or the fishing-village on the seashore to which it goes, but we hardly ask where it began to be a river at all; we do not try to separate its mobile particles into those which came from heaven and those which sprang from the earth. The river flows on in

¹ "I attained an insight into the close union of all those psychic functions usually separated by artificial abstractions and names, such as ideation, feeling, will; and I saw the indivisibility and inner homogeneity, in all its phases, of the mental life." (Wundt, *Phil. Studien*, X. 121-124, as quoted by James, *Talks to Teachers*, p. 21).

unbroken unity through one field after another, undisturbed by the fences that run down to it, or the bridges that cross it. So is it with the human consciousness in either its general or its Christian aspect. In this latter, we cannot hope to separate the Spirit of God from the spirit of man, and to make God somehow an "object" of our consciousness, like other objects. We can no more put the Spirit of God under our microscope than we can discern Him beyond the stars with our telescope. Such controversies as those between the Calvinist and the Arminian as to divine grace and human freedom are not so much settled as superseded; we have caught a deeper glimpse of Christian experience, in its unity. We have learnt to say: "There is no spiritual power but in God. The well of water, springing up within us, is His Spirit, given at the first, increased from time to time, through the working of this Spirit in the lives and writings of men, and made permanent at last by the appearing of Christ, and our conscious acceptance of Him and His Holy Spirit. . . . God's work all of it, and man's work all of it."¹ Stated philosophically, this means that whilst the supernatural transcends the natural, it is known to us as immanent in the natural. This was virtually the Apostle Paul's contention, when he shewed the more excellent gifts of the Spirit to be the moral qualities of Christian life, as it was the contention of George Fox in his appeal to the "Inner Light".² We have already seen that one great feature of Spirit is the inclusiveness, which

¹ Steven, *The Psychology of the Christian Soul*, p. 240.

² Cf. the answer made by him to the denial of any "Inner Light" amongst the Indians. "Whereupon I called an Indian to us, and asked him, 'Whether or not, when he lied, or did wrong to anyone, there was not something in him that reproved him for it?' he said, 'there was such a thing in him that did reprove him; and he was ashamed when he had done wrong, or spoken wrong.'" (*Journal*, II, p. 185; ed. of 1901).

transforms by taking into itself. At each stage, up to and including the Christian discovery of God, the old life goes on into the new life, the same and yet not the same. Conversion is a reality, but it is a "spiritual" reality, and dramatic incidents belong to its accidents, not to its essentials. Fellowship with God is a reality, but it is a "spiritual" reality; though we may see no visions and dream no dreams of Him, His presence is not the less real.

The discovery of God is not, then, the discovery of something in a corner of our experience. It is the discovery of Someone Whose presence gathers the whole of our experience into the comprehensiveness of His being, and gives it a new unity. We know that presence by the newness of life, the increased vitality and power, the new relation to men, the new sense that all things are now possible. The romance of human love is its nearest analogy, however imperfect. This discovery is of the romance of God's love for man, as we know it in Christ.¹ The familiar things of the Gospel glow with a new light, and we wonder that we never saw its deep and eternal meaning before. We knew a great deal about it before, but we did not know it until it became part of ourselves, until verbal statement became a realized personal presence. We know now a little of what the apostle meant when he said, "I live, and yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me." That life of Christ in us is a spiritual fact, made possible by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of Christ. The sign of the new fact is a new consciousness of unity with God, which carries on the making of personality in us. That divine creation which began with our birth and was continued in every stage of our growth into self-consciousness now reaches its larger

¹ 2 Cor. v. 14, with its context.

meaning and fulfilment in the "new creation" of the Gospel, which repeats in the human heart the work begun when God said, "Let there be light."¹

There are analogies to this discovery in other realms of our life, though none of them are comparable with this in depth and significance. A student of chemistry, for example, may work day after day at the elements of qualitative analysis, without any illuminative vision of the work he is doing as a whole. Then, after a great mass of detailed knowledge has been acquired more or less by rote, there comes a day when he sees into the meaning of all this work as by a flash of intuition, and all the details fall into place as part of a great system of truth, authoritative by its own nature, and no longer accepted on the statement of the text-book. But the discovery of God within our experience is much more than the discovery of living truth. It is the discovery of a Person, other than ourselves, yet so intimately associated with our consciousness that we may for long be unaware of His "otherness". In the Christian experience, this revelation is made through Jesus Christ; "it was the good pleasure of God . . . to reveal His Son in me".² Such a statement expresses one supreme aspect of the inseparable unity of experience, i.e. its historical source; but it implies much more than this, as Paul elsewhere makes explicit. The Son revealed and revealing is not simply Jesus of Nazareth; He is the risen Christ, the Lord the Spirit. His indwelling presence is convertible with the Holy Spirit, and the classical account of the eighth chapter of Romans makes no attempt to distinguish them, indeed seems to identify them. A historical person, *as such*, cannot be revealed in any consciousness, in the deep sense of the apostle's words. The human life, so identified with God as is that

¹ 2 Cor. iv. 6.

² Gal. i. 15, 16.

of Jesus of Nazareth, obviously gives a new definiteness to our ideas of God, a new wealth of conception, by what He is and by what He does. But Christian experience is not simply that of the working of a historical memory ; it claims, at its deepest, to be a fellowship with the God we have come to know in the person of Christ. That fellowship implies spiritual contact, far more intimate than we know in our closest human friendships. That contact is something new, for it makes a new life possible, and the classical expression for its source is "The Holy Spirit", i.e. God, who is Spirit, revealed through the Lord the Spirit, in the realm of human personality united to Christ by faith. "Psychologically, it is the setting of the mind on Christ, in the revelation of His graciousness and of the infinite love of God in it, that makes it possible for the Spirit of Christ to act unto the soul's complete deliverance."¹ But, as we have always to remind ourselves in this subject, the psychological explanation is not the metaphysical. It is by a *conscious* relation to God in Christ that the highest activity is opened up to God as Spirit. But that activity is no more the product of our own discovery of it than any discovery we make in natural science. When our eyes are opened to something that has always been there, a new advance is made possible, as with radio-activity, which finds new applications in human life through our discovery of its presence. So with the presence of God the Spirit, in Whom at all times we live and move and have our being. The discovery of that presence made historically through Jesus Christ, experientially in the Holy Spirit, marks a new beginning, and opens up a new range of possibilities, the whole range of experience, in fact, which we call specifically "Christian". We need not here discuss the fitness of the

¹ Steven, op. cit., p. 264.

term "Holy Spirit".¹ The important point for Christian theology is to realize that here, in this new centre of life within us, there is the true and primary centre for our thought.² The specifically Christian experience does not begin with a knowledge of the Jesus of history; it begins with that faith in the God He reveals which is at once a surrender of ourselves to God, and an entrance of God into our personality. It is one of the serious defects of the Ritschlian school that it has emphasized the historical at the cost of the "mystical" or experiential element.³ Such a book as Herrmann's *The Communion of the Christian with God* has often puzzled its readers by its polemic against mysticism. But in fact the fine qualities of this book are due to the Christian "mysticism" which inspires it. Though it ignores the Holy Spirit, yet almost from beginning to end it is describing His work. That communion with God through Christ which it so eloquently and passionately presents is not theologically conceivable without such fellowship of *spirit* as mysticism claims, and as the doctrine of the Holy Spirit declares. The polemic is rightly directed against that misuse of the mystical experience which claims to dispense with historical fact, and to climb beyond Christ into an immediate experience of God. But in the strict sense there can never be a complete "immediacy" in our experience of God. He is always known *in our experience*, that is, mediated by it. The centrality of Jesus Christ in that experience is permanent as a psychological fact; it

¹ See the Introduction (3).

² See Winkler, *Das Geistproblem*, and the larger book by Schaefer, under the same title, which argues this point with great thoroughness, and is the most suggestive modern book I have found on the doctrine of the Spirit.

³ Schaefer, *op. cit.*, p. 126. I use the term "mystical" here to denote simply the highest range of normal Christian experience of fellowship with God.

cannot be less permanent as a theological reality. We shall be on safer ground if we say that historical facts and "mystical" experience are both essential to the fullest and deepest Christian life, even though that leaves us with the great philosophic problem of the relation of time and eternity.¹ It is not an answer to this to say, as Denney did, "I cannot conceive anything which transcends a moral union".² How is a moral union possible without that mutual activity of Spirit and spirit which is nothing less than a personal fellowship? How is such a fellowship conceivable without a *religious* surrender of man to God which transforms morality into religion? Indeed a moral union of persons itself implies a conception of Spirit which transcends morality. As our conscience is the consciousness of a God-pressure upon us, so the higher form of it which is clarified by faith in Christ is not less conscious of a God-pressure through Him, which implies a spiritual "medium". These are physical terms, and we need psychical. "Contact", "pressure", "medium" are all apt to be misleading. The relation is one of spirit, and we are back in the unity of self-consciousness which rises above these physical metaphors implying, as they do, a relation of externality.

II. Let us look at this whole experience in that human reaction to the discovery of God which we call "faith", remembering that faith is not so much an element in the discovery as another aspect of it. Christian faith is trust in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. As such, there is nothing arbitrary in it. No man can compel himself to trust God, though he may seek and find the ways in which God will be revealed as One to be trusted. Those ways may be as unlikely to human eyes as the road to Damascus; yet there is an inner way

¹ See Ch. XII.

² *Letters to W. R. Nicoll*, p. 37.

of the Spirit prescribed by God which surely leads to Him. Faith is the Spirit's work as much as any other part of Christian experience. It is the inevitable human response to God when He is seen and known in His true nature as a living presence. We may call it a divine compulsion of man, if we remember that we are moving in a spiritual realm, where compulsion is conviction, and conviction is wrought only by the discovery of that which is. The prophets of Israel felt this spiritual compulsion in the realm of their special work, and they did not feel themselves to be free agents when they uttered their "Thus saith the Lord". We have not entered into the full inheritance of faith until we learn to say, "I can no other." But this compelled response to the revelation of the Gospel is a service which man feels to be perfect freedom. It is a personal surrender to the divine personality in which the whole of the new life in the Spirit is already germinally present. The intellectual content of this faith will vary greatly, as we have seen at the outset, according to the media and particular emphasis of the environment, as well as according to the uniqueness of human personality. We must be prepared to admit the widest variety in the statement of that in the Gospel which has won incipient trust.¹ But Christian faith always finds Christ ultimately at its centre, and the historical revelation stabilizes the intellectual equilibrium, whilst the Holy Spirit works through the humblest and simplest relation of personal trust, in spite of intellectual error.

One result of this new attitude is a new relation to the world of Nature and of history. The determinism of an implicit or explicit naturalism is destroyed by trust in the divine providence, expressed and sustained by prayer, experienced in a sense of personal guidance in

¹ Cf. e.g. Starbuck, *The Psychology of Religion*, Ch. VII, for a typical attempt to classify groups of converts according to differing emphases.

Ch. VII.
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response to prayer. The new relation is often imperfectly understood in terms of a "piece-meal supernaturalism". God is thought to be here and not there; He is conceived to be working in a more or less alien medium, as though He were not the Creator and Sustainer of the world, and the Controller of its history. The work of the Holy Spirit within is not co-ordinated with the work of the Spirit of God without, to the serious impoverishment of both conceptions. But, however imperfect and partial the grasp of what the new relation means, it is essentially a deliverance from the bondage of time and space, a triumph of spirit over matter, an enfranchisement of the believer's life in the Spirit.

Another result is a new judgment of moral evil, now seen to be the only evil to be feared by the sons of God. The new judgment, which as applied to our own moral responsibility is repentance, is as much the work of grace as faith itself. We misrepresent Christian repentance when we suggest that it is something more or less complete before faith can begin. We may know, and we usually do know, regret, moral self-condemnation, or remorse, before we discover God in Christ. But the essentially Christian judgment of moral evil as "sin" is possible only in the light of grace. The Christian view of sin is not simply that it is rebellion against the commands of God, but that it is to come short of the glory of God (which is seen in the face of Christ),¹ and to mind the things of the flesh, instead of those of the Spirit; in other words it involves a certain churlishness of ingratitude when once the grace of God is known.

This measurement of sin by the new knowledge of God is seen in the experience of Isaiah in the temple, made conscious of his own uncleanness, and the experience of

¹ Rom. III. 23; 2 Cor. IV. 6.

Peter when he cried, after a new discovery of Christ, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord."¹ The integral unity of the new experience is here again illustrated. The danger of our analysis is that we may put asunder what God has joined—the conviction of sin and the attitude of faith. There is always some faith present where there is a Christian conviction of sin; there is a growing and deepening hatred of sin, and a sterner judgment of our own responsibility for it, as faith in God grows stronger and clearer.

The most important feature of faith is that it constitutes a new dynamic, by its discovery of the unlimited resources of God, and of His will to use them for us and in us, to our deliverance from the bondage of sin. Yet this is itself an external and inadequate way of expressing the new relation. The forgiving grace of God becomes a new and supreme motive; the welcome into a new relation to God inspires new aspirations and hopes; the new horizon in which sin is judged shews a land of far distances in which sin shall be overcome as surely as it has been forgiven. Here we see the deepest and most vital work of the Holy Spirit in the transformation of moral personality, the regeneration of the human will, which has become conscious of its weakness, even though it has been illuminated.

Grant us the will to fashion as we feel,
Grant us the strength to labour as we know,
Grant us the purpose, ribbed and edged with steel,
To strike the blow.

Knowledge we ask not—knowledge thou hast lent,
But, Lord, the will—there lies our bitter need,
Give us to build, above the deep intent,
The deed, the deed.²

¹ Isa. vi. 5; Luke v. 8.

² John Drinkwater, "A Prayer"; cf. the collect, "O Almighty God, who alone canst order the unruly wills and affections of sinful men, etc.," itself based on Augustine's *da quod jubes, et jube quod vis*.

Christian faith is moral to the core, though it is so much more than "mere morality". Just because of its moral character anything arbitrary or superficial is alien to its true nature. The atoning work of God in bearing the sin of the world, as revealed and realized on the Cross, belongs to His essential nature, and the disclosure of that nature through Christ in the Holy Spirit awakens the faith that our sins are forgiven—in that deepest sense of forgiveness which includes sacrifice and achieves atonement. Yet there remains the irrevocable fact of sin, for which we are personally responsible, though penitent and forgiven. There is a transformed present; does not the full work of grace also mean a transformed past? It is here that the crowning work of the Holy Spirit must be done (see Chs. I, 4, and III, 3). Our own past acquires a new meaning by our changed attitude towards it, wrought by the Holy Spirit within us, and the memory of sin may thus become a means of grace. But this partial and individual transformation by the Holy Spirit suggests a complete and racial transformation of realized evil in human history by the same Spirit. We often say that a sinful world redeemed by grace is spiritually richer than a sinless world could ever have been. But this is really to say that the ultimate facts of the universe are its spiritual meanings, and that God is Spirit, and therefore able to transform even the evil which man has done into good. Faith in God means faith in such an ultimate transformation *sub specie aeternitatis*, and it is the present experience of the transforming power of the Holy Spirit which gives to us our partial and individual glimpse of that divine consummation.

III. The technical term in theology for this process is "sanctification", a word which simply gives an abstract rendering of what is expressed by the adjective in the

phrase "Holy Spirit". The fundamental meaning of "holy" is "separated", i.e. appropriated to God. The ethical meaning which has come to be so large a part of its content is due to the ethicization of the character of God in the development of belief about Him, specially seen in the religion of Israel, and thence transmitted to the New Testament ideas. But the term "holy" always carries with it more than the sense of the morally good, even at the Christian stage of thought. Here it may suggest what ought to be the ground principle of Christian Ethics, viz. that the dynamic of Christian character is objectively the Holy Spirit, "God exerting moral creative power", whilst subjectively it is faith in Him.¹ The cardinal virtues of Greek life were those which are reproduced in the Wisdom of Solomon (VIII. 7): temperance, prudence, justice, fortitude. It would quite misrepresent Christian ideals of character to suggest that these were taken over with the addition of the so-called "theological virtues", viz. faith, hope and love. In the light of the Christian faith there is a new conception of human personality and of its worth to God, and there emerges, especially in Paul, the sense of a new relation to God, which gives new ideals and makes them possible. This new relation we have seen to be that which is in one aspect the surrender of faith, in another the appropriation of human personality by the divine through the Holy Spirit. Since this new relation is wrought out by faith in Christ, we may say with Schleiermacher, "the fruits of the Spirit are nothing other than the virtues of Christ."² But these virtues are not to be construed either as legal

¹ Mackenzie, art. "Ethics and Morality" (Christian) in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, V, 469, 470. This article does what many treatments of Christian Ethics fail to do,—it puts the emphasis in the right place.

² *Der Christliche Glaube*, II, 124.

commands or as moral example. The relation is much more intimate, and carries with it both a higher standard and a larger liberty than any such external relation would afford. The Christian finds his true life to be hid with Christ in God,¹ that is to say, he discovers that his personality is in some sense part of a larger personality to which he has surrendered. The centre of gravity has shifted; he is instinctively led to think and act in different ways because his life is controlled from this new centre. He is a "Christian"—a Christ's man, as the use of the term first indicated, though in an opprobrious sense.² Of course, this experience is partial and incomplete, and our frequent moral failures may sometimes lead us to doubt its reality. Yet nothing less than such a transformation of personality by its inclusion in larger personality is adequate to explain the highest achievements and the deepest experiences of Christian character.

The moral equivalent to this "metaphysical" relation is love, that word so difficult to rescue from our abuse of it, and to raise to its full Christian sense. We have to remember the priority of God, and that "we love because He first loved us"; "the love of Christ (for us) constraineth us"; "the love of God hath been shed abroad in our hearts through the Holy Spirit which was given unto us".³

In these three texts taken together we have the triune activity of the Benediction—the love of God, and the grace of Christ and the fellowship wrought by the Holy Spirit, but here brought back to the fundamental principle of love. We see that love most clearly in the person of Christ, and the Gospel is the declaration of it, whilst the most characteristic response to the divine love so recog-

¹ Col. III. 3.

² Acts XI. 26.

³ 1 John IV. 19; 2 Cor. V. 14; Romans V. 5.

nized is a love for Him that identifies itself with His life and shares His purpose. This means that men are no longer things but persons, whose worth to Him is to be recognized in all our attitude and acts towards them. Every failure to realize this attitude and express it in appropriate acts ought to send us back to the primal fact of God's love for us, the love that is measured by the Cross of Christ. If I am a Christian, I *belong* to Christ; "know ye not that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit which is in you, which ye have from God? and ye are not your own; for ye were bought with a price." The argument in which those words¹ occur is the more significant because the most debased connotation of "love" as physical lust is there brought into sharpest contrast with the Christian. Sexual cohabitation with a prostitute is a union of personality with her² at the lowest level; spiritual union with Christ is a not less real union of personality with Him (in the Holy Spirit), and the more vital and transforming because made at the highest level. We become in a real sense that which permanently holds our admiration and love; "Not where I breathe but where I love, I live."³ In this process of becoming, we see the moral relation passing into the metaphysical, in that unity on which we are insisting throughout.

IV. It should be apparent, from what has already been said about this surrender of the human spirit and this appropriation by the divine, that there is no sacrifice of individuality in any true sense. Biblical "mysticism" is built up on that Hebraic sense of individuality which

¹ 1 Cor. vi. 15-20.

² The full force of this is felt only when we remember Paul's Hebraic psychology according to which a peculiar emphasis falls on the *body* as the seat of personality: see my essay on "Hebrew Psychology" in *The People and the Book*, pp. 365 ff.

³ Robert Southwell.

springs from an intense life, and a full acceptance of its reality ; whatever Hellenistic influences we may admit in Paul's case, there was no question for him of any absorption into larger Being by which his own being became less real to himself. His consciousness is of a larger life in which he now shares, but it is *he* who shares in it. Thus the work of the Holy Spirit is seen to be the enrichment of reality by the "new creation" of finite spirits: "just as the goods of the spirit are not lessened by being shared, but rather increased, so there is no consumption of material in the making of souls, no exhaustion of the resources of the universe."¹ A new level of spiritual revelation is reached on which the wealth of divine grace can manifest itself ; a new type is created in comparison with the pre-Christian stage of individuality.² The revelation of Holy Spirit through individuality suggests the banded colours of the spectrum, rather than the focussing of a ray of light on a single point ; each of the colours is actually there, in its own wave-length, and with all its variety from the rest, yet there is a unity of them all which we know as the single beam of white light. It is of importance to realize this aspect of the inclusiveness of Spirit, because, as we shall see when approaching the doctrine of the Trinity, this inclusion of our human personality in the larger personality of God without the loss of distinctiveness is the supreme contribution of experience towards an understanding of the relation of the three "Persons" of the Godhead.

We have a special application of individuality in that most "objective" of all the varieties of the Spirit's work—the "witness of the Spirit", and the consequent "assurance of salvation". We may not use these theological technicalities as freely as a previous generation,

¹ Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 163.

² Seeberg, *Christliche Dogmatik*, I, p. 380.

yet the importance of what they represent is no less than it was. Where the emphasis falls on the external expression of religion, as in the sacraments of Roman Catholicism, the need for "assurance" falls into the background. But where faith seeks a more direct and ultimate relation to God, it is at the cost of exposure to changes of mood and circumstance, to the depression wrought by moral failure, and the uncertainty arising from intellectual questionings. How can I know that I am saved? Or, if we put the question in more general form, what is the real proof for me that this Gospel of divine love is true, and true for me?

It is useless, or worse than useless, to seek for some authority without on which to roll the responsibility of our decision—useless, that is, if we have once realized that the soul is face to face with God. The authority we seek can never be found divorced from our experience, for that is a contradiction in terms. But the unity of experience itself shews us God in personal presence by His Spirit. We trust Him because He is what we have found Him to be, and we must return to the experience of what He is, to be assured that He is—the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. It belongs to the very nature of the whole experience that the "subjective" and "objective" elements can never be separated, as we have seen all along. But this does not make their reality any the less. Nor does it mean that we are committed to a co-operative theory of salvation. The emphasis falls on God, first and last, in Christian experience: "His willing is the real ground of our willing, whilst our willing serves for the ground of knowledge of His willing. . . . So far as faith is called forth by the essentially eternal its assurance is unchangeable and so far as its content is judgment (*Urteil*) as well as act of eternal love, its

assurance is the assurance of salvation."¹ We may humanize that theological statement by recalling our own experience of parenthood—if it is ours; that we have found our life projected into new centres of life, and continued in them; in that continuity of larger life there is the basis of ministry to our children's welfare, within the pathetic limits of our powers; to that the child can appeal, with undeniable and undenied claim. "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him?"² In His will is our peace—peace the rarest of the Spirit's fruits.

The individuality of the life in the Spirit raises insistent questions in regard to the life beyond death.³ The answer to those questions is clear, in view of what has already been said. Life in the Spirit is a progressive life, ever advancing to more and more reality, already possessing the earnest of more to come. On grounds of reason, and in a rationally interpretable universe, we could not think that the achievement of so long and costly a process of development would be flung aside at physical death. Personality is the highest product of that development, and its life in the Spirit is full of the promise of larger life. All things are ours, and in that "all" must be included all spiritual values of truth and beauty as well as that goodness which is our immediate and primary concern. Life here is not long enough to do more than stimulate a hunger and thirst after the abundance of God. What is physical death but an incident in the

¹ Seeberg, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 468, 569, cf. Ch. XII, p. 275.

² Luke xi. 13. Cf. Julian of Norwich, *Revelations of Divine Love*, Ch. VI: "For the Goodness of God is the highest prayer, and it cometh down to the lowest part of our need."

³ What follows is based on my essay, "Personality and the Life Beyond", to be found in *Life after Death* (ed. by Marchant), pp. 37-61.

course of such spiritual growth as we may know already ? It cannot touch that fellowship of the Spirit which more and more gathers into itself the supreme values of human personality. It can but help us to leave behind the trifles which have served their end in training us for what lies beyond them.¹ Life in the Spirit creates its own world independent of the temporal in issue, though not in process. The undeveloped life—in rich or poor, “wise” or ignorant,—cannot bear to be left to such resources. But life in the Spirit means a life less and less dependent on any support beyond itself save God. It is an epistle of Christ, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God.² Faith in immortality is both historically and in principle the offspring of faith in God, as its Greek and Hebrew lines of development amply shew³—a faith that is essentially the experience of union with Someone Whom death cannot touch. The effective continuity of Christian life must include a full individuality, for with that individual consciousness the great values of Christian experience, the life lost to be found, the ministry of service in every wider fellowship, are essentially involved.

No attempt has been made, in this brief survey of the work of the Holy Spirit in the individual life, to give a systematic correlation with the copious teaching of the New Testament on this subject. It must be sufficient to

¹ Cf. Emerson’s “Lecture to Divinity Students” : “The child amidst his baubles is learning the action of light, motion, gravity, muscular force ; and in the game of human life, love, fear, justice, appetite, man and God, interact.”

² 2 Cor. III. 3. Cf. Maclaren, *Sermons preached in Manchester*, 3rd series, p. 10 : “A thin filmy sheet here, a bit of black paper below it ; but the writing goes through upon the next page, and when the blackness that divides two worlds is swept away there, the history of each life written by ourselves remains legible in eternity.”

³ Cf. Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality*, Lect. II.

refer to such a passage as the latter half of the eighth chapter of Romans, which gathers up (especially in verses 29 ff.) the leading conceptions in systematic order.¹ But it is useful to remember, especially for the great majority of us who have made so little progress in the life of the Spirit, that the New Testament shews us Christians of many types and at many stages of development. Life is short, and the art of the Christian life is long ; what matters most is that we are found somewhere, even in the lowest class, within the school of God, which is more than a school, because it is a home.

¹ Cf. Seeberg, *op. cit.*, II, p. 469.

PART III

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND THE GODHEAD

CHAPTER X

THE SPIRITHOOD OF GOD

IN human thought, as in human life, we always come at last to a "Land's End". We reach a point on the verge of our experience, at which our further journey must be made across an uncharted sea. We have reached such a point in our present argument, and it is fitting that we should frankly recognize it. So far, though we have often spoken of the Eternal Spirit, it has always been of Him as realized and revealed in temporal experience. Can we venture to speak of Him as He is in Himself, which is what we are trying to do when we frame a Christian doctrine of the Godhead?

If this is to mean a doctrine of God detached from all our experience of Him, the question answers itself. Where we have no data, "the rest is silence". But we have been speaking of immanent Spirit, Who is known in His activities. We know too much to remain silent. Thought refuses to abstain from looking across the sea of eternity from the cliffs of time. We can bring together all we already know of Him in our experience, and affirm on the strength of that experience that the reality of God is not hidden behind the appearance of His activity, but is revealed in it and through it. Our intellectual categories cannot contain *Him*, and nothing could discredit a doctrine of the Godhead more effectually than the claim to have solved its mysteries. Our feeling to-day about most of the elaborate systems of the past is that they claim too

much to be true. We suspect their assertions to be mere logomachies, based on the mistaken exegesis of Scripture, or the *ex cathedra* utterance of a creed. But it is a different thing to gather together what God has revealed of Himself in human experience, and reverently to ask what this shews Him to be, or at least the line of its approach to Him. The previous argument and exposition has afforded us a suggestion of this, by its emphasis on the Spirithood of God. It has been argued that the failure of the classical doctrine of the Trinity to satisfy us is due not simply to its formulation in the terms of a philosophy that is no longer familiar or natural, but also to the neglect of the data for a doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity. The results reached so slowly and so painfully in the doctrine of the Son were virtually transferred to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit without independent discussion. The consequence was that the term was divorced from its proper content. The whole development of religious thought in recent centuries has been forcing us back on that content, by compelling the modern appeal to the ultimate authority of experience. We have been following the course of that appeal in previous chapters, and have now to see whether its momentum will carry us further. The divine revelation in Nature and history has been stated in terms of Spirit. We have recognized that Spirit is the fundamental implicate of all experience, and we have seen the explicit articulation of this in the Christian experience. It is natural, therefore, that whatever we have to say about God should be stated in terms of Spirit, and that the most inclusive conception of God we have yet reached should be that of Spirithood.

I. This line of approach is confirmed by an appeal to the primary Christian experience, i.e. that of the New

Testament. Historically, of course, the central place in the Christian revelation is occupied by Jesus Christ. The Synoptic Gospels shew Him to us more or less directly, and occupy so large a space in the New Testament that we forget they are speaking of a few months only. The rest of the New Testament covers most of the century, whilst the brief ministry of Jesus was the condition and foundation of the future experience, rather than already affording it, even for the disciples who knew Him "according to the flesh". The difference may be seen in the fourth Gospel as compared with the Synoptics. Here we see the Son of God as no eye saw Him whilst He walked the earth. It is still Jesus, but Jesus in the light of eternity, Jesus as the Christ of Christian experience. The emphasis on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the fourth Gospel is the key to the difference, and the doctrine itself throws us back on the Pauline epistles. Here we see clearly that the centre of faith is the risen Lord; the centre of spiritual gravity is in heaven, not on earth. We have already seen (in the chapter on "The Spirit and the Incarnation") that the Spirit becomes the earthly representative of Jesus Christ, and therefore of God. The emphasis on the Holy Spirit begins with Pentecost, though it was left for Paul to bring out the full doctrinal significance of that emphasis. The signs of the Holy Spirit's presence, according to Peter and primitive Christianity in general, were crude and external enough. They resembled the phenomena of the prophetic consciousness in the earlier days of Hebrew prophecy. But Paul did exactly what the greater prophets of Israel did. He lifted the doctrine of the Holy Spirit from the quasi-physical to the moral and spiritual realms, and made it cover the whole of Christian experience. He threw the emphasis on the highest side

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of that experience, and opened the way for the noblest conception of the Spirit. He closely relates, if he does not identify, the risen Lord and the Spirit, and the fourth Gospel is in full harmony with this, when it records the saying of Jesus, "God is Spirit". The New Testament starts with the contemporary Jewish idea of God, more or less distant for popular (apocalyptic) thought, and needing elaborate mediation through angels, though this or that Rabbi doubtless reached a simpler and more immediate sense of His presence. The unity of God in this idea is never challenged by the New Testament; what it does is to shew God brought near to men through His Messianic representative, Jesus the Christ. Then Christian experience discovers that the removal of this personal representative through the crucifixion has become the condition of a new realization of the divine presence, closer and more intimate than ever. It is this experience that is uttered in the words, "our fellowship is with the Father, and with His Son, Jesus Christ", and the experience of that fellowship is made possible by the activity, and interpretable by the idea, of the Holy Spirit, indwelling the bodies of believers, and constituting the unity of their fellowship, itself conceived as "the Body of Christ" by the apostle Paul.

✓ It is therefore useless, and indeed, an anachronism, to look for a formal *doctrine* of the Trinity in the New Testament. The need for it has not yet arisen. Christian experience thinks of questioning neither its own unity nor the unity of God from whom it derives. The relation of the Spirit to the Father may be summed up in three briefest sentences. God gives Spirit. God has Spirit. God is Spirit.

(a) He gives Spirit—that which the risen Lord pours forth, He has first received from the Father (Acts II. 33).

The native breath of the Spirit becomes articulate in the cry, Abba, Father (Rom. viii. 15 ; Gal. iv. 6), which was the cry of Jesus in Gethsemane (Mark xiv. 36). The Spirit brings independent testimony to the divine Father in the experience of sonship (Rom. viii. 16). The intimate relation of the Spirit to the Father is shewn in connection with the intercession of the Spirit ; the inarticulate cries of the Spirit (that is, of the believer under the influence of the Spirit) are understood by God, " for the Searcher of hearts knows what is the aim of the Spirit " (Rom. viii. 27).

(b) Further, God *has* Spirit. An important passage (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11) brings the Spirit into closer relation with the divine personality than that of an external gift. It is said that things otherwise unknown " God revealed to us through the Spirit, for the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God ; for who of men knows the things of the man except the spirit of the man which is in him ? so also the things of God none has discerned except the Spirit of God ". Here a parallel is drawn between human and divine personality implying psychological resemblance of constitution. In both man and God there is a principle of self-consciousness, unshared by any other, that exclusive principle of individual personality which gives the peculiar quality of " my " experience, as distinct from another's. The name " Spirit " is given to this principle in God, just as " spirit " denotes it in man. The gift of the Spirit of God means that this exclusive consciousness of His is exceptionally shared with man, or, as a Hebrew prophet would have put it, that man is admitted into the council of Yahweh, to think His thoughts (Jer. xxiii. 18, 22). At present, however, we have no more than the " earnest " of the condition of full knowledge (1 Cor. viii. 2, xiii. 12 ; Gal. iv. 9), the condition itself being full

transformation by the Spirit (2 Cor. III. 18). But even the partial experience implies a fellowship of God and man so intimate that it transcends the closest fellowship of man and man, in which the barrier of self-consciousness always partially remains. Moreover, the parallel implies that for Paul the essence of Spirit is psychical, or at least psychical as well as quasi-physical. This may seem a truism, since to us the term "spirit" is used in antithesis to the material. But there was no such antithesis in Jewish or Pauline thought; the physical body of man has psychical qualities and probably there was no idea of "spirit" as immaterial in our sense. Many of the references to the Spirit as the gift of God suggest the old idea of a quasi-materialistic fluid being poured out on man, and do not express conscious "spiritual" co-operation. The passage last quoted (1 Cor. II. 10, 11), however, whilst not inconsistent with this, shews that we must include what we call the psychical in the Pauline idea of Spirit, and must say that God both gives and has Spirit.

(c) The further stage reached in John IV. 24, "God is Spirit", is still more important for our subject. The context says that there must be a congruity between the worship and the being to whom it is offered. Worship must have the essential quality of His nature, i.e. be "spiritual". This is partly defined in the context as meaning freedom from the bondage of particular places and rites, i.e. of the physical conditions of worship. Just as a man must be born of the Spirit, so he must worship by the Spirit. Fellowship with God (1 John I. 3) implies admittance by birth into a spiritual aristocracy and the maintenance of a spiritual relation. The whole content of "eternal life" according to the fourth Gospel must be put into the term "Spirit" when so used of God. It is not a metaphysical definition of His substance; such a

definition would be alien from the whole atmosphere of the New Testament; but it is a mystical sublimation, an apotheosis, of ideas found already in the Old Testament. As, in the Old Testament, Yahweh is of that *ruach* or "Spirit" nature which He temporarily imparts to men, and shares with the heavenly guild of supernatural beings, so here, at a higher level of conception, God the Father is conceived to be of that etherealized essence in which all that we should call material is taken up into those realities of "spiritual" life which Christian experience already tastes. Analogies are perilous, but perhaps we should get near to the shifting lights and colours of the *New Testament* use of "Spirit" and "spirit" if we thought of it as the "spiritual" counterpart of an encompassing and penetrating psychical ether, far subtler ✓ than "matter", yet quasi-material, and nucleated, as it were, into specialized centres of *energy*, both in men, angels and God, to all of whom in such varying degrees belong those qualities we call "spiritual". In many ways modern theories of physics approximate to ancient theories of "spirit"—though this does not justify us in the unguarded use of physical analogies for the formation of a modern theory of Spirit.

In the light of what has been said, we can see why the New Testament experience was not troubled with the problems that have perplexed our own generation, in regard to "The Jesus of History" and "The Christ of Experience". The figure of Jesus, interpreted as the Logos-Christ¹ or the Risen Lord Who is the Spirit, could introduce no alien factor into that relation of God and man which was mediated by Spirit. According to the fourth

¹ The hypostasis doctrine of New Testament times is best construed as that of mediators or media of *energy*; cf. Seeberg, *Christliche Dogmatik*, I, 374.

Gospel, the Logos became flesh (I. 14), but the Spirit so dwelt upon Him that He could say "He that eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life" (vi. 54), whilst the words He speaks are spirit and life (63). It is the resurrection body of Jesus, the body to which the shut door is no hindrance (xx. 19), that imparts holy Spirit by its very breath (22), and this body is "spiritual" in such a way that it forms a true and cognate link between the spirit of man and God who is Spirit. According to the more detailed analysis given in the Pauline epistles, there is in man a spirit which shews its nature by delighting in the (spiritual) law of God, and accepting it as the law of the mind (Rom. vii. 22, 23). Faith-surrender to the deliverer, Jesus Christ ("The Lord the Spirit", 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18), unites this inner man with One Who, like the law, is spiritual, but, unlike the law, is able to deliver where that could only condemn. In both "justification" and "sanctification", to use the technical terms of theology, the faith-union is a spiritual union with the Lord the Spirit, the risen and ascended Christ. The Christian experience of the apostle moves wholly in the realm of the Spirit, both upwards towards Christ as the source of grace and life, and downwards into the *charismata* and the fruit of the Spirit in conduct and character. Beyond Christ, there is only God, and though Paul does not say, like the fourth Gospel, that God is Spirit, he says what is as vital for our purpose, that God has Spirit as the constitutive principle of His personality. The full conception is most clearly expressed in the words of Ephesians ii. 18: "Through Him (Christ) we both have our access in one Spirit unto the Father." Here we see the unity of the approach to God which the Christian experiences—from the first approval of the law of God to the new law of the Spirit, that is of life in Christ Jesus,

and upwards through Him, always in the Spirit, to the spiritual Fatherhood of God, which the very voice of the Spirit acclaims. This means that Paul did not conceive Father, Son and Spirit as three *hypostases* and one *ousia*, three "centres" on one plane equidistant from the believer. Paul conceived a line of intensive approach, always in the Spirit, always through Christ, always to the Father, even though he may not always express this as explicitly as he does in the passage quoted. This unity of the Godhead in the Christian experience of the New Testament is of primary importance, and remains true for all unsophisticated reproduction of that experience. The unity of God is as clear to the normal faith and experience of the Christian as it is to the philosophical theist. Any attempt to differentiate Father, Son and Spirit must be made *within* an already existent unity of experience.

The only New Testament passages that can be plausibly alleged to the contrary are the Benediction of 2 Corinthians XIII. 14, and the Baptismal Formula of Matthew XXVIII. 19, and in both instances the difficulty arises from our habit of reading later doctrine into the simpler ideas of the New Testament. In regard to the Benediction, it must first of all be remembered that "the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with you" appears elsewhere (1 Cor. XVI. 23, etc.) as a *complete benediction*, denoting the essential basis of the Christian experience of salvation. This is sufficiently shewn by two passages in the same Epistle, viz. 2 Corinthians VIII. 9 ("Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor, that ye through His poverty might become rich"), and XII. 9 ("My grace is sufficient for thee: for power is perfected in weakness"). The former brings out the spontaneity and sacrificial intensity

of the Incarnation, and all that flowed from it ; the latter the power of the Spirit of Christ in the life of the believer. To invoke the presence of the grace of Christ with believers is therefore to desire for them the whole benefit of His saving work, and the inner energies of His spiritual presence. Even in this shorter form the benediction is virtually complete, for what remains to be said, after this, by way of blessing ? But in the longer form, the implicit becomes explicit. "The love of God " does not mean something purchased by Christ from God, but is the very motive of grace : " God establishes His own love towards us, in that whilst we were yet sinners, Christ died for us " (Rom. v. 8). By adding this phrase, therefore, Paul simply carries back the grace of Christ to its ultimate source and meaning. The third phrase, " the *koinonia* of the Holy Spirit ", is more difficult to interpret, but the most probable interpretation seems to be that it denotes an activity of the Spirit comparable with and resulting from the active grace of Christ and the active love of God (cf. Rom. xv. 30, " the love of, i.e. produced by, the Spirit "). The fellowship is a fellowship with God through Christ mediated by or in Holy Spirit—which would exactly agree with what has been said already about the Pauline approach to God. There is certainly no warrant in the New Testament for the interpretation " fellowship *with* the Holy Spirit " as a personality here distinguished from the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ ; nor does it satisfy the parallels (always important for Hebrew or Hebraising thought) to make *koinonia* mean simply the fellowship with men created by the Spirit, viz. the Church. But the intermediate meaning, out of the three grammatically possible, not only gives a good sense, paralleled elsewhere, but agrees with the two preceding terms of the Benediction. It is by the fellowship *with*

God through Christ which is created by the Spirit and realized in the Spirit, that the spiritual man realizes the love of God which issued in the historic grace of Christ. The work of Father, Son and Spirit is so much a unity that to invoke the aid and presence of One is to invoke each and all. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact already mentioned, that the fuller Benediction is an isolated expansion of the regular (and sufficient) Pauline Benediction, "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ be with you all."

The (probably later) Baptismal Formula is of somewhat more formal character. Baptism "into the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit" is an explicit confession of faith in their real being, as well as their activity. By this confession, "the baptized enter a community which uses and acknowledges these names" (Holtzmann), and may be said to have passed beyond the instinctive unity of the Pauline Benediction. As Heitmüller¹ has shewn, baptism "into the name" denotes ascription to, dependence on, the person named. It is very improbable that "into the name", instead of "into the names", is an *assertion* of ultimate unity; had the need for this been felt, it would have been met much more clearly. All we are warranted in saying is that "only where the one God is acknowledged as Father, who reveals Himself in the Son, and communicates Himself in the Spirit, is there a Christian confession of God."²

Other references in the New Testament to Father, Son and Spirit as conceived together or in close connection, do not carry us beyond the range of the Pauline Benediction, and such a passage as Revelation i. 4 f., where "the seven Spirits that are before His (God's) throne" replace

¹ *In Namen Jesu*, p. 122.

² Kirn, *Realencyklopädie*, XX, p. 114.

the reference to the Holy Spirit, shews us how far were the New Testament times in general from reaching a fixed Trinitarian formula, such as is outlined in the baptismal commission. In 1 Corinthians xii. 4-6, the triple ascription of gifts to the Spirit, of ministries to the Lord, and of energies to God, is rhetorical rather than theological; one and the same group of phenomena is in view, and Father, Son and Spirit are concerned in each activity as we have seen in the Benediction. Similarly in Ephesians iv. 4-6, the emphasis falls on the unity of experience as reflecting the unity of operation of the one Spirit, the one Lord, the one God and Father, "who is over all, and through all, and in all". Such references declare the unity of the experience rather than any attainment or attempt at attaining a doctrine of the unity of Father, Son and Spirit. Thus in Ephesians iii. 14 ff., the thought of the Fatherhood of God leads to that of the indwelling Spirit, straightway made equivalent to the indwelling Christ. A sharper and more formal distinction of activities is made in the opening verses of the first Epistle of Peter, "according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, in sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ", though all questions as to their ultimate relation lie beyond the writer's horizon.¹

The contribution of the New Testament towards a doctrine of the Godhead is thus seen to be historical and experiential, rather than theological. All that we are entitled to say is that both in Jesus Christ and in that inner appropriation of Him ascribed to the work of the Spirit the Christians were so conscious that God was present with them, and so felt the importance of this Presence as essential to the experience of

¹ Cf. 1 Cor. vi. 11; 2 Cor. i. 21, 22; Eph. i. 13, 14; Jude 20, 21.

salvation, that they often named these distinguished, though not separated, activities side by side with the activity of God, because in fact they were essential to the Christian experience of the presence of God. It would be quite true to say that the *issues* involved in the doctrine of the Trinity are raised for us, not only in the New Testament experience itself, but also in the New Testament interpretation of it. But it would not be true to say that the doctrine of the Trinity is *taught* in the New Testament ; how could it be taught when the necessity for it had not yet been felt ?

We shall be building, therefore, on the solid rock of the New Testament experience of God, when we make His Spirithood both the initial and the ultimate conception of His being. It is the initial conception, because the love of God and the grace of Christ are known, then or now, only through the work of the Spirit. If we speak from the standpoint of Christian experience, we know God first and foremost as Spirit, indeed, we know Him in the most intimate sense only as Spirit. It is also the ultimate conception of the Godhead in the New Testament, so far as such a conception is reached at all. God (the Father) is Spirit, the Lord (Jesus Christ) is Spirit, and the Holy Spirit of God and of Christ is the historically specialized activity of Spirit in the largest sense. That which is last in order of historical revelation is also first for theological construction.

II. It is important to distinguish the permanent values of this conception of Spirithood from the particular form of the conception. The values remain throughout the whole Christian experience of the generations ; the form in which they find expression must be considered separately in regard to its adequacy. This is not to attempt the impossible task of an ultimate separation of

“ content ” and “ form ” ; they mutually react, and are always relative to each other.

The “ values ” of the New Testament experience are primarily those of Fatherhood, Saviourhood, and Spirit-hood, and the central ideas attaching to each are respectively those of creation, redemption and sanctification. Since the new experience of God is based on the new revelation in Jesus Christ, the cardinal question concerning Him was, “ By what authority doest thou these things ? ” The Christian answer was that the authority was divine, and that the person of the Saviour had a unique nature and a permanent place in the fellowship of man with God. Reason working on this experience of Christ was finally led to the conviction that the essential values could not be maintained unless in some real sense Jesus Christ was the Eternal Son of God, and this was ultimately construed to mean that He is of the same essence or nature as God. The early theology of the Church was more or less dominated by Greek thought, with the result that the saving work of Christ was conceived chiefly as the impartation of immortality, the great mark of difference between the human and the divine. But the divine gift could not be realistically brought into the world of humanity, unless the divine Giver was Himself united with humanity. The real presence of God in Christ was therefore essential to the validity of the Christian experience. This necessity remains even when the emphasis falls, as for many Christians to-day, on the atoning work of Christ. The Christian consciousness has been generally led to such a vision of the magnitude of the work of atonement that none but God Himself can bear the burden of man’s sin ; in Christ He is actually bearing that burden. The values of Christian experience would be fundamentally

altered if the Church took Jesus to be a human seeker after God and neglected the divine side of His Person and Work.

Further, the revelation of the divine Fatherhood in and through the Sonship of Jesus Christ, whilst including the values already named, also implies the effective control of the world by God. Man's destiny must be safeguarded and guaranteed, and the spirituality of his nature, including the social ideals of the kingly rule of God, vindicated. The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is revealed by Him to be the Creator and Sustainer of men. There is no such dualism in the universe as Gnosticism implied, with its doctrine of a "demiurge" responsible for creation, from whose tyranny the spirits of men must be saved. Against ancient Gnosticism, or the modern equivalent in the doctrine of a "limited God", the value of the divine Fatherhood in creation and providence is its assertion of the ultimate unity of control, and of the beneficence of this control. The saving purpose which we have come to know in Jesus Christ is seen to be carried up into God; it belongs to Him, and He can accomplish it.

But Christian experience was not only characterized by the new content thus brought to it; it was vitalized by a new consciousness of the immediate nearness of God. God is active in human life, active here and now, and active by His real presence in the hearts and lives of men. This is a Hebrew inheritance, enlarged and enriched by the new sense of a personal presence of God in Jesus Christ. It was through His Person that God had drawn near to men in the flesh, near as never before. But that nearness did not cease with the cessation of the human life of Jesus; it was rather deepened and universalized. God the Father known in Christ was brought into the self-consciousness of men, energizing in their whole

personality. As we look back on the whole period we can see that this is the primary value which the conception of the Holy Spirit safeguards—the real presence of God in human personality through faith in Christ.

The significance of this primary value lies partly in the experience of its *unity*. If God is really present by “Holy Spirit” in human life, then it is the whole Godhead with which we have to do, in all the values of the divine presence. There is a gathering up of all that has been or is being done outside our consciousness and a bringing of all this into our consciousness. God as Holy Spirit, therefore, may be conceived as present in all His activities, creative, redemptive and sanctifying. The Holy Spirit in fact repeats within the human life the whole work of God without the life. By the further transformation of personality, He works a “new creation”; by indwelling human life as His temple, He repeats the mystery of the Incarnation, *mutatis mutandis*; by taking the human life into the inclusive fellowship of the divine, He appropriates man for God. This is the justification for that transference of function, the Pauline interchange of “Christ” and the Holy Spirit, which was later to be reflected in the ecclesiastical doctrine of “perichoresis”, the “going around” of the activities and attributes of the “Persons” of the Godhead. Wherever we begin we find God; where God is, there the whole of God is active. On the other hand, that intensive approach to the Trinity which we have found in the New Testament affords some parallel in experience to the ecclesiastical doctrine of “procession”, the relation of the Spirit to the Son and the Father. These doctrines which have so engaged the thought of the Church and so affected its history are apt to seem remote from the interests of practical religion. So far as this is

true, it is because the Person of the Holy Spirit has been divorced from His work. In spite of the protest of Montanism, and to some extent in reaction from it, the early Catholic Church affiliated Christian experience to its sacramental doctrine and its formal organization. The real presence of God was still asserted, but it was now felt to be mediated by the sacramental elements, with the result that there was much less recognition of the immediate presence of divine personality in the unity of His activity. The unity of the New Testament doctrine of God was lost, and that unity is recoverable only by a new experience of God's actual presence, such an experience as characterized the Reformation, and must underlie any real revival of religion.¹

The three primary values attaching respectively to the Fatherhood, Sonship and Spirithood of the Godhead in the New Testament, have a direct relation to our discussion of the Revelation of the Spirit in the first part of this book. We saw there the successive levels of revelation in Nature, History and the human self-consciousness prior to any study of the Christian revelation. There is nothing arbitrary in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, at least so long as we are speaking of it in relation to actual Christian experience. It is the specialization within the Christian consciousness of that experience of God which is also found in the concentric circles of personality, history, Nature, beyond Christian life. There is a triple revelation of God within and without the Christian consciousness, because there is a triple experience of God within and without that consciousness.² The

¹ This line of thought is clearly and admirably indicated in R. Winkler's *Das Geistproblem* (1926).

² Cf. Seeberg, *Christliche Dogmatik*, I, pp. 379 ff., though he fails to bring out the primacy of Spirithood; for this, see Schaefer, *Das Geistproblem*.

revelation of God in Nature acquires a new meaning when it is deepened into the Christian doctrine of divine Fatherhood, by which Nature's inevitabilities are transformed into parental discipline, wisely, effectively and lovingly controlled. The revelation of God in history finds its supreme instance in the Incarnation, which enables us to see the hidden meaning and goal of that history ; Jesus Christ explains that which cannot explain Him. The revelation in self-conscious personality which all men have in some degree, as in conscience, is raised to a new level of meaning when the Christian conscience is created, and the personality of Christ is being formed within the heart by the Holy Spirit ; but there is no need to draw artificial lines between the "natural" and the "Christian" in order to maintain the unique authority and the intrinsic supremacy of the Christian experience.

III. When, therefore, we try to see the unity of all experience of God by thinking of a Christian foreground and a universal background, it is of great help to be able to use some principle of interpretation which can be expressed in a common term. This term we have found in "Spirit" as part of our theological inheritance, a term capable of a vast philosophical development beyond its earlier scope. The Hebrew usage, as we have seen, largely concentrated on the revelation of God in human personality and life ; the Greek usage, philosophical rather than religious, gave the larger background ; to some extent (e.g., in the doctrine of the Logos) both meet in the New Testament. It was highly important for the conceptions of Paul that there was spirit in man corresponding to Spirit in God, and waiting to be quickened and reinforced. It is of real value for us to-day that we should use a term for our ultimate theological conceptions which by its very amplitude and scope corresponds with the

amplitude and scope of the data it has to cover. If it be said that this may easily lead to ambiguity in the use of the term "Spirit", this is only the peril which is inseparable from the subject. We have been considering throughout a living unity of experience, in which we can see now more and now less, according to our view-point. The unity of the term reminds us of the unity of the experience, which analysis is so apt to forget. The one real instance of unity we know from within is "spirit"—spirit in the form of our own self-consciousness; it is fitting that we should use that term to denote the ultimate Personality of God, the very nature of the inclusive Godhead. The very fact that we have found "spirit" in ourselves to be a unity (though only in process of creation) admitting much diversity of content, may encourage us to believe that the ultimate unity of God must be conceived by us in the same terms of Spirithood. That which is partial, limited and imperfect in us will be complete, all-embracing, and perfect in God, but the growing unity of the microcosm at least foreshadows that of the macrocosm.

The conception of religion as fellowship with God carries with it the conception of His personality, for there can be no fellowship where all the activity is on the human side, and the activity of God which religious faith discerns is conceived in personal terms. We cannot indeed maintain the great "values" of religion, unless we carry them back to divine personality, and the same thing is true of all the other spiritual values of art and science, morality and social life. But what has been said about the necessary inclusiveness of the conception of God reminds us that personality in Him must be immeasurably vaster in scope and nature than what we call personality in ourselves. Our experience is limited to the

inclusion of the physical phenomena of our own bodies within "spirit", whilst we can never include the consciousness of another personality within our own. But God must be conceived not only as including all Nature within the circle of His being, but, in some sense, all created spirits. This fact alone removes His personality so far above ours that the very term "personality" seems to many thinkers a misnomer. Others would speak of "supra-personality", and the term may be allowed if it denotes that which is not less but more than human personality, and includes all its values. Perhaps the best statement is to be found in the classical words of Lotze, who would attribute perfect personality to God alone: "We have little ground for speaking of the personality of finite beings; it is an ideal, which, like all that is ideal, belongs unconditionally only to the Infinite, but like all that is good appertains to us only conditionally and hence imperfectly."¹

We have used the term "spirit" or "Spirit" to include all the attributes and activities of human personality, in itself or in fellowship with the divine. The history of the term sufficiently shews its legitimate extension, both in the upward and the downward direction, from the standpoint of human personality. Personality might be described as Spirit creating human experience through an individual, though socialized, consciousness. Below that consciousness, the historical use of the term has covered physical phenomena such as the wind of the desert, which actually supplied the term (*ruach* means "wind" all through the Old Testament, and this meaning is the primary one). But these phenomena ascribed to "Spirit" in the Old Testament are always of a supernatural order, from the

¹ *Microcosmus*, Bk. IX, Ch. IV, 4; E.T., p. 687.

contemporary standpoint.¹ From the beginning, including the use of the term for "wind", there is an upward reference to powers beyond man's, and this "supernatural" suggestion accompanies the use of the word throughout. Above human personality, it denotes personality which is greater, at first in strong contrast ("Spirit" and "flesh," Isa. xxxi. 3), but ultimately as that which has its human analogy (the Pauline parallel between the "spirit" of man and the "spirit" of God). No better term could be found, therefore, to denote the "supra-personality" or the "perfect" personality of God. The metaphors of "Fatherhood" and "Sonship" are so integral to the Christian revelation that, religiously, they can never be displaced; but they remain metaphors. The history of Christian doctrine along the lines of both orthodoxy and heresy shews the tyranny of these metaphors, when they have been pressed into the service of theology and philosophy; so used, they never escape from the perils of anthropomorphism, even whilst they conserve some of its essential truth. The term "Spirit" is of a different order, not less a metaphor, as all human language must be, but a metaphor drawn from a different sphere, and so corrective of the perils of the others. It has its own perils, of course; its physical origin still influences popular theology, as when the Spirit of God is thought to be a "breath" or a "wind"; the influence has been felt in theology proper, as when thinkers have been content to describe the Holy Spirit as a "relation" existing between the Father and the Son, instead of God in His immediate activity and essential nature. But when, as throughout our argument, the term "Spirit" has been used to include all that we mean by personality, those

¹ H. Wheeler Robinson, *Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*, pp. 110, 111.

perils are minimized, and the very breadth of the term makes it the more suitable to describe or suggest the ultimate being of God, Who must be so much more than what personality includes in our imperfect attainment of it.

The inclusiveness of "spirit", shewn in the growing unity of man's inner life (Ch. III), suggests that this is the true category with which to face the perennial problem of transcendence and immanence—the relation of the God who is above and independent of the world to the God who is within and realized by the world. We can hardly hope to get nearer to the necessary union of these two conceptions than through the unity of our own self-consciousness. The miracle of assimilation of the not-self to the self is constantly being wrought within our personal consciousness. The whole world is brought to a focus within that consciousness without overwhelming its self-hood. We retain our own sense of personal identity as of something, or rather, someone, greater than the multitude of sensations, percepts and concepts which form its content. We enter into the world without us by bringing it within us. Such a unity as this is demanded in our ultimate idea of God, though the analogy of the inclusiveness of our spirits does not extend to that inclusion of the self-consciousness of other *persons* which must be postulated for the divine self-consciousness. The Christian idea of God is of One in Whom all men live and move and have their being, as well as of One in Whom all things find their ground of existence. All history must be somehow brought into the compass of God's consciousness and purpose. All Nature must be somehow conceived as His work, which means His unceasing work, and His omnipresence. We cannot possibly defend the Christian faith to-day on a deistic basis ; the heavens and

the earth, Nature and man, reveal a God who is working from within. Yet the immanent God must also be transcendent, or the peculiar values of religion will be lost. To assert both immanence and transcendence does not carry us far unless we can correlate them. The only real basis we have for their correlation is afforded by our experience of spirit, however partial. The only category to which we can appeal is that of Spirit, transcending even when it includes, and indwelling by its inclusiveness.¹

This conception of God in ultimate terms of Spirit is not intended to suggest the Hegelian interpretation of experience, "which regarded the world as the necessary development of the divine Spirit".² The Spirithood of God is here intended to emphasize the creative and redemptive *will* of personal being, realized in history in relation to the human wills which He has endowed with a real, though limited, freedom. "Spirithood" gathers up the great Christian values, reminding us that whilst the initial fact of Christian experience is the activity of the Holy Spirit, the ultimate conception of God is that of Him as Spirit. Within that unity of Spirit—"Spirit the end and Spirit the beginning"—there is the infinitely rich content of Fatherhood and Sonship, God in His creative and God in His redemptive being and activity.

¹ Cf. the useful survey of "Immanence" by A. C. McGiffert, in the E.R.E. (s.v.)

² Windelband, *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, II, p. 322 ; also J. Hessen, *Hegels Trinitätslehre*, p. 41.

CHAPTER XI

THE OLD APPROACH AND THE NEW

IN the previous chapter we have reviewed those permanent values of religion which Christianity essentially expresses, and we have emphasized their unity in the Christian experience of the Holy Spirit. But that experience itself implies that these values are objectively based in ultimate reality. It is inevitable that human thought should attempt to formulate the nature of that reality. Whatever limits are imposed by the incompleteness of our knowledge and the inadequacy of our capacities, we cannot escape the necessity of thinking out the meaning of the data of experience, and trying to discover necessary implicates, rational postulates, to make that experience intelligible.

I. It does not belong to the method of our inquiry, or to the scope of this book, to trace the history of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. But some of the chief points in Trinitarian discussion must be noticed, if we are to correlate the old approach with the new, and we may notice first the failure of "Modalism". In the New Testament itself there is, as we have seen, no consciousness of any challenge to the unity of God through the significance assigned to Christ and the Holy Spirit. But the primary and central place of Jesus Christ in Christian experience naturally raised the question of His original and ultimate relation to God. In some of the Pauline epistles, and notably in the prologue to the fourth Gospel,

this question is answered in the terms of contemporary thought, Jewish or Greek. The dominant conception used to explain Christ in the thought of the early Christian centuries was that of the "Logos". The attractiveness of this Greek concept (which goes back to Heraclitus through the Stoics) lay in its twofold meaning of "thought" and "word". It was thus admirably adapted to express the mediatorial activity of Christ, for by calling Him the Logos He was at once designated both as divine thought and divine utterance or activity. Along a parallel line of thought (without use of the term "Logos") the Epistle to the Colossians gives to Christ a cosmical significance,¹ which hopelessly puzzles us so long as we are thinking only of Jesus of Nazareth. The Logos Christology, however, whilst answering some questions, raised others. If the Logos-Son was divine, how was He related to God as Father, and how did this relation affect the unity of the Godhead? The first question might be answered by giving Him a subordinate place within deity, which was thought to leave the unity of the supreme God unimpaired. Thus, for example, we may take the statement of Hippolytus in what is "perhaps the earliest *apologia* for the Church doctrine of the Trinity":²

"Whether he will or nill," a Christian "must needs confess God the Father Almighty and Christ Jesus the Son of God, God made man, to whom the Father has subjected all things save Himself and the Holy Spirit, and that these are in fact three things. . . . So far as regards the Divine power, there is One God, but as regards the 'economy', the manifestation is threefold. . . .

¹ I. 13-20; II. 9, 10, 15, 20; cf. 1 Cor. VIII. 6, II. 8.

² Swete (*The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church*, p. 103), whose translation and selection is here quoted (*Hipp. adv. Noet.* 8, 14).

I will not speak of two Gods, but of one only; yet I will speak of two 'persons', and, third in the order of 'economy', the grace of the Holy Spirit. For the Father is one, but there are two persons, since there is also the Son; and the third, the Holy Spirit. . . . He who commands is the Father, He who obeys is the Son, He who gives understanding is the Holy Spirit. The Father is over all, the Son through all, the Holy Spirit in all. In no other way can we hold One God, but by really believing in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. . . . Through this Trinity the Father is glorified; for what the Father wills, the Son translates into act, and the Spirit manifests."

Such a solution of the problem, however, failed to satisfy those Christian thinkers who asserted the "monarchy" or single rule of God, and were therefore known as "Monarchians". One of their own ways of solving the problem was by what has come to be called "Modalism", owing to their representation of both Christ and the Holy Spirit as temporary modes or aspects of God. The best-known leader in this school of thought was Sabellius.¹ There was, of course, an attractive simplicity in such a solution. The ultimate problem was escaped by a virtual denial of its existence; for this is what is meant by making the real activities and personalities of Christ and the Holy Spirit temporal and transient. But this did not satisfy the deeper religious convictions of the Christian Church, convictions which inspired its thinkers to carry back the successive realizations of God in time into the eternal nature of God Himself. On the surface of things, the Monarchian Modalists might seem to conserve religious values; but their theory was in fact

¹ Apparently the first to include the Holy Spirit in the scheme.

a form of intellectualism, securing unity by sacrificing some of the data of experience. Sabellianism carried to its logical issues becomes a sort of Christian pantheism,¹ a charge to which its modern representative, Schleiermacher, seems open.

It was Tertullian who made "the first attempt at a scientific treatment of the doctrine" of the Trinity.² He speaks of :

"the mystery of the providential order which arranges the unity in a trinity, setting in their order three—Father, Son and Holy Spirit—three, however, not in condition (*status*) but in relation (*gradus*), and not in substance but in mode of existence (*forma*), and not in power but in special characteristics (*species*): yes, rather of one substance and of one status and power, inasmuch as it is one God from whom these relations and modes and special characteristics are reckoned in the name of Father and of Son and of Holy Spirit."

Whatever may be thought of the adequacy of this attempt to express a diversity within unity which should safeguard both the unity and the religious values, there can be no question that Tertullian did re-assert those values by transferring the emphasis from the Logos idea of the Apologists to that of Sonship, and by his own (Montanist) interest in the work of the Holy Spirit. Origen carried further the idea of divine Sonship by his characteristic doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, which lifted the metaphor of "sonship" out of some of its perils. Modalism had failed, as it must always fail. The ontological goal of our thinking is at least kept before

¹ Bethune-Baker, *A History of Early Christian Doctrine*, p. 106.

² Op. cit., p. 201; the translation on p. 240 is quoted above; the reference is to Tertullian's *Adversus Praxean*, 2.

us by the historic formulae of the "eternal generation" of the Son, and the "eternal procession" of the Spirit.¹ The heart has its reasons, which the reason *may* know,² for demanding an *eternal* Fatherhood and Sonship and Spirit-hood in God which Modalism can never offer. Its failure does not lie so much in proclaiming "modes" of deity (for there is a sense in which all divine revelation is modal to our apprehension) as in making these "modes" nothing but modes, i.e. temporary instead of eternal. This failure is well characterized by H. R. Mackintosh:³ "God appears to be triune; He is not really so . . . this theory of knowledge, which is ultimately agnostic, leaves phenomena in no positive or definable relation to reality. Applied to the Christian thought of God, it means that *for us* God is Father, Son and Spirit; but these appellations in no way answer to real facts which qualify His essential being. . . . Our believing apprehension of Father, Son and Spirit is in contact not with appearance only, but with reality."

II. The Arian controversy which ran its chequered

¹ Swete (*On the History of the Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, p. 3) claims that this subject is of more than historical interest, and cannot become obsolete. It is very doubtful, however, whether the Scriptural metaphor of "proceeding" (John xv. 26) ought to be made the basis of speculation. Like the other metaphor of "generation", the use of it is apt to produce the appearance of knowledge rather than its reality. To say this is not, of course, to deny that the doctrine of the double procession of the Spirit (from both the Father and the Son), which gave rise to the famous *Filioque* clause dividing the Eastern and Western Churches, has been the symbol of real issues. "The Western Church realized that to uphold the closest connexion between the Son and the Spirit was vital—not so much to the cause of dogmatic precision as to the cause of the gospel in the world" (H. Watkin Jones, *The Holy Spirit in the Mediaeval Church*, p. 327).

² Pascal's famous *obiter dictum* (*Pensées*, ed. Faugère, II, p. 172), "Le cœur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connaît pas", really means that the data for reasoning must be drawn from experience, not from mere speculation.

³ *The Person of Jesus Christ*, pp. 514, 515,

course through half a century was concerned not with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit but with the relation of the Son to the Father, and with the true nature of the Son. The enemy was subordinationism, ranging from the crude type represented by Arius to the subtler forms of Eastern "orthodoxy". The battleword was *homoousios*, which asserted that the Son was of the same *ousia* or "being" as the Father. It was only towards the end of this long controversy that the question about the *ousia* of the Holy Spirit was directly raised, when it was seen that the *homoousia* already won for the Son must be held for the Holy Spirit.¹ The so-called "Macedonian controversy"² affecting this issue was brief, and in itself, unimportant; indeed, it is to be regarded rather as an appendix to the Arian controversy than as an independent issue. Thus the *homoousia* of the Spirit was asserted as a necessary consequence of the *homoousia* of the Son, and not as a result of any adequate independent inquiry based on the work of the Holy Spirit.

The formulation of the classical doctrine of the Trinity now became possible. The main issue was simple enough, however elaborate and technical the details of its formulation might be. Christian men were now, as a whole, agreed that the religious values of their faith, experienced in time, must be carried back and based in eternity. In their relation to Jesus Christ and to the Holy Spirit, not less than in their relation to the Father, they had to do with God Himself, Who had been, and still was, really present and active amongst them. But Christian men were also agreed that this threefold activity of Father,

¹ Athanasius argued directly from the *homoousia* of the Son to that of the Holy Spirit; cf. Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 210; Seeberg, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*² II, p. 80.

² See the article by Loofs in the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, VIII, pp. 225-230.

Son, and Holy Spirit must not be so interpreted as to obscure the ultimate unity of the Godhead. The Three are One, and One is directly known in the Three. In the light of subsequent developments it is broadly true to say that the emphasis of the Eastern Church fell on the Three who are One, and that of the Western Church on the One who is Three. The consequence of this difference of emphasis was that the Eastern Church tended to subordinate the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father, whilst the Western Church tended towards Modalism. "The peril of one was Arianism, of the other Sabellianism."¹ This general difference of attitude was complicated (as such differences usually are) by a difference of vocabulary. The key-words here were *ousia* and *hypostasis*. Both express "being" or "substance" (which are their respective etymological equivalents), and at the Council of Nicaea they were used as synonyms. They were regarded as such by Athanasius all through his work.² But the Eastern Church had developed a use of the rarer term *hypostasis* to denote the distinctive being of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in contrast with *ousia*, their common being. "Thus the Westerns who spoke of one *hypostasis* regarded the Eastern three *hypostases* as tritheist, while the Easterns in their turn suspected one *hypostasis* of Sabellianism".³ This barrier to mutual understanding was removed in 362 (Synod of Alexandria) through the agency of Athanasius himself, by the recognition that the difference of vocabulary was harmless.

¹ Seeberg, *op. cit.*, II, p. 151.

² Thus, in the late *ad Afros*, 4 (quoted by Bethune-Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 237) he says, "*Hypostasis* is *ousia* and means nothing else but simply 'being' ". In 360 the Synod of Constantinople declared against both terms, apparently treating them as synonyms (Hahn, *Symbole und Glaubensregeln*, p. 209).

³ Gwatkin, *Studies of Arianism*, p. 211.

The larger problem of relating the One to the Three and the Three to the One, was faced by the three Cappadocian Fathers, whose influence was primary in the formulation of the classical doctrine.¹ Basil of Cæsarea brought out the real significance of the Holy Spirit; his brother, Gregory of Nyssa, developed distinctions which were largely verbal developments of metaphor,² and Gregory of Nazianzus helps us to see the varieties and uncertainties of opinion at the time when the formula was being framed. That formula in briefest expression is "one *ousia* in three *hypostases*", though it does not actually occur in this form in the conclusions of the Council of Constantinople (381), which gather up the results. The formula may be expounded as the doctrine of "One God existing permanently and eternally in three spheres of consciousness and activity, three modes, three forms, three persons, in the inner relations of the divine life as well as in the outer relations of the Godhead to the world and to men".³ The doctrine was further developed for the West (with characteristic emphasis on the Unity rather than on the Trinity) in Augustine's great work *De Trinitate*. His teaching is virtually reproduced in the later, so-called "Athanasian Creed", in which the Greek *ousia* is represented by the Latin *substantia*, and the Greek *hypostasis* by the Latin *persona*.

In any rendering of the terms *substantia* and *persona* into English, we are practically compelled to use their etymological equivalents, "substance" and "person". Yet the result of these renderings has been a grave misfortune for the popular, and sometimes for the professional, understanding of the classical doctrine. On the one

¹ On their difference from Athanasius see Seeberg, *op. cit.*, II, p. 126.

² On the formality of these, see Seeberg, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 117, 118.

³ Bethune Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 224, 225.

hand there is the suggestion of our modern use of the term "substance", as equivalent to "material". This inevitably tends, unless carefully watched, to de-spiritualize the nature of God, and to ascribe to Him a sub-personal existence, if not a quasi-physical energy. On the other hand, our modern use of the term "person" is as much above the connotation of *persona* as our modern use of "substance" is below that of *substantia*. If there can be an *embarras des richesses* in the connotation of a theological or philosophical term, it is surely found in that of "personality" in contemporary usage. We cannot possibly make sense of the classical doctrine of the Trinity without deliberately eliminating the full and rich content of the term "person" which fifteen centuries have bequeathed to us. We must go back to the Latin use of *persona* to denote bare rank or status such as that of the citizen in comparison with the slave. In fact, the term *persona* does not imply what concerns us most in thinking of personality, viz. the inner content and the unique self-consciousness. "It is always a person looked at from some distinctive point of view, a person in particular circumstances, that is, it conveys the notion much more of the environment than of the subject."¹ This applies in an even greater degree to the connotation of the Greek word, *hypostasis*, which the Latin *persona* represents, for this is an abstraction, without any original relation to personality at all. When we speak in English, therefore, of the "persons" of the Trinity, we must not forget that we are at two important removes from the original employment of *hypostasis*. Ignorance of this fact, or failure to recognize it adequately, is more responsible for misunderstanding and difficulty in the doctrines of the Holy Spirit and of the Trinity than any other remediable cause. No

¹ Bethune-Baker, op. cit., p. 234.

question is more frequently asked about the doctrine of the Holy Spirit than this—"Are we to believe in His personality?"—yet in most instances it is asked in a way that shews that the questioner is reading a modern connotation into the term. If this is done, the problem of the three "Persons" becomes insoluble. The classical doctrine cost a half-century of struggle to reach and establish; it never would have been reached and could not have been established if it had meant the assertion of three distinct centres of personality in our modern sense, which were somehow to be reduced to one.¹

The fourth century doctrine in its historical interpretation is much more intelligible than some of the modern attempts to defend it. It safeguards the values of Christian experience by relating them to the ultimate being of God, and it declares that God is for ever in Himself that which we have found Him to be in our experience of Him. It asks us to think of Him as eternally existent in three forms of being beyond our experience of being, but it does not ask us to ascribe to each of those forms of existence a conception of personality which belongs rather to the *unity* of the Godhead. Personality, as we so far know it, exhibits the approximation of a developing self-consciousness towards unity. Its true analogy, therefore (incompleteness apart), would be with the *ousia* rather than with the *hypostases* of the Godhead (see Ch. XII).

The limitations of the classical doctrine are suggested by what has been said of the development in the meaning of "personality". These limitations centre in the inadequacy of the term "substance" (*ousia*) even in its

¹ If a physical parallel is at all permissible here, we might think of Rodin's "La Pensée", where the head emerges from the unshaped block, as a rough suggestion of the relation of *hypostasis* to *ousia*.

proper philosophical use, to express the values of "subject". The main difference between the modern approach to the doctrine of God and that of the fourth century is that we think of Him in terms of "subject" where that age thought of Him in terms of "substance".

We may express this by saying that "Substance is, in fact, the persistent value which we find subsisting throughout all the transformations of phenomena. . . . In the unity of this self, or subject, amid its changing states, has been found the substance so long sought for by philosophy, unique and incomparable as it is among the substances of the world."¹ The whole development of modern philosophy from Descartes onwards lies between us and the ecclesiastical doctrine of the Trinity. We have discovered that static concepts and verbal arguments cannot deal adequately with the rich content of experience. We need a doctrine of the divine nature bringing out the dynamic values of redemption, of what God is in the light of what He does. The static conception of *ousia* is in harmony with the Greek idea of salvation as the impartation of the divine attribute of immortality. In this respect the soteriology of Athanasius is in agreement with his theology proper, i.e. his doctrine of God. But the ethical values more adequately represented in Latin thought, themselves deriving from Hebrew experience, are another and perhaps truer way to the heart of things. The West has yet to create its own Trinitarian doctrine which shall do justice to these ethical values, instead of vainly struggling to express them in Eastern terminology. The essentially Greek doctrine of the fourth century, propagated in the West through Augustine's reproduction and modification of it, ought to be for us not a traditional encumbrance of thought, but an inspiring example and

¹ James Lindsay, *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, XI, p. 911.

teacher of what thought should attempt. The classical doctrine of the Trinity fails to satisfy Christian men to-day not because it says too much, but because it says too little. We have richer categories and an ampler experience of the work of the Holy Spirit. *Ousia* and *hypostasis* are inadequate to our larger concept of "spirithood". That is probably the chief reason why the typical modern attempts to defend the classical doctrine fail to bring conviction or to inspire enthusiasm. The classical doctrine has, of course, great "symbolic" worth, and is rightly felt to safeguard religious values that are vital to the Christian experience. But its underlying philosophy is superseded, and our experience cannot be run into the mould of these conceptions without most serious loss (see Ch. XII). No re-statement of the Christian doctrine, of course, will be satisfactory which does not conserve the religious values as faithfully as did that of the fourth century. We are only at the beginning of the formulation of such a doctrine, but it does seem possible to indicate the path of approach to it, in view of the whole momentum of Christian experience and its modern interpretation.

We have seen that, in the formation of the ancient doctrine, there was no period in which the work and personality of the Holy Spirit formed the central subject of debate. The long Arian controversy of the fourth century secured a thorough discussion of the relation of the Son to the Godhead, within the limits of ancient thought. The value of the result is best seen in its unchallenged supremacy down to the time of Socinianism. Truth is won only through the struggle with error, whatever its cost, and in theology as in life there can be no ultimate evasion of issues. It was natural enough in the fourth century for the Catholic Church to believe that the assertion of the *homoousia* of the Son carried with it that

■

of the Holy Spirit. But this transference of result, with relatively little conflict, combined with other causes to rob the Church of any adequate discussion of the work and personality of the Holy Spirit. The one exception to this is the doctrine of "Procession", which ultimately divided the Eastern and Western Churches.¹ But, however important the issue for Church history, or for the theological conceptions of ancient times, this formal doctrine has little constructive value for ourselves. The question as to whether the Holy Spirit "proceeded" from the Father alone, as the Easterns taught, or from the Father and the Son, as the Westerns held, does indeed cover and symbolize important differences in the respective doctrines of the Godhead.² But our concern is with Christian experience, rather than with speculative construction more or less divorced from it. In the practical realm the institutional and sacramental emphasis of the mediaeval Church externalized the interpretation of Christian experience. It is true that this framework of religious life provided a sufficient home for a rich and varied experience of God, as the records of mediaeval mysticism amply prove. That mysticism was destined to be the pathway of the return to a direct experience of God in Christ which is the true glory of the Reformation. Prior to the Reformation, however, the ecclesiastical conditions did not allow for a fresh examination of Christian experience with a view to the re-statement of the doctrine. In the centuries since the Reformation down to our own time the doctrine of the Holy Spirit has been implicitly or explicitly in the forefront of inquiry.

¹ See the note on p. 250.

² E.g. the subordinationism of the East, whilst the Western "filioque" safeguarded the historic contents of Christian experience (cf. Schaeder, *Das Geistproblem der Theologie*, p. 80 n).

III. It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that these recent centuries have done for the doctrine of the Holy Spirit what earlier centuries, particularly the fourth, did for the doctrine of the Son of God. We may accordingly describe their contribution as "the Arian controversy" of the Holy Spirit. Their most significant result is the shaping of a deeper and fuller concept of personality, human and divine, and this may be most conveniently illustrated by following the English stream of development, both because it most nearly concerns most readers of this book, and because it is marked by the characteristic English emphasis on experience.

(1) The course of the Reformation in England during the sixteenth century was largely dominated by political considerations. It was not until the seventeenth that there was free play for the consciousness of God's direct activity in religious life. This is the feature which makes the seventeenth century more interesting than any other in the history of English religion. The price paid for that freedom, especially under the Commonwealth, was a bewildering crop of vagaries and eccentricities. The minor sects of the Commonwealth and Protectorate form a strange but fascinating study—Fifth Monarchy Men, Ranters, Muggletonians, Familists, Diggers, Seekers.¹ Over against these there was the more orderly Puritan development of the Independents and the Baptists, not less based on the new experience of God, but restrained within a more normal and rational interpretation of Scripture. The most interesting religious figure of the century is undoubtedly George Fox, and he may well serve to illustrate the emphasis on the immediacy of man's

¹ Cf. R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*: Braithwaite, *The Beginnings of Quakerism*. Note parallels with Montanism in the second century.

relation to God, which is the characteristic religious contribution of the century.

George Fox was brought up under religious influences, and shewed a sturdy moral character, but his religious experience began in reaction from the worldliness of those professing Christ. He reacted again from the ministers of religion from whom he sought guidance and help, chiefly because of the externalism of their religion. "I saw there was none among them all that could speak to my condition. When all my hopes in them and in all men were gone, so that I had nothing outwardly to help me, nor could I tell what to do ; then, O ! then I heard a voice which said, There is one even Christ Jesus that can speak to thy condition ; and when I heard it, my heart did leap for joy."¹ That is all. Fox can tell us little more than that, for he is not able to get behind the ultimate fact of the soul's immediate contact with God through the Spirit of Christ. Henceforth, his aim was to bring seekers away from the outward to the inward, away from men to Christ, away from the letter of the Bible to its creative Spirit. He led men to Christ that Christ might convert them. In noble words he subsequently wrote down what he meant by the Church :

"the state of the New Jerusalem, which comes down out of heaven, was opened to me ; . . . I saw the beauty and glory of it, the length, the breadth, and the height thereof, all in complete proportion. I saw that all who are within the light of Christ, and in his faith, which he is the author of ; and in the Spirit, the Holy Ghost, which Christ and the holy prophets and apostles were in : and within the grace and truth and power of God, which are the walls of the city ;—such are within the

¹ *Journal*, I, p. 11 (ed. of 1901).

city, are members of it, and have right to eat of the tree of life which yields her fruit every month, and whose leaves are for the healing of the nations.”¹

One of his hearers, long afterwards drawn into the closest of all relations to him, describes the effect of his preaching :

“ how that Christ was the Light of the world, and lighteth every man that cometh into the world ; and that by this light they might be gathered to God. I stood up in my pew and wondered at his doctrine ; for I had never heard such before. And then he went on and opened the Scriptures, and said, the Scriptures were the prophets’ words and Christ’s, ^{and} the apostles’ words . . . what had any to do with the Scriptures, but as they came to the Spirit that gave them forth ? You will say, ‘ Christ saith this and the Apostles say this ; || But what canst *thou* say ? Art thou a child of Light and hast thou walked in the Light, and what thou speakest is it inwardly from God ? ’ ” This opened me so that it cut me to the heart ; and then I saw clearly that we were all wrong. So I sat down in my pew again and cried bitterly, and I cried in my spirit to the Lord, ‘ We are all thieves ; we are all thieves ; we have taken the Scriptures in words and know nothing of them in ourselves.’ ”²

To translate the moving simplicity of this account into theological terminology seems almost a desecration. But we may say that the teaching of Fox and the experienced immediacy of fellowship with God through Christ postulated three principles : vitality as the mark of

¹ Op. cit., II, p. 135.

² Op. cit., II, p. 512 (Margaret Fell of Swarthmore).

genuine religion, inwardness of experience as the realm within which God must be sought and found, and that He is found by the activity of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the individual. Fox's characteristic doctrine of "the inner light" has at its centre the religious interpretation of ethical values, though doubtless including more than these.¹ However limited and deficient on the sacramental side the Quaker testimony may seem to most of us, its clear and continued assertion of a direct relation to God in the Holy Spirit is a vital and permanent contribution to the truth we are seeking.

(2) It was natural that the eighteenth century should react from the unguarded "enthusiasm" of the seventeenth. The characteristic product of the eighteenth in English theology is the attempt of the "deistical" writers to state and defend a natural religion which should be free from the superstitions of the revealed. It is probable, as F. R. Tennant has argued,² that justice has not been done to these writers for their clear enunciation of fundamental principles: e.g. "That revealed theology logically presupposes natural (though not of their kind): that reason (though again not as they conceived it) is the sole arbiter of truth: that the world is a derived existent over against God, endowed with somewhat of delegated activity and autonomy." The significance of the deistical writers for our purpose lies in their attempt to explain experience by the principle of transcendence without immanence. The externality of the relation of God to the world which characterized their thinking is found to some extent in those who answered

¹ See p. 203 n.

² *Miracle and its Philosophical Presuppositions*, note (a), pp. 96 f. The historical "deism" of these writers must not be confused with the larger issues of philosophical deism, though these are implied in their natural theology.

them, notably Butler, for all men are the children of their age. A typical example of this externality is afforded by Paley in his *Evidences of Christianity*, and is not yet expelled (will it ever be ?) from popular ideas. Many men have yet to learn, in John Caird's words, that "the truths of natural religion in so far as they are contained in Christianity, are not contained therein simply by addition or accretion, but rather by absorption and transmutation".¹ Whether in the inner experience of religion or in the interpretation of Nature as a whole, we cannot draw a hard and fast line between the natural and the supernatural. Spirit, as we have seen, realizes itself by inclusion, and the transcendence without the immanence of Spirit is doomed to failure as an explanation of experience.

(3) The characteristic movement of the nineteenth century is again a corrective reaction, though in a new realm. The study of Nature issued in the formulation of the principle of evolution, which has been defined as "the teaching which holds that creation has been and is accomplished by the agency of energies which are intrinsic in the evolving matter, and without the interference of agencies which are external to it".² As thus stated, the principle of evolution concerns only the manner and does not raise the question of the ultimate source of cosmic energies. It is therefore an assertion of the principle of immanence within the realm of natural history, and does not constitute or claim to be a philosophy. Paley, as is well known, had begun his "Natural Theology" by arguing from a watch found on a heath to the existence of a watch-maker, and Paley contrasted the watch as a datum with a stone. A modern apologist might make the

¹ *The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity*, I, p. 21.

² E. D. Cope, *The Primary Factors of Organic Evolution*, p. 1.

stone, as the product of an age-long geological development, a more impressive text for his sermon, whilst the botanist might continue the argument with "the flower by a mossy stone", and higher forms of life would illustrate the principle of evolution within the realms of biology. The emergence of new qualities would have to be recognized, though this need not imply "interference". "According to emergent evolution we find and loyally accept a series of ascending steps in advance as we pass from natural entities of lower to those of higher status . . . successively supervenient. Regarded as instances of Divine Purpose, I find difficulty in the concept of Divine *intervention*."¹ The recognition of such "emergent evolution" destroys the direct argument as from a watch to an externally working watch-maker. In the nineteenth century with its eighteenth-century religious tradition of divine externality, there were many who believed, joyfully or sorrowfully, that the principle of evolution was incompatible with the Christian faith, and there are still numerous people at this stage of mental growth. But most of us have now come to see in the vast evolutionary progress a revelation of Spirit immanent in method, transcendent in Nature. The spirituality of man's nature can be held on an evolutionary view of his origin, no less than before. Indeed, more than this needs to be said. The evolutionary process itself calls for explanation. It is impossible to give a rational interpretation of it unless we consider the process in the light of the product, unless, that is, we imply some degree of transcendence at every stage of immanence. The modern doctrine of "emergent evolution" will serve only to intensify this reasoning. The more clearly we recognize a series of new beginnings, however immanently controlled or achieved,

¹ Lloyd Morgan, *Life, Mind and Spirit*, pp. 300, 301.

the more confidently may we claim the whole as a revelation of transcendent Spirit. Immanence of this "evolutionary" type without transcendence is an even greater philosophical failure than transcendence without immanence, which at least does justice to some, though not the deepest, of the religious values.

(4) Finally we reach that phase of thought which forms our own mental environment. We are in the midst of a demonstration of the inadequacy of psychology without metaphysics. The present phase of Christian apologetic, as already seen in Chapter II, is primarily concerned to defend the reality of religious experience against the criticism that it is a psychological illusion. This is an attack on the very centre of the Christian position. The appeal to experience is destroyed altogether if its very data are delusions, and a religion that is purely subjective ceases to be a religion. This does not mean that we can assert objectivity in its traditional forms, Scriptural or ecclesiastical, without regard to all that may be learnt from psychology, old or new. Psychology is a science, and deals at most with a method; it has never the right to constitute itself a philosophy. Spirit, working in our own self-consciousness, may project itself in religious imagination and speculative thought, just as it projects itself in the scientific interpretation of Nature. Religion and philosophy may claim just as much or just as little validity for their projections as does natural science; in either case, the validity turns on the interpretation of the data, not on their particular character.¹ It is not necessary to develop this argument, already discussed in Chapter II. But we may well find encouragement for the reconstruction of theology and the revival of religion in the very fact that this psychological

¹ See the Editors' Preface.

criticism of religious experience is the most central of all, and surely marks the end of the controversy in its present character. Through four centuries it has been waged, and over far wider fields than those of ancient times, because we live in a much larger world. From the Reformation onwards we may claim that the higher thought of man has been dealing with the nature and reality of Spirit—Spirit as manifested in and to his own spirit, and Spirit as manifested in the natural world. This is the ground for belief that there is a new approach to the Christian doctrine of Godhead.

CHAPTER XII

THE PROBLEM FOR PHILOSOPHY

I. **H**OW are we to conceive the divine personality ?

The question takes us to the very centre of philosophy at the present time, for it is around the conception of personality that there is the keenest debate. Here is our highest category, our chief hope of an ultimate interpretation of experience. If this is true for philosophy, it must also be true, sooner or later, for theology. If the religious values belonging to Father, Son and Holy Spirit are to be justified for our day, it must be in terms of personality. Yet it is just here, as we have seen, that the rendering of the ancient terms *hypostasis* and *persona* by " person " have made discussion difficult.

Most students of theology become conscious of a cleavage between their philosophical and theological studies as these converge on God—or perhaps we should say that the two lines of approach do not converge, but move along parallel lines to two different ideas of God. The God of philosophical theism is not usually recognizable as the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Even when the combination has been made, the theologian is perplexed about his doctrine of the Trinity. The arguments of philosophy are unitarian, and such trinitarian differentiations of the Godhead as are offered by philosophy are apt to seem polite concessions, not very convincing. It is worth while for the theologian to look at this difference from the standpoint of one of our most distinguished

Christian philosophers. "Few things are more disheartening to the philosophical student of religion," says Professor Pringle-Pattison, "than the way in which the implications of the doctrine of the Incarnation are evaded in popular theology by dividing the functions of Deity between the Father and the Son, conceived practically as two distinct personalities or centres of consciousness, the Father perpetuating the old monarchical ideal and the incarnation of the Son being limited to a single historical individual. Grosser still, however, is the materialism which has succeeded in transforming the profound doctrine of the Spirit, as the ultimate expression of the unity and communion of God and man, into the notion of another distinct Being, a third centre of consciousness mysteriously united with the other two."¹ There is a double criticism here—a criticism of the artificial separation of the "Persons" of the Trinity, for which there is, as we have seen, no ground in the actual experience of the Christian (nor even, to the extent described, in the *ancient* doctrine) and a criticism of the artificial separation of God from man, whereas the doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Holy Spirit both imply their spiritual kinship. The two separations, however, are closely linked; if we do not discover the unity of God and man in religious experience, we shall not be likely to find a satisfactory unity of "Persons" in the Godhead.

Theism has its own serious problems, but it is straightforward in this respect at least, that the personality ascribed to God is really in some sense analogous to human personality, though somehow supposed to be free from its limitations. The philosophic strength of theism lies in this principle of unity—the unity of a single divine

¹ *The Idea of God*, pp. 409, 410.

consciousness and will. "Personality is not only the strictest unity of which we have any experience ; it is the fact which creates the postulate of unity on which all philosophy is based."¹ To the theistic conception of ultimate reality many weighty contributions have been made in modern times, notably by Leibnitz, in changing the idea of substance to that of subject,² by Kant, in his emphasis on the practical reason as the basis of theism,³ and by Lotze, in his conception of a perfect personality imperfectly represented in human personality.⁴ All these great lines of argument, amongst many others, point to personality as a single centre of consciousness. We ought frankly to admit that we know nothing of personality possessing three distinct centres of consciousness.⁵ If, then, it is necessary to the Christian values of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, that we should base them ultimately on a conception of divine personality possessing three distinct centres of consciousness, it seems doubtful whether we ought to speak of Christian *monotheism* at all. At any rate, there is an unbridged gulf between theism and the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as so conceived.

Professor C. C. J. Webb, who rightly and strongly insists on the religious values as integral to theism itself, interprets the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as of personality "freed from these limitations which we find in our own. God's not-self, or other, is described as being

¹ Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, p. 30.

² Cf. Windelband, *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, I, p. 478.

³ A. Seth (Pringle-Pattison), *Theism*, p. 22.

⁴ Illingworth, *Personality Human and Divine*, pp. 243 ff.

⁵ The abnormal developments of alternating or multiple personality offer no real exception to this statement. A convenient review of what is known on this subject will be found in McDougall's *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, Chs. XXX ff. The value of these abnormal cases consists in shewing what lies below, not above, the unity of normal personality. But they do illustrate the inclusiveness of Spirit (see Ch. III).

wholly what he himself is and knows himself to be : yet in this inner converse of God with God the self and the other have each the satisfactory completeness of a distinct person ; while, on the other hand, these two persons are each in the other in a mutual inwardness whereof the utmost human love and sympathy can but afford a faint image. Moreover, the unity which makes possible the mutual intercourse of the two and is actualized in that intercourse . . . possesses itself a complete reality of personal spirit ”.¹ It is further claimed that the doctrine suggests “ an intrinsic sociality in the ultimate sources ” of our life. The conception of a “ social Trinity ” has become a favourite one in our time, owing to the intellectual tendency to pluralism, reinforced by the social emphasis of the age. Dr. F. R. Tennant practically offers us our choice between “ what looks like a humanitarian Christology, involving a monarchian conception of the Trinity ”, and a conception of the Godhead, “ in terms of plurality, not of solity, and as comparable to a society rather than to an individual subject ”.² He prefers the latter alternative. This, as he clearly sees, would give us one Godhead, though not one God. Further, in this Godhead, “ The homoousia of the plurality of divine subjects leaves room for a real and no mere figurative *perichoresis* or mutual indwelling of those subjects, such as finds no counterpart in human individuals ”. It is satisfactory to have so clear a statement worked out to its logical issues ; but most thinkers will hesitate before they accept a divine pluralism of this frank and unashamed kind. The conception of a social Trinity is usually presented in the obscurer terms of

¹ *Divine Personality and Human Life*, pp. 163, 164.

² “ The Doctrine of the Trinity ” in the *Congregational Quarterly*, Jan. 1925 (pp. 8-20).

Professor C. C. J. Webb, already quoted, who claims and fully intends to safeguard the unity of God. But when we ask in what this unity subsists we do not seem able to get anything more than the "group mind" or corporate personality of a community. Important as this conception undoubtedly is, we may fairly ask whether the "group mind" has any existence at all, other than in the minds of the individuals composing the group. We can conceive the unity of *mind* in relation to the plurality of its comprehended ideas, and we can conceive the plurality of a group which shares in the unity of the *idea* of the group (with all its momentous practical consequences), existing in any one of its members. But in what sense can we ascribe personality to the *idea* of a collective mind? Personality has ideas, but ideas do not have personality. This seems to be the old fallacy of the ontological argument; the idea of a collective mind is assumed to imply the real existence of such a mind, beyond the individual minds which share in it. We have no ground in experience for conceiving a plurality of *persons* as brought into a larger unity of existence, save through their mutual relations.¹ The conception of a "social" Trinity does not really help us to conceive the unity of divine personality, and really leads us, with Tennant, to replace theism by pluralism.

It is not, however, necessary to regard his Monarchian alternative as the only possible one. If our theology has issued in the doctrine of three distinct "persons" with the modern connotation of personality, it is certainly true

¹ The existence of a collective mind, other than in the idea of it, is vigorously criticized by McIver, in his *Community*, e.g. p. 76 ff. "Because a community is a union of minds, it is not therefore itself a mind." Cf. McDougall, *The Group Mind* (Preface to 2nd ed.) who disclaims a group mind denoting "some mental entity that exists over and above all individuals comprised in the group".

that no metaphysical dexterity will ever avail to combine them into a convincing unity. But if we interpret the Christian experience of God as already a unity of Spirit, in which divine Fatherhood, Sonship and Spirithood are inseparably commingled, then we may and ought to begin with that experienced unity, and our endeavour should be to state what degree of differentiation may be necessary within that unity. Our religious interests themselves suggest that this is the right procedure and the right emphasis. It has often been pointed out that in the great pioneers of Christian experience, Augustine, Luther and Schleiermacher, "the religious interpretation of doctrine allows the diversity to withdraw behind the unity".¹ Augustine in fact apologizes for the use of *tres personae* at all, in speaking of the One God.² His psychical analogies, e.g. the "trinity" of memory, understanding and will, may not carry us very far, and are rather illustrations of the inclusiveness of personality than examples of the inclusion of *tres personae* within a single consciousness. Yet we do well to hold fast to the unity of human personality and to continue to seek within its inclusiveness such analogies, admittedly imperfect or incomplete, as may further elucidate the mystery of divine personality. Anything which suggests to us the complexity of human personality or reminds us that its unity is in the making will be of use. There is, for example, the psychological aspect of consciousness, viz. the clearly-lit circle of momentary interest, the penumbra of semi-conscious observation, and the sub-consciousness, with its unrealized possibilities. In this focussing of consciousness upon a single object, without sacrifice of the marginal or sub-conscious field, there is a suggestive

¹ Kirn, *Realencyklopädie der prot. Theologie und Kirche*³, XX, p. 118.

² *De Trinitate*, V, 9.

parallel with the concentration of the divine activity on the work of redemption, as we see it in Christ; the shifting margins of our own consciousness of a purpose suggest the fluidity of a higher consciousness, and its far subtler inter-relations. Again, we may look at human personality in its ontological aspect. There is the cross-sectional self, the object of a historical observer; there is the personality of self-consciousness for which the whole time-series is held together as a unit; some thinkers have gone deeper still by the assumption of a timeless self; we are reminded that even human personality brings together time and eternity into some sort of unity, and that the historical manifestations of the Godhead may have their eternal pre-suppositions. Further, we may think of the ethical aspect of personality as including both individuality and sociality in the unity of self-consciousness, though this is not to be confused with the alleged argument for a social Trinity; we are here thinking of the inclusion of apparently distinct phases of consciousness into the unity of a moral personality.¹ All these analogies, like those of Augustine, do not carry us beyond the realm of suggestiveness, and might even suggest that the Son and the Spirit were only "manifestations" of the Godhead. The most valuable analogy of all, because it does exhibit the real inclusion of one life within another, is that afforded by the religious experience of surrender to God, in which man loses himself to find himself, and his life is "hid with Christ in God". Here, in however faint miniature, there is an experienced unity of distinct personalities (as the Christian interprets the experience), a unity realized without the

¹ Cf. Garvie, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*, pp. 476-479. Though he insists strongly on the unity of the Godhead, his conception of society as "personal" seems to me to come under the criticism of the "group mind" theory indicated above.

annihilation or even the absorption of the lower consciousness. In the rarer and intenser moments of such an experience, there is the consciousness of an identity¹ with God in which He lives in us, and we in Him. This line of thought deserves the more particular discussion which follows.

II. The Christian experience of union with God is rooted in a moral experience. When a man, conscious of many moral failures, still persists in clinging to his moral ideal, there is nothing consciously religious in his attitude. All that is explicit is the refusal to identify his inner or ultimate "self" with this self of repeated and shameful failure, and the unquenched hope of the realization of that better self in the future. When, however, this moral attitude is interpreted religiously, there is a double intensification of his experience. His moral failures become "sins", acts of rebellion against the moral law of God; his vision of a morally successful self so blends it with the purpose of God for him or in him that he conceives all the resources of God as aiding that true self,—if only he himself were that self! If he is as honest and relentless in his self-analysis as is the apostle in Romans VII., he will see that the failure springs from his own divided heart. But so long as he *wants* God and God's victory in him, the man is more or less conscious of something of God within his life, however full of failure that life remains. Because of that failure, God is his enemy; yet because God wills that success, God is his friend. Thus there is a religious division corresponding to the moral one. How can we describe it better than by borrowing the words of that strangely impressive fragment of Hebrew folklore, which pictures Jacob wrestling with

¹ The term "identity" here marks an intentional advance on that of "kinship", which was employed in Chapter III, to describe the general relation of man to God.

the Unknown—"I will not let thee go, except thou bless me"? The greatest value of the reference, however, lies in this, that it suggests a still deeper, if less articulate consciousness—that God has us in His grip all the time that we are struggling against Him. It is a paradox; but the paradoxes of religion are the ultimates of faith. Whatever be the vocabulary I use, or fail to use, I am in the lecture-halls of morality so long as the ultimate emphasis falls on my own persistent purpose, and I enter the vestibule of the temple of religion only when the emphasis falls on God's. Then, within the Christian temple, I say with the apostle (whose seventh of Romans describes that vestibule)—"I live, yet no longer I, but Christ liveth in me."

The significant fact in this "mystical" experience is that it is a positive enrichment and fulfilment of our own personality (including its individuality), and in no real sense the diminution or absorption of it. The man who so lives in God is conscious of living a larger life through his surrender to God. To use quite inadequate, but inevitable, spatial imagery, his sin kept him outside of God's life, whilst his surrender to God (with its results in moral "holiness") brings him within the circle of that life. Yet he remains still a smaller circle within it. God's purpose flows through him, and the energy and achievement are God's; yet they are also by God's gift the man's own, endowed with the unique quality of his own self-consciousness. He is conscious of living "in" God in a way far deeper than he can be said to live in the life of his friends or they to live in him. His own personality has been integrated into a larger personality.

This consciousness is a real fact of the Christian experience, not for the "saints" alone, on the higher levels of mysticism, but for plain men and women living the ordinary

life, however incomplete or discontinuous its realization. In one life, unique in its moral and religious qualities, we seem to see a complete and continuous realization of it. The human life of Jesus of Nazareth shews us how a human personality may be integrated into the divine, whilst retaining its own individuality and characteristics. In this, He is for faith the first-born among many brethren. Before we begin to frame a Christology to explain Him, we have to find room for His *human* personality within the divine. That issue is not faced as clearly as it should be. It is so far exactly the same problem as arises with every human life in God, though the levels of achievement in Jesus be so much higher. We cannot think of His human personality being annihilated or even absorbed into an entity no longer continuing His unique self-consciousness—unless we are prepared to abandon our own to death's final destruction, or a similar loss of individuality. But if even ordinary men may become conscious here and now of a life lived in God, which physical death cannot touch, still more must it be true of One Who fully realized that of which others get but imperfect and transitory glimpses. We *must*, then, on the grounds of Christian experience, conceive that personality higher than our own is able to include our own within itself whilst conserving the content of our self-consciousness. A humanitarian or Unitarian view of Jesus does not escape the metaphysical problem of the inclusion of one personality within a higher, unless it denies the higher religious experience altogether, and becomes sheerly "rationalistic".

A higher Christology, involving the pre-existence as well as the post-existence of Christ, does not seem to alter essentially this problem of inclusion, though giving to it an altogether new significance. The Eternal Son of

God, Whom we have come to know through Jesus of Nazareth, is then the supreme example of included personality. If we take our stand on our own humble experience of life in God, for which we can frame no adequate formula, how shall we think it possible to do more than look upwards in reverence to its divine analogy at levels beyond our utmost comprehension? We cannot "explain" the inclusion of the consciousness of the human Jesus within that of God, either in time or in eternity; yet Christian faith builds on the truth of it, in the light of our own partial experience, and looks beyond a human Jesus to One Who is the eternal pattern of manhood, the eternal redeemer of men, the eternal goal of the world's history, whilst including the earthly consciousness of Jesus in His own—"Christ is God's". The mystery will remain, but as a mystery of light, not of darkness; for in our own experience of union with Him, wherein God stoops to our limitations, He has shewn sufficient of His light for us in the dark to rise by—in gaining some conception of His being, as well as in following the pattern of His example.

No one doubts the personality of Jesus Christ, for it has found definite expression in an individual figure of human history; indeed, our modern difficulties of thought about the relation of the Eternal Son to the Godhead begin with too individualistic a conception of that human personality. The difficulty is just the other way with the doctrine of the Holy Spirit; the definition is so vague that men often doubt the "personality" of the Holy Spirit altogether. But here, as so often, we are confusing imagination with conception. We have no single historical figure with which to identify the Holy Spirit, no complete and perfect example (apart from Jesus Christ), of what He is in Himself. But, instead, we have a wealth of revelation

that overwhelms us by its immensity. Through the centuries, from countless lives of the most varied type, He has been reflecting Himself, as if in the myriad flashing jewels on the wavelets of a sunlit sea. Within the dark caverns of a single soul there is in miniature the same miracle of multiplicity, for His lantern flings its light on stalactite and pool, on narrow crevice and open spaces.¹ We can never hope to gather all this testimony, as we gather the words and works of Jesus. Moreover it is so mingled with human inconsistencies and denials as to be hidden by a disguise far deeper than that of a Jewish peasant. Yet, on the other hand, the wealth of the testimony removes the kind of difficulty arising in historical testimony to the single words and works of Jesus—the difficulty of evidence and its critical sifting—for here the historical evidence is invulnerable by its very quantity. If the real presence of the Spirit with mankind and with the Church is more elusive than that of the historical Jesus with His contemporaries, yet, on the other hand, it is far more intimate when we do discover it. These are great compensations, not always realized. Rightly weighed, they prepare us for the frank and open confession of the personality of the Holy Spirit, a personality better known to us, far better known, than that of Jesus. The ministry of a few months in a single life is replaced by the ministry of nineteen centuries, to speak only of the Christian experience in millions of lives. God Who is present with men is present as Spirit, and the Holy Spirit Who is God's presence active with the fulness of Christ's personality cannot Himself be less than personal. Our metaphors of a quasi-physical energy break down utterly when we try to conceive an "ether" itself endowed with the love whose expression it serves to transmit.

¹ Prov. xx, 27,

If the Spirit were but a means of transmission, or a mediating "energy", then the cardinal assumption or conviction of the real presence of God with us would be denied, and we should be left with a distant and inaccessible God.

The fact that our highest knowledge and experience of God are indissolubly bound up with Christ has given Him His permanent place in the communion of the Christian with God. But it is not less true that there is no way into a living and real experience of religion except through the real presence of God with us, which means the personality of the Holy Spirit. Without the Spirit there is no tiny fragment of Christian experience, any more than there is without Christ. If Christ were not Himself personality, and personality higher than that which we are, He could not speak to us as He does. But unless Holy Spirit meant the personal presence of God through Christ, there would be an impenetrable screen to prevent living companionship with Christ and so with God. If it be said that all this is not what is meant by an inquiry about the personality of the Spirit—that what is meant is His individual existence as a separate entity, we must simply turn back to the testimony of the experience we have examined, both in the New Testament and in our present Christian consciousness. We know nothing here about "separate entities", and we do not need to know. The Christian Benediction marks a unity of experience, as well as of thought. We know that God is with us, the God to Whom we have access in Christ and that this presence is so vital, so creative, so wonderful, that it constitutes a new datum, a new series of data,—the fellowship of the Spirit—for our knowledge of God. He must be wonderful enough, in the light of the unquestionable unity of our experience of Him, to include within His

personality both that of Jesus Christ and that of the Holy Spirit. Again we are constrained to follow that "intensive" line of approach to the knowledge of God, which marks the Pauline experience—in one Spirit, through Christ, unto the Father (see Ch. X).

What, then, are we to say of the Father Himself? Surely this, that Fatherhood is no less a metaphor than sonship, and that we cannot build arguments on the elaboration of a metaphor, as theology has too often done. In some respects "Motherhood" is a richer metaphor. We are concerned rather with the real content of the experience of God which is suggested by the metaphor of Fatherhood. That content is the creative work of God, if in creation we include the thought of conservation, or rather, if we remind ourselves again that "creation" is also a veiled figure of speech. There is a great divine activity lying outside the Christian sphere and pre-supposed by it, a creative presence of God which gains its full meaning and reveals its full purpose only when the complementary sonship of Jesus shews what fatherhood in God really means, and when the intimacy of the Holy Spirit brings man into the family fellowship of God. Yet the creative work of God is not less a spiritual fact, and does not less involve a personal presence. We may come some day to such an interpretation of Nature as to find God everywhere, in those varying degrees of reality which belong to His manifestation.¹ It is the one God we meet, in Nature and in history, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. That one God is always Spirit, always therefore personal, not less when He sustains the electrons whirling round their nucleus to make a single atom than when He enters

¹ Cf. Traherne, *Centuries of Meditations*, I, 26, where he contrasts the meaning of an acorn to a pig and to an angel, respectively.

the world in Jesus of Nazareth or deigns to dwell in the heart of the humblest believer on Him. The one God is Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier—all within the spirithood of divine personality, and all within the personality of divine Spirit. If we have to read “pneuma” for the ancient *ousia*, then perhaps for the ancient *hypostasis*, the least inadequate word will be *parousia*,¹ so long as we remember that the divine presence means God as He is, and is eternally, and not a transient “mode” of Him.

III. It will be seen that the line of thought we have been following brings us finally to the most inclusive problem of experience, in regard either to philosophical theism or to the Christian doctrine of God, viz. the relation of time to eternity. This is the problem when we try to translate our experience of God into terms of His ultimate being. “The point where mysticism arises in Christian theology is exactly the point at which it inevitably arises in philosophy. When we attempt to rise above personality and to think out the relations between persons, above all, when we try to reach the position of concrete universality from which all persons should be seen to enter as elements into one great system, when we try, that is, to attain to the last great unification, we find ourselves baffled, and have to fall back upon mysticism, the representation of higher things by means of categories which form the true measure of lower things. We have to speak truth in terms which are true, but not true enough.”² Is not this exactly the position of the thoughtful physicist also, whose purely theoretical assumption of an “ether” has for him a symbolic value

¹ For the implication of *dunamis* (power) with *parousia* (presence), see 2 Peter i. 16; Matt. xxiv. 30.

² C. F. D’Arcy, *Idealism and Theology*, p. 252; but should we not say rather “to rise above *individuality*”?

only, justified by its ability to explain certain phenomena? The electronic theory of matter, which gives to the atom the dignity of a miniature sun with its planetary system (in which electrical attraction replaces gravitation), is the theoretical projection of an image framed from the contemplation of the universe. When we dare to speak of the Godhead in terms of inclusive personality or Spirit, we are reversing the process; we are advancing from our inside knowledge of a miniature world of being to its projection into the whole of things or persons. In either case, the justification lies in the degree to which the assumption explains the phenomena; its truth is measured by its relative success in doing this.

The peril of the thinker is to shape Reality to the Procrustean bed of his logical system, which means that he will either lop off some of its living members or stretch it out beyond recognition. The great example of this in regard to our subject is Hegel, whose treatment of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity virtually attenuates it to the illustration of a speculative theory.¹ From this form of danger we are safeguarded at the present time by the strong reaction from mere speculation, and the general recognition that religion has its own rights, which philosophy must respect. We are more ready to admit the existence of irrational elements, such as sin, and to confess that we must always look upwards towards God, and can never gain a position from which we can look downwards on Him. We are perhaps more likely to-day to reject all attempts at philosophic interpretation of religion, and of theological reconstruction, and to acquiesce in either traditionalism or agnostic indifference. But, sooner or later, theology must come to terms with the contemporary philosophy, must think out its issues with the highest

¹ Cf. *Hegels Trinitätslehre*, by Johannes Hessen, p. 37.

categories which philosophy can teach it. Chief amongst these is the relation of time and eternity, the perennial problem of philosophy, the cardinal question for a historical religion.

If we begin by making a sharp antithesis of "appearance" and "reality", we shall probably make the problem insoluble from the outset. We make a better beginning by the assumption that appearance truly reveals the reality of which it is a part. But even so, how is our thought to escape from the bondage of space and time so far as to reach any adequate statement of the eternal meaning of experience? The task seems easier in relation to space than to time, for the temporal succession seems to be integral to our experience in general, and especially to our Christian experience of a developing personality. The moral struggle and the religious aspiration of human life are robbed of their reality when the gain of earth is not heaven's gain too, and that gain seems inseparable from the *succession* of events. It does not, therefore, seem sufficient that we should describe God's view of things as the simultaneous vision of a whole series of events; something has, then, been left out of the series which belongs to its essential reality. Professor Pringle-Pattison reminds us that "the eternal view of a time-process is not the view of all its stages simultaneously, but the view of them as elements or members of a completed purpose."¹ The principle of purposive activity is essential to the Christian idea of God, as it is to the Christian idea of man. We cannot be content to regard

¹ *The Idea of God*, p. 358. The whole chapter, "Time and Eternity", is a valuable and suggestive discussion of the problem, to which the remarks made above are greatly indebted. Contrast Amiel, *Journal*, 9 Juin, 1870: "L'absolu, s'il était esprit, serait encore activité, et c'est l'activité, fille du désir, qui est incompatible avec l'absolu."

the world as the necessary development of the divine Spirit;¹ His purpose must make room for the working out of human purposes in their integrity, if their moral and religious values are to be retained for Him. If there is thus what may be called a temporal element in the divine purpose, it is not less true that there is a timeless element in human purpose—"some temporal interpenetration of first and last."² When we turn from this wholly human relation of the temporal to the eternal, to those activities of the divine purpose in time which we have recognized as creative, redemptive and sanctifying, the eternal element comes into the foreground, and the temporal, though by no means excluded, falls relatively into the background. The unity of the triple purpose is apparent, on the Christian interpretation of life, and our inability to translate this fully into ontological equivalents or presuppositions need not perturb us. It is a dynamic and not a static God we need, and the Gospel of Christ proclaims such a God. The unity of purpose³ in Father, Son and Holy Spirit (to use again the consecrated terms, as we shall always do) implies a unity of personality, which must have its ontological basis, though it be beyond our power to do more than suggest it, by the analogy of human personality. A doctrine of the Godhead can try to explain too much, as well as too little.

¹ As Hegel does; cf. Windelband, *Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, II, p. 322.

² Lloyd Morgan, *Life, Mind and Spirit*, p. 286.

³ Seeberg's doctrine of the volitional activity of the divine personality in the world, the Church and individual persons, seems to move in this direction, though I do not think that either he or anyone else has framed a convincing doctrine. (*Christliche Dogmatik*, I, p. 384). Professor A. E. Taylor's suggestion of "Three Centres of One Activity" (adopted by Mr. Thornton in *Essays Catholic and Critical*, p. 140), does not carry us as far as might seem, for we know nothing of *personal* activity from three centres, except from three individuals, whereas "the Nicene formula, and any modern equivalent, must mean that such relationship exists in God, but *not* as between three individuals".

The lines of the foregoing argument may be summarized as follows :

(1) The intensive approach of the New Testament—Spirit, Son, Father—together with the fact that both the Son and the Father are described in terms of Spirit, affords an ultimate conception of the Godhead as Spirit ; that which is last in revelation becoming first in principle, and that which is initial in experience becoming also final in interpretation.

(2) Spirit is interpretable in terms of personality, our highest category ; our knowledge of God as Spirit must always be based on the assumption that there is real kinship between the human spirit and the divine.

(3) The nature of spirit in ourselves is chiefly seen in its unifying, socializing, transforming and sacramentalizing activities ; all these are suggestive of the nature or activity of God.

(4) The most important analogy is that of the communion with God in which man realizes his own personality in God ; the supreme case of this is in regard to the human personality of Jesus. Individuality is realized by its own moral and religious surrender.

(5) A “social” Trinity taken seriously is pluralistic and destroys the unity of God, but our experience of Spirit does suggest a unity differentiated, though not individualized, in which there is the co-existence of that which our thinking cannot combine ontologically.

(6) Spirit affords the necessary conception of God as dynamic and redemptive. In this connexion, the true equivalent of the temporal in the eternal is not simultaneity but purpose. It is creational, redemptive, and sanctifying purpose that best displays the unity of the Godhead.

The practical value of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is not to be measured by the intellectual results of our inquiry. To keep the mind steadily and reverently fixed on this subject is to open a way for a new experience of God. The interpretation of His ways with us makes possible a new fact, indeed, the ultimate fact—the fellowship of spirit with Spirit. This is the doctrine of the Life-giver, the vitalizing doctrine to all other portions of Christian truth. Whilst it draws its content from them, they draw their vitality from it. He who finds that the familiar truths of the Gospel or the traditional ways of the Church fail to arouse him to devotion and loyalty because of their remoteness from his living interests, does well to ask whether the lacuna in his experience does not arise from the lack of any real understanding of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit.¹ This specially concerns those who are professionally concerned with religion. They are always in danger of a familiarity which breeds, not contempt, but the atrophy of spiritual response. They need always to be climbing above their own professional duties, like Father Hilary in D. G. Rossetti's poem ("World's Worth"), to the roof of their church, where the winds of God blow, and they may inhale for themselves

the breath
Of God in man that warranteth
The inmost, utmost things of faith.

This is the doctrine of a dynamic God. His limitless resources roll in on the shores of human life like the waves of the sea, ceaseless and unnumbered, terrible in wrath, majestic in their encompassing might, mysterious by their far horizon. Yet for all the immensity of that "sea of the Spirit" (a better metaphor than the wind for an

¹ See Introduction, p. 4.

island-race), it does not disdain to enter into our little lives, shaping itself to our pattern, rippling its way into the tiny pools, lifting the pink shells and floating the fronds of weed; nothing is too small for the dynamic activities of the Spirit, as nothing is too great. When the Christian truths are baptized into the consciousness of this, they become what the Gospel is meant to be: the *dunamis* of God unto salvation.¹

This, too, is the doctrine of divine personality, which brings God near in all the intimacies of spiritual companionship. The basal kinship of God and man is lifted to a new level by this growing friendship, this conscious kinship of mind and heart. The inevitable loneliness of life in its inner consciousness here finds its explanation; the truest human friendship cannot replace that of the Father of spirits. As we enter more and more into the experience of what this means, the externality of religion is transfigured into a new relation. Religion is no longer a wearisome burden, a load for weary beasts,² something to be protected, and if possible saved from the encroachments of other interests. Religion becomes faith in a Burden-bearer, Who carries us and saves us, a God Whom no imagery can ever portray, because He is Spirit.

At an earlier stage, we found the salient marks of the human spirit's activity to be four—it lived by unifying, socializing, transforming, and sacramentalizing life. Practically all that has been said of the work and personality of the Holy Spirit in this book is the expansion of those attributes in relation to the Spirit of God, like unto our spirits, though so far beyond our comprehension. The God of Christian faith is Himself a unity, Who reveals Himself in unifying the universe, both in nature

¹ Romans I. 16.

² Isa. XLVI. 1-4.

and in grace—One God, not three—but God Who is Spirit, and Whose unities are always inclusive and recapitulatory, giving as they receive. We have seen that the essential work of the Holy Spirit is fellowship. Life in the Spirit does not mean simply more of life, it means new life, and the primary content of that new life is in a new relation to other persons, a new ethical relation, which is best expressed in the Spirit of the Cross of Christ. The actual world we know is a world half-spoiled in the making—whatever be the ultimate mystery of evil, physical and moral. Yet we see a miracle of transformation wrought in the meaning of things by the attitude of individual spirits, and we dare to believe in an ultimate transformation of the meaning of it all by the Spirit of God—and what of things is left at last in a spiritual universe, save their meaning and practical outcome for spirits? Last of all, we may come back from these studies, that have shewn horizons of speculation whither we cannot pass, to the homely ways of common life with a new conviction that they are sacramental to Spirit :

—well-spent toilsome days,—
And natural life, refined by honest love,
And sweet unselfish liturgies of home,
Heaven's will, borne onward by obedient souls,
Careless of what may come.¹

“Careless of what may come”—because the care to do God's will can lighten every other care, and because the fruit of the Spirit, given to those who obey God, is love, joy, peace.

¹ Lewis Morris, “The Wanderer.”

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